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WHY ARKANSAS ACT 710 WAS UPHELD, AND
WILL BE AGAIN
Mark Goldfeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is
putting on its shoes.
— ironically, not Mark Twain
The recent Eighth Circuit ruling in Arkansas Times LP v.
Waldrip1, the lawsuit revolving around an Arkansas antidiscrimination bill, has led to a lot of (at best) confusion or (at
worst) purposeful obfuscation by people unwilling or unable to
differentiate between procedural issues and the constitutional
merits of a case.2 In other words, reports of the bill’s death have
been very much exaggerated.3
Despite the fact that the court’s narrow ruling did not even
strike down the bill in Arkansas, let alone set a precedent for other
similar bills, there are those who are concerned that the Arkansas
Times decision somehow calls into question legislative action in

* Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. is the Director of the National Jewish Advocacy Center, a
Member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, counsel for Hillels of Georgia,
and a contributor at the MirYam Institute. He also served as the founding Editor of the
Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism. The author wishes to thank
Danielle Park, Miles Terry, Marc Greendorfer, and Gadi Dotz for their reviews and
assistance, and a special thanks to Sasha Volokh for his ever-helpful critiques.
1. 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (8th Cir. June
10, 2021) (No. 19-01378).
2. See e.g., Elliot Setzer, Eighth Circuit Strikes Down Arkansas’s Anti-BDS Law,
LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/36TX-HAAU] (falsely claiming that the Eighth
Circuit struck down the bill, when in fact all it did was remand the case for further
proceedings).
3. See Sean Savage, Advocates See Federal Court Decision on Arkansas Anti-BDS Law
‘Disappointment,’ Not Setback, JEWISH NEWS SYNDICATE (Feb. 16, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/C8BW-CSWP].
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other states across the country.4 In order to separate fact from
fiction and clarify the constitutional concerns that are still very
relevant in a case that is still very much alive, this Article will
recap what has already actually happened and why, explain what
is still being decided, and then forecast what is likely to happen
in the future of this case.
II. BACKGROUND
“In 2017, Arkansas enacted Arkansas Act 710, titled ‘An Act
to Prohibit Public Entities from Contracting with and Investing in
Companies That Boycott Israel; and for Other Purposes.’”5 Under
this law, state entities are prohibited from contracting on ordinary
terms with companies that boycott the State of Israel.6
The majority of states in the United States of America (thirty
as of the date of this writing) have adopted similar bills, and the
motivation behind them was the rise of the antisemitic Boycott,
Divestment, and Sanctions (“BDS”) Movement, which “operates
as a coordinated, sophisticated effort to disrupt the economic and
financial stability of the state of Israel,”7 persons conducting
business in and with Israel,8 and individuals that the movement
deems to be too closely affiliated with Israel in some way.9
It is the longstanding policy of the United States to oppose
discriminatory boycotts against Israel; ever since President Carter
4. See e.g., Aaron Terr, Eighth Circuit: Arkansas Anti-BDS Law Violates First
Amendment, FIRE: NEWSDESK (Feb. 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/AW27-6UWM].
5. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 458; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-503 (2017).
6. § 25-1-503(a).
7. See OMAR BARGHOUTI, BDS: BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS: THE GLOBAL
STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS 223 (2011); see also Bob Unruh, Hate-Israel
Movement Flames Out as Investments Rise, WORLD NOT DAILY (June 4, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/4N26-TXQX].
8. GHADA AGEEL, APARTHEID IN PALESTINE: HARD LAWS AND HARDER
EXPERIENCES 100 (Joanne Muzak ed., 2016).
9. As long as those people do not also make useful things that the boycotters want, like
Covid-19 vaccines. Marcy Oster, BDS Founder: Israel-Invented Virus Vaccine Would Be
OK for Boycotters to Use, TIMES ISR. (Apr. 7, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3U9V-PPBN]; see
also Karl Vick, This Is Why It’s Hard to Boycott Israel, TIME (June 5, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/D94K-KJAR] (discussing how the Israel-boycott-movement began with a
targeted boycott of items produced on the West Bank, but the BDS movement has expanded
to a boycott of all things produced in Israel); Boycott Israel Products, BOYCOTT ISR. TODAY
(Sept. 8, 2014), [https://perma.cc/39N3-R7WD] (advocating for a boycott of Israeli and
Jewish products that support Israel directly or indirectly no matter where produced).
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signed the anti-boycott amendments to the Export Administration
Act in 1977,10 every single Congress and administration has
affirmed it.11 All that Arkansas Act 710 and the rest of the socalled anti-BDS bills really do is implement that federal policy by
saying that if you want a particular state to do business with you,
you need to abide by that state’s policies (reflective of federal
policies) related to sound and fair business practices. This
includes a requirement to abide by the state’s anti-discrimination
rules.
In theory this should not be controversial. “The Supreme
Court has consistently found that state and federal antidiscrimination laws that relate to race, religion, color, and
national origin do not violate the highest level of First
Amendment protections.”12 States “all have a compelling interest
in preventing invidious discrimination,” and they are free to
implement “that compelling interest by imposing conduct-based

10. Statement by President Carter upon the Signing of Anti-Boycott Legislation, ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., [https://perma.cc/2PDQ-DD2X] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing Statement].
11. See Marc A. Greendorfer, The BDS Movement: That Which We Call a Foreign
Boycott, by Any Other Name, Is Still Illegal, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2017)
(“Though the EAA Anti-Boycott Law has statutorily lapsed by its own terms pursuant to its
sunset provision, as the Congressional Research Service Report states, ‘its provisions are
continued under the authorization granted to the President in the National Emergencies Act
and the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, most recently under Executive
Order 13222 signed August 17, 2001.’”) (quoting MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL33961, ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 6 n.18 (2017)). President Carter’s signing
statement itself was quite telling:
For many months I have spoken strongly on the need for legislation to outlaw
secondary and tertiary boycotts and discrimination against American
businessmen on religious or national grounds . . . . My concern about foreign
boycotts stemmed, of course, from our special relationship with Israel, as well
as from the economic, military and security needs of both our countries. But
the issue also goes to the very heart of free trade among all nations . . . . The
bill seeks instead to end the divisive effects on American life of foreign boycott
[sic] aimed at Jewish members of our society. If we allow such a precedent to
become established, we open the door to similar action against any ethnic,
religious, or racial group in America.
President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing Statement, supra note 10.
12. Marc A. Greendorfer, Boycotting the Boycotters: Turnabout is Fair Play Under
the Commerce Clause and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV.
29, 61 & n.135 (2018) (first citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 549 (1987); then citing Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2015);
and then citing Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697-98 (2010)).
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regulations on government contractors.”13 In fact, liberal
organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
have been publicly supportive of this idea on a regular basis and
in a variety of contexts.14 The only difference here appears to be
the relative popularity of the targets of the discriminatory action
that the government is seeking to protect against. In this case (as
applied), more often than not the people being discriminated
against are Jewish people and those who support the Jewish
state.15 “Act 710’s text makes clear the Arkansas General
Assembly’s antidiscrimination goals. As [the legislature] found,
boycotts of Israel, which are ‘discriminatory decisions,’ are
rooted in animus towards ‘the Jewish people.’”16
13. Brief of States of Arizona & Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 2526871,
at *1.
14. See e.g., Heather L. Weaver & Daniel Mach, A New String of State Bills Could
Give Religious Organizations Blanket Immunity from Any Wrongdoing, ACLU: NEWS &
COMMENT. (Mar. 20, 2021), [https://perma.cc/2J63-563P] (arguing that states should be free
to decide whom they contract with, otherwise the law could “make the government an
accomplice to discrimination. For example, the bills could prohibit the State from denying
State contracts, licenses, and certifications, as well as tax exemptions based on religious
organizations’ exercise of their faiths. Under these provisions, the State could be required
to give government contracts to groups like the KKK, which claim to be religiously based,
or organizations that claim a religious right to discriminate against certain social-services
beneficiaries.”).
15. See David Bernstein, The ACLU’s Shameful Role in Promoting Antisemitism,
REASON (Mar. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/6P26-79TX] (noting how, when it comes to the
BDS movement, the ACLU is surprisingly willing to engage in some light antisemitism,
including the use of classic antisemitic tropes, like calling the anti-discrimination provisions
“loyalty oath[s]” to the State of Israel). In his words:
This is complete nonsense. Contractors certifying that their businesses don’t
boycott Israel-related entities is no more a “loyalty oath” to Israel than
certifying that they don’t refuse to deal with black or gay or women-owned
business, or or [sic] that they will deal only with unionized businesses, is a
“loyalty oath” to blacks, gays, women, or unions. Contractors who sign antiboycott certifications are free to boycott Israel and related entities in their
personal lives, and they and their businesses are free to donate to anti-Israel
candidates and causes, and even to publicly advocate for BDS.
Id.
16. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir.
2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 2407954, at *2; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(2)(3) (2017) (noting that discriminatory boycotts of Israel predated even its official declaration
of independence). Other states have been even more explicit on the subject. See, e.g.,
Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 46 (citing Act of Sept. 24, 2016, §§ 1(f), (j), 2016 Cal. Stat.
4023, 4025 (West 2016) (codified at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 2010 historical and statutory
notes)).
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To be clear, while it is not the case that all BDS supporters
are antisemitic, the movement itself is demonstrably so, and that
is the relevant fact for a constitutional analysis.17 The BDS
campaign “is predicated on the claim that Israel is nothing more
than a colonial and racist initiative undertaken by Jews and
explicitly states that the State of Israel is a racist, illegitimate
entity that should not exist.”18 Its leaders openly and repeatedly
deny the Jewish people’s right to self-determination and call for
the destruction of their homeland.19 Per the internationally
recognized International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
(“IHRA”) definition of antisemitism, that alone is unacceptable
antisemitism,20 but it is also true that the nonprofit umbrella group
for U.S.-based BDS organizations funnels money to terrorist
organizations that specialize in killing Jews and that call for
Jewish genocide;21 that more than thirty22 of the BDS National
Committee’s leaders are actual violent terrorists;23 and that the

17. Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 33.
18. Marc A. Greendorfer, Discrimination as a Business Policy: The Misuse and Abuse
of Corporate Social Responsibility Programs, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 307, 358 (2020) (citing
GRASSROOTS PALESTINIAN ANTI-APARTHEID WALL CAMPAIGN, TOWARDS A GLOBAL
MOVEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR TODAY’S ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVISM, (2007),
[https://perma.cc/TCT5-LQNV] [hereinafter TOWARDS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT]). In
relation to the colonialist claim, Greendorfer also notes the fact that this is a complete
inversion of history: Jews are the indigenous people of the land and are simply reclaiming
their historic homeland and asserting their inherent right to self-determination. Greendorfer,
supra note 11, at 5, 85.
19. See, e.g., Ali Abunimah, Finkelstein, BDS and the Destruction of Israel, AL
JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2012), [https://perma.cc/TX4R-8AA4] (quoting an interview with
Norman Finkelstein); Rachel Avraham, Goal of the BDS Movement: Delegitimize Israel,
UNITED WITH ISR. (July 10, 2013), [https://perma.cc/M4HY-L4UP]; HAROLD BRACKMAN,
SIMON WIESENTHAL CTR., BOYCOTT DIVESTMENT SANCTIONS (BDS) AGAINST ISRAEL:
AN ANTI-SEMITIC, ANTI-PEACE POISON PILL 1-3 (2013).
20. See Ahmed Shaheed, Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, ¶¶ 18, 50,
U.N. Doc. A/74/358 (Sept. 20, 2019) (noting with concern the claim “that the objectives,
activities and effects of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement are fundamentally
antisemitic” under the IHRA’s internationally accepted standard definition of antisemitism).
21. Armin Rosen & Liel Leibovitz, BDS Umbrella Group Linked to Palestinian
Terrorist Organizations, TABLET (June 1, 2018), [https://perma.cc/P3WK-8H52].
22. Terrorists in Suits: The Ties Between NGOs Promoting BDS and Terrorist
Organizations, STATE OF ISR. (Feb. 2019), [https://perma.cc/Z4U7-D6PW] (detailing
exposed information of more than thirty individuals who are BDS leaders and have personal
involvement in actual terrorism).
23. Emily Jones, ‘Terrorists in Suits’: Senior Leaders of Anti-Israel BDS Groups Tied
to Palestinian Terror, CBN NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9QNN-TMA6].
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antisemitism some BDS activists spout24 often breaks through the
“non-violent” veil,25 leading to people, including innocent Jewish
(not Israeli) American citizens getting hurt.26 Our government is,
of course, aware of these connections; in 2016 for example,
Congress heard testimony from former United States Department
of the Treasury counterterrorism analyst Dr. Jonathan Schanzer
that: “[i]n the case of three organizations that were designated,
shut down, or held civilly liable for providing material support to
the terrorist organization Hamas, a significant contingent of their
former leadership appears to have pivoted to leadership positions
within the American BDS campaign.”27
This is also not in any way a partisan issue: both the
Republican and Democratic parties have consistently denounced
BDS in their platforms.28 Nor is it only a federal issue; in 2017,
the governors of all fifty states signed onto a statement affirming
24. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, After Threat of Violence, Calls to Fire RA, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Aug. 1, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6L42-F2VG] (stating that a college student who was
associated with a student organization which supports BDS sought to physically fight
Zionists on campus).
25. Rachel Frommer, British Jewish Leaders Outraged by London University AntiIsrael Protest Which Required Police Intervention, ALGEMEINER (Oct. 28, 2016, 4:37 PM),
[https://perma.cc/JNH2-T3UD].
26. DAN DIKER & JAMIE BERK, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFS., STUDENTS FOR
JUSTICE IN PALESTINE UNMASKED: TERROR LINKS, VIOLENCE, BIGOTRY, AND
INTIMIDATION ON US CAMPUSES 5, 28 (2018), [https://perma.cc/6NYS-TSLK].
27. Israel Imperiled: Threats to the Jewish State: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, & Trade & the Subcomm. on the Middle E. & N. Afr. of the
H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 114th Cong. 23 (2016) (statement of Dr. Jonathan Schanzer,
Vice President of Rsch., Found. for Def. of Democracies); see also Israel, the Palestinians,
& the United Nations: Challenges for the New Admin.: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Middle E. & N. Afr. and the Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Hum. Rts., & Int’l
Orgs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 115th Cong. 42-43 (2017) (statement of Dr.
Johnathon Schanzer, Vice President of Rsch., Found. For Def. of Democracies):
[The Palestinian National Fund] reportedly pays the salaries of the [Palestine
Liberation Organization’s (“PLO”)] members, as well as students, who
received tens of millions of dollars in support of BDS activities each year . . .
. PLO operatives in Washington, DC are reportedly involved in coordinating
the activities of Palestinian students in the U.S. who receive funds from the
PLO to engage in BDS activism. This, of course, suggests that the BDS
movement is not a grassroots activist movement, but rather one that is heavily
influenced by PLO-sponsored persons.
28. See, e.g., Republican Platform 2016, GOP (2016), [https://perma.cc/U9AEDNKA]; 2016 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (2016),
[https://perma.cc/S6Z8-Q6YE]; 2020 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L
CONVENTION (August 18, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S7VL-MB9S].
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their opposition to BDS, noting that “[t]he goals of the BDS
movement are antithetical to our values and the values of our
respective states[,]” and reiterating that BDS’s “single-minded
focus on the Jewish State raises serious questions about its
motivations and intentions.”29
And so, it is not surprising that, in response to the BDS
movement, a majority of states have enacted their own “anti-BDS
bills,”30 which mirror the federal anti-boycott provisions and seek
to prevent American citizens and businesses from being forced to
take sides in a foreign conflict, and to take part in actions (such as
national origin discrimination) which are repugnant to American
values and traditions.31
Just so that there is no confusion: none of the state “antiBDS” laws ban or punish speech that is critical of Israel; none of
the state laws target advocacy for Palestinian rights; and none of
the state laws stop anyone or any business from boycotting Israel.
The laws simply say that if you do choose to boycott Israel in a
discriminatory manner, the State can choose not to do business
with you.
Again, there should be nothing controversial with a state
simply choosing how to spend its dollars.32 Government
29. Governors United Against BDS, AM. JEWISH COMM., [https://perma.cc/M9MX98QY] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
30. Some of which are modeled in spirit after the 1977 amendments to the Export
Administration Act. See, e.g., Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9552, 91 Stat. 235 [hereinafter EAA of 1977]; Impact of the Boycott, Divestment, & Sanctions
Movement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich); Ribicoff Amendment
to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 999); Anti-Semitism: State Anti-BDS Legislation, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
[https://perma.cc/H9HJ-NWNS] (last visited Nov. 25, 2021).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)).
32. This is usually not a disputed point, and it applies in a variety of areas. For
example, there is a market participant exception to the Commerce Clause that allows a state
to make commercial purchasing decisions to comport with the interests of the state, even if
that decision may otherwise appear to be partisan in some way. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1980). While Act 710 is not a Commerce Clause case, the market
participant exception certainly reinforces the idea that states are not always prohibited from
acting in their own interests when it comes to commercial relations. If this were not the case,
then states like California would not be allowed to do what they do when acting as a market
participant for state-sponsored travel by state employees, i.e., prohibiting travel to states or
localities that have policies or laws that California’s legislators find to be discriminatory,
such as states that refuse to fully support LGBTQ activism. See Rebecca Beitsch, Supposedly
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spending (especially with accompanying legislative findings) in
this context is government speech, and “as a general matter, when
the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to
espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents
its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.”33 In fact,
the Supreme Court has continually refused “[t]o hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative
goals.”34 In the case of Arkansas Act 710 and all similar statutes,
the government does not even seek to fund a controversial
program, it merely seeks not to fund a program that
discriminates.35 While people remain free to engage in hateful
actions, that does not make them less hateful, nor does it mean
that the State must agree to subsidize those actions.36 “To argue
otherwise would be to suggest that [a] state is constitutionally
obligated to support the BDS [M]ovement, which is not only
irrational but also has no basis in law.”37
In addition to protecting citizens from coercion and
protecting the government from involving itself in discriminatory
Symbolic, State Travel Bans Have Real Bite, PEW (Aug. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/C34V8GE6] (detailing the negative economic impact imposed on some states by six other states,
including California, by utilizing the market participant exception to further their interests).
Of course, in that case the ACLU (which filed against Act 710 here) openly supported the
choice that California made not to engage with those whom they consider to be acting in a
discriminatory fashion. See Carma Hassan, California Adds 4 States to Travel Ban for Laws
It Says Discriminate against LGBTQ Community, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (June 23, 2017,
5:50 PM), [https://perma.cc/KZL5-E6FH].
33. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 208 (2015);
see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that a city’s
decision to reject, or accept, certain monuments is a form of government speech).
34. Walker, 576 U.S. at 208 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
35. See Mark Goldfeder, Stop Defending Discrimination: Anti-Boycott, Divestment,
and Sanctions Statutes Are Fully Constitutional, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 207, 219 (2018).
36. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (“[I]nvidious private
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected
by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470
(1973)); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip,
988 F.3d 453, 467 (8th Cir. 2021).
37. Andrew Cuomo, If You Boycott Israel, New York State Will Boycott You, WASH.
POST (June 10, 2016), [https://perma.cc/727P-CW9X].
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practices, anti-BDS bills also protect the economic interests of the
United States, which could be detrimentally impacted by efforts
to disrupt the economic stability of a close ally,38 as well the
interests of each of the individual states themselves. Arkansas,
for example, does almost $43,000,000 a year worth of trade with
Israel,39 and has longstanding binational foundation grants that it
shares with Israel in the areas of Agricultural Research and
Development; Science and Technology; and Industrial Research
and Development.40 And so aside from the fact that supporting
BDS is morally wrong, supporting those who would boycott
Israel is also a bad business decision for the United States of
America, and leading politicians of both major political parties
have consistently affirmed this.41
As it relates to this point, on February 24, 2016, President
Barack Obama signed the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 into law.42 The Act promotes United
States–Israel relations by discouraging cooperation with entities
that participate in boycott, divestment, and sanctions movements
against Israel, and requires regular reporting on such entities.43
As the President explained, in no uncertain terms, “I have directed
my administration to strongly oppose boycotts, divestment
campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel.”44 Several
provisions in the Act bear repeating—for example, the
“[s]tatements of policy,” say that Congress:
(1) supports the strengthening of economic cooperation
between the United States and Israel and recognizes the
tremendous strategic, economic, and technological value of
cooperation with Israel;
....

38. Michael Eisenstadt & David Pollock, Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli
Alliance Is Good for America, WASH. INST. (Nov. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/7NV4-JKB5].
39. State-to-State Cooperation: Arkansas and Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
[https://perma.cc/DJT9-6CSE] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
40. Id.
41. See Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 210–12.
42. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130
Stat. 127 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4456 (2016)).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 4452(a)-(b), (d).
44. Statement on Signing the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015,
2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 98 (Feb. 24, 2016).
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(4) opposes politically motivated actions that penalize or
otherwise limit commercial relations specifically with Israel,
such as boycotts of, divestment from, or sanctions against
Israel[.]45

Based on these and other similar (and consistent)
Congressional findings over the decades,46 the Arkansas
legislature found in the passing of Act 710 that:
(4) It is the public policy of the United States, as enshrined
in several federal acts, to oppose boycotts against Israel, and
. . . Congress has concluded as a matter of national trade
policy that cooperation with Israel materially benefits
United States companies and improves American
competitiveness;
(5) Israel in particular is known for its dynamic and
innovative approach in many business sectors, and therefore
a company’s decision to discriminate against Israel, Israeli
entities, or entities that do business with or in Israel, is an
unsound business practice, making the company an unduly
risky contracting partner or vehicle for investment; and
(6) Arkansas seeks to act to implement Congress’s
announced policy of “examining a company’s promotion or
compliance with unsanctioned boycotts, divestment from, or
sanctions against Israel as part of its consideration in
awarding grants and contracts and supports the divestment
of state assets from companies that support or promote
actions to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel.”47

For the purposes of the statute, the term “boycott of Israel”
means:
[E]ngaging in refusals to deal, terminating business
activities, or other actions that are intended to limit
commercial relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing
business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories, in a
discriminatory manner.48

45. 19 U.S.C. § 4452(b)(1), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
46. See e.g., EAA of 1977, supra note 30; President Carter Anti-Boycott Signing
Statement, supra note 10.
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501 (2017) (emphasis added).
48. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Note that a decision not to engage in
business with Israel for non-discriminatory reasons is perfectly fine.
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Operationally, the Act requires entities who wish to do
business with the State of Arkansas to sign a certification stating
that they are not currently boycotting Israel as defined by the Act,
and do not intend to boycott Israel for the duration of the
contract.49 It is worth reiterating that the law only applies to
discriminatory boycotts, and non-discriminatory boycotts are not
subject to the certification requirement.50 If a party was, for
example, boycotting all Middle East countries, or all companies
that work with militaries, or all companies that provide tech for
security forces, without regard to the country of origin, that would
not be a discriminatory boycott under the Act. A party could sign
the certification and if ever asked, simply show that the boycott
was not discriminatory. Regardless, even if a company is not
willing to sign such a statement, it can still do business with the
State if its price comes in at 20% less than the lowest certifying
business,51 an amount the legislature has deemed enough to make
up for the greater inherent risk involved in doing business with a
company that makes political rather than economically sound
business decisions.
III. THE LAWSUIT
The Arkansas Times is a free weekly newspaper that has
never actually boycotted Israel. Nevertheless, in October 2018,
the paper decided to file a test case against Act 710, challenging
it on the grounds that it conditioned State contracts “on the
unconstitutional suppression . . . of protected speech[,]”52 and
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, based on alleged
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It argued
“that the law impermissibly compels speech regarding
contractors’ political beliefs, association, and expression[,]” and
that it imposes an unconstitutional condition on funding by
impermissibly restricting “state contractors from engaging in
protected First Amendment activities, including boycott
49. § 25-1-503(a)(1).
50. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i).
51. § 25-1-503(b)(1).
52. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th
Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378).
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participation and boycott-related speech, without a legitimate
justification.”53
It was especially surprising and disheartening that liberal
groups like the ACLU, which filed on behalf of the Arkansas
Times, came out in support of the plaintiffs and argued against
the general rule that commercial decisions to buy or not to buy
are not protected by the First Amendment.54 It is surprising
because, as noted above, they are arguing against literally the very
same rule that they have championed publicly and consistently in
other contexts when it better suited their ideological leanings.55
For example, upon rereading certain passages in the brief that the
ACLU filed in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,56 it is hard to find a better word to describe its
position here in the Arkansas case than hypocritical:
The Bakery is not the first business to claim a First
Amendment right to violate an antidiscrimination law . . . .
This Court has never accepted that premise, and has, instead,
affirmed repeatedly the government’s ability to prohibit
discriminatory conduct over the freedom of expression,
association, and religion objections of entities ranging from
law firms[;] . . . to private schools, and universities; to
membership organizations open to the public; to restaurants,
and newspapers. . . . “The Constitution does not guarantee
a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those
with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions,
without restraint from the State.”57

53. Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 621 (E.D. Ark. 2019) rev’d and
remanded, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021).
54. Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip, ACLU, [https://perma.cc/5LF3-D68B] (May 9,
2019).
55. This is not entirely surprising. See Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats From
Free Expression, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/N2EM-6FCH] (noting the
ACLU’s 2018 guidelines assertion that case selection should involve an assessment of
whether it will advance the goals of those “whose views are contrary to our values . . . [i]n
selecting speech cases to defend, the ACLU will . . . balance the ‘impact of the proposed
speech and the impact of its suppression’”).
56. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 14-15, Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
57. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945); Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976), Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 60304 (1983); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987);
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The ACLU was also clear that this was in fact the general
rule for all commercial activity and all kinds of discrimination,
and was not somehow case specific:
While the particular facts of this case involve a bakery
refusing to sell a cake for the wedding reception of a samesex couple, the implications of the . . . arguments are not
limited to sexual orientation discrimination or weddings . . .
[a]nd, because “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes,” a
wide range of businesses could claim a First Amendment
exemption from generally applicable regulations of
commercial conduct. . . . To recognize either of the Bakery’s
asserted First Amendment objections would run counter to
the basic principle, reflected in over a century of public
accommodation laws, that all people, regardless of status,
should be able to receive equal service in American
commercial life.
....
The State’s prohibition against discrimination in the sale of
goods and services to the public is a regulation of
commercial conduct that affects expression only incidentally
. . . [b]usinesses, the court has held, have “no constitutional
right . . . to discriminate.”58

As several prominent amicus curiae in this case have already
pointed out, this idea is in fact “the foundation of the wide range
of antidiscrimination laws, public accommodation laws, and
common carrier laws throughout the nation.”59
It is unclear why the ACLU would change its position in this
case. Charitably, perhaps it is because it is not aware that the BDS
movement is actually antisemitic, and so it thinks that states do
not have a compelling interest in combatting it with antidiscrimination laws. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the
statements of the movement’s leaders, and its founding

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402-03 n.5 (1968) (per curiam); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
58. Brief for Respondents, supra note 56, at 2-15.
59. Brief of Profs. Michael C. Dorf et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees at 1, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2019
WL 2488957.
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documents, that line of thinking is both wrong on its face and
wrong as applied.
BDS leaders often use classic antisemitic tropes to make
their arguments “including, but not limited to, false accusations
of Jewish conspiracies; blood libels; portraying Jews ( . . . not just
Israelis but caricatures of religious Jews) as Satanic, demonic,
and evil (at times even using actual Nazi propaganda), accusing
Jews of dual loyalty, and engaging in Holocaust denial and
Holocaust inversion.”60 In terms of its practical effect, the BDS
movement discriminates against Jewish people in an absurdly
clear and disproportionate manner: 95% of American Jews
support the State of Israel61 which is the definition of Zionism that
BDS targets. A movement that discriminates against 95% of a
group based on its members’ shared ethnic beliefs is
discriminatory toward that group, and a state has the right not to
subsidize or further that movement’s discriminatory goals.
But even if the BDS movement was not generally
antisemitic, that would also be irrelevant for the purposes of this
statute and for the proper disposition of this case. The statutes in
question, including the Arkansas statute, do not target BDS
supporters, or even the BDS movement as a whole;62 by definition
the law in question (and BDS laws and anti-discrimination laws
generally) only affect discriminatory conduct in commercial
activity, i.e., when the action taken is based on race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.63 In this case, the Act does
not affect decisions not to deal with Israel that are based on
economic reasons, or the specific conduct of a person or firm.
The only way we could possibly know that a company’s buying
decisions were based on discriminatory reasons and not economic
60. See Mark Goldfeder, The Danger of Defining Your Own Terms: Responding to the
Harvard Law Review on Antidiscrimination Law and the Movement for Palestinian
Rights, 3.2 J. CONTEMP. ANTISEMITISM 141, 143 (2020). It should also be obvious that
saying Jews are not a people while calling for the destruction of the world’s lone Jewish
state, along with the ethnic cleansing and/or the genocidal extermination of its millions of
Jewish inhabitants, is also antisemitic.
61. Frank Newport, American Jews, Politics and Israel, GALLUP (Aug. 27, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/74VQ-2AWZ].
62. It is also worth highlighting that while the BDS movement is antisemitic, that is not
a criticism of general Palestinian rights work and advocacy. See Goldfeder, supra note 60,
at 141, 143.
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(3) (2017).
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ones would be if it told us, in accompanying speech, that it was
taking this action in order to discriminate. Certainly, we should
all be able to agree that when BDS, by admission, involves nonexpressive discriminatory conduct, it can and should be regulated
by anti-discrimination law.64
Now to be fair, the truth is that a casual observer (not the
lawyers at the ACLU) might be excused for some confusion in
this case because of the use of the term “boycott” in the statute.
The term “boycott” could, in some contexts, refer to the kinds of
boycott activities that are protected by the First Amendment. The
fact is though that none of the state laws in question, including
Arkansas Act 710, regulate that kind of expressive boycott
activity, and indeed they could not legally do so.
As the Supreme Court ruled in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,65 a case about a primary boycott of white-owned
businesses to protest racial discrimination in Mississippi,66 “[t]he
right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify
a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and
to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.”67 No
one involved in the Arkansas case (or with any of the state antiBDS bills for that matter) in any way disagrees with that principle.
The boycott in Claiborne involved a range of First
Amendment protected activities, including speeches, picketing,
the sending of telegrams and the publication of lists, etc.68
“Crucially, Claiborne did not ‘address purchasing decisions or

64. The argument that an individual’s refusal to deal, or his purchasing decisions, when
taken in connection with a larger social movement, do become inherently expressive is also
unpersuasive. “Such an argument is foreclosed by FAIR, as individual law schools were
effectively boycotting military recruiters as part of a larger protest against the Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell policy.” Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 624 (E.D. Ark. 2019);
see Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc. (‘‘FAIR’’), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
65. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
66. Id. at 889. A boycott by those whose constitutional rights were being infringed
upon and against those who were infringing upon those rights, as opposed to a secondary
political boycott directed towards foreign governments against longstanding U.S. policy. See
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1982).
67. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 914.
68. See id. at 889, 902, 907.
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other non-expressive conduct.’”69 As former Solicitor General
Paul Clement has explained, what Claiborne did was affirm that
those elements of a boycott that do involve protected First
Amendment activity do not lose that protection simply because
they are accompanied by elements that are not expressive.70 But
“[a]t no point did the Court suggest that the mere act of refusing
to deal—accompanied by no protected conduct like speech or
picketing—constitutes ‘inherently expressive’ conduct” entitled
to First Amendment protection.71
The Court in Claiborne also did not address whether the First
Amendment would protect a refusal to deal with someone that is
forbidden under state anti-discrimination law because at the time
there were no laws in Mississippi that prohibited racial
discrimination. “Nor was the boycott banned by general
prohibitions on ‘concerted refusal to deal,’ ‘secondary boycotts,’
or ‘restraint[s] of trade[]’ . . . . Indeed, Claiborne Hardware
expressly reserved the question whether a boycott ‘designed to
secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a valid state law’ is
constitutionally protected.”72
That question was left open by Claiborne but conclusively
resolved by the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR: to the extent
that such a boycott involves non-expressive activity, that activity
is not protected.73

69. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 625 (quoting Jordahl v. Brnovich, Case No. 1816896, Dkt. No. 26 slip op. at 5 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018) (Ikuta, J., dissenting)).
70. Brief for Amicus Curiae Christians United for Israel in Support of DefendantAppellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453
(8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-1378), 2021 WL 1603995.
71. Id.
72. Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 59, at 7 (quoting Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 891 n.7, 894, 915). “The holding of Claiborne is thus consistent
with the principle set forth just six years before in Runyon v. McCrary: Though people and
institutions have a right to advocate for discrimination . . . ‘it does not follow that the practice
of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle.’”
Id. at 7-8 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)).
73. 547 U.S. 47, 65-66 (2006). Rumsfeld involved law schools engaged in a boycott
of military recruiters to protest the military’s then-extant “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy. See
id. at 52. The Court held that such conduct was “not inherently expressive” because the
actions “were expressive only because the law schools accompanied their conduct with
speech explaining it.” Id. at 66; Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 623. Otherwise, no one
would know for sure why the recruiters were not there. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
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In addition, the BDS movement is fairly open74 about the
fact that, as opposed to the primary boycott activity in Claiborne,
for the most part, BDS activities take the form of secondary and
tertiary boycotts.75 A primary boycott is generally one in which
the boycotter is acting against the entity that it has a grievance
with; a secondary boycott is one in which the party boycotting an
entity has a goal of affecting a third party, rather than the
boycotted entity. A tertiary boycott is one in which the goal is to
affect a fourth party, who supports the third party supporting the
boycotted entity.76 BDS activists say that their issue is with the
State of Israel, but the bulk of their targets are not the government
of Israel, but rather companies doing business in or with Israel (a
secondary boycott) and the people that support them (a tertiary
boycott). Unlike in Claiborne, “[t]he BDS supporters are not
trying to protect their own constitutional rights[]” from those who
are oppressing them; “they are trying to use commerce to inflict
harm on a foreign nation[.]”77 “In both Claiborne and
International Longshoremen’s Association,78 the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that secondary boycotts are not accorded the
same types of protections under the First Amendment as primary
boycotts.”79 In fact, the Court in Longshoremen actually upheld
a law regulating boycott activity directed at a matter covered by
U.S. foreign policy, “conclud[ing] that boycotts that impede
United States commerce and are political protests intended to
punish foreign nations for their offshore conduct may [in fact] be
limited by the government.”80
74. See, e.g., TOWARDS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT, supra note 18.
75. See Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 223-31.
76. See generally Presentation by the Office of Antiboycott Compliance in the Bureau
of Industry and Security in the U.S Department of Commerce, [https://perma.cc/EA7YQ6CK].
77. Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 224.
78. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982); Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1982).
79. See Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 58 (first citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
912 (“Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited . . . .”); then
citing Longshoremen, 456 U.S. at 226-27 n.123 (“holding that a law prohibiting secondary
boycotts did not violate the First Amendment and stating, ‘[i]t would seem even clearer that
conduct designed not to communicate, but to coerce, merits still less consideration under the
First Amendment.’”)).
80. Goldfeder, supra note 35, at 229 (emphasis added) (citing Longshoremen, 456 U.S.
at 221).
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Of course, BDS activists like to conflate protected and
unprotected activities,81 which is exactly why the state had to
clarify that the mere use of the term boycott “to refer to one’s
commercial choices does not create a First Amendment right to
contract, or not to contract.”82 The clear distinction between
expressive and non-expressive “boycott” activity is precisely why
the legislature in Arkansas defined the term “boycott” in the
statute to only refer to a company’s non-expressive commercial
choices.83 Contractors with the State remain absolutely free to
engage in any and all expressive boycott activity against Israel.
The Arkansas Times may, for example, “send representatives to
meetings, speeches, and picketing events in opposition to Israel’s
81. Indeed, the ACLU relied extensively on a cherrypicked recitation of Claiborne in
briefing this case. See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362
F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 19-1378), 2019 WL 1756930; Appellant’s Reply
Brief, Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 19-1378), 2019
WL 3208596.
82. Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 59, at 5, 7. For instance, “[a]
limousine driver cannot refuse to serve a same-sex wedding party, even if he describes this
as a boycott of same-sex weddings (or part of a nationwide boycott of such weddings by
like-minded citizens).” Id. at 2. By that very same token, it should be obvious that:
A cab driver who is required to serve all passengers cannot refuse to take
people who are visibly carrying Israeli merchandise. Of course all these people
would have every right to speak out against same-sex weddings . . . and Israel.
That would be speech, which is indeed protected by the First Amendment. But
as a general matter, a decision not to do business with someone, even when it
is politically motivated (and even when it is part of a broader political
movement), is not protected by the First Amendment. And though people
might have the First Amendment right to discriminate (or boycott) in some
unusual circumstances—for instance when they refuse to participate in
distributing or creating speech they disapprove of—that is a basis for a narrow
as-applied challenge, not a facial one.
Id. at 2-3.
83. To the extent that anyone really does believe that such a boycott is expressive, then
the reverse should also be true, and the State of Arkansas’s decision not to do business with
those who engage in discrimination should be considered government speech, not a
regulation of private speech. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68
(2009). “[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a
program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and
it carries out its duties on their behalf.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49
(Wolters Kluwer 2019). The Supreme Court has continually refused “[t]o hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to
fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals[.]” Id. (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
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policies . . . call upon others to boycott Israel, write in support of
such boycotts, and engage in picketing and pamphleteering to that
effect[]” and the State can say nothing about it.84 This does not
mean, however, that the newspaper’s non-expressive commercial
decisions are also protected by the First Amendment.85
And so, it was not surprising when the district court—based
on the well-established rule that particular commercial
purchasing decisions do not themselves communicate ideas86—
rejected the Plaintiff’s shallow surface comparison of the
“boycott” activities proscribed in Act 710 to the activities in
Claiborne and denied the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, while granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.87
The court correctly concluded that a boycott of Israel, as
defined by the Act,88 commercial actions undertaken in a
discriminatory way, is “neither speech nor inherently expressive
conduct[]” and is thus not entitled to First Amendment
protection.89 Such actions are only expressive when the conduct
is accompanied by speech that explains it.90 As the court noted:
Very few people readily know which types of goods are
Israeli, and even fewer are able to keep track of which
businesses sell to Israel. Still fewer, if any, would be able to
point to the fact that the absence of certain goods from a
contractor’s office mean that the contractor is engaged in a
boycott of Israel. Instead, an observer would simply believe
that the types of products located at the contractor’s office
reflect its commercial, as opposed to its political,
preferences. In most, if not all cases, a contractor would
have to explain to an observer that it is engaging in a boycott
for the observer to have any idea that a boycott is taking
place. And under FAIR, the fact that such conduct may be
subsequently explained by speech does not mean that this
84. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 624.
87. See Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453, 458 (8th Cir. 2021).
88. I.e., a refusal to deal or a company’s purchasing decisions. Ark. Times LP, 362 F.
Supp. 3d at 623.
89. Id.; see Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rumsfeld
v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc. (“FAIR II”), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)) (“The Supreme Court
has made clear that First Amendment protection does not apply to conduct that is not
‘inherently expressive.’”).
90. See FAIR II, 547 U.S. at 66.

1 GOLDFEDER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:21 PM

626

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

conduct is, or can be, transformed into inherently expressive
conduct. (“The fact that . . . explanatory speech is necessary
is strong evidence that . . . conduct . . . is not so inherently
expressive that it warrants protection.”).91

Arkansas Times appealed, and in February 2021, the Eighth
Circuit issued an opinion reversing the decision and remanding
the case back to the district court for further findings.92
IV. A NARROW (AND VERY STRANGE) APPELLATE
DECISION
This is where the purposeful misreporting comes in, with
BDS activists falsely claiming that the anti-BDS law in Arkansas
had been struck down as unconstitutional.93 Here is what actually
happened in the Eight Circuit’s extremely narrow opinion
reversing the district court’s decision to immediately dismiss the
case.
First and foremost, the court accepted the fairly obvious
principle that commercial buying decisions are not inherently
expressive.94
Far from being an adverse ruling, that
understanding alone confirms the constitutionality of anti-BDS
laws across the country.
Perhaps because the Arkansas Times is not actually
boycotting Israel, and the court felt the need to find an
interpretation of the Act that could even possibly apply to it such
that it would have a potential claim, the majority opinion chose to
focus on one phrase in the definition of boycott that (according to
the court) could reasonably be misconstrued as applying to
actually expressive conduct. Again, the Act defines “boycott of
Israel” to mean:
(1) “engaging in refusals to deal”;

91. Ark. Times LP, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 624. The Court also noted in Longshoremen that
“[i]t would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits
still less consideration under the First Amendment.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO
v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982).
92. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 458, 467.
93. Federal Court Rules Arkansas Anti-Boycott Law Violates First Amendment,
PALESTINE LEGAL (Feb. 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/XH7N-PD5A].
94. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 460.
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(2) “terminating business activities”; or
(3) “other actions that are intended to limit commercial
relations with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in
Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories, in a discriminatory
manner.”95

The State has consistently insisted that, like the activities
described in subsections (1) and (2), the phrase “other actions” in
subsection (3) is clearly also limited to similar non-expressive
commercial conduct and indeed has reiterated many times that
any and all contractors are in fact free to express their feelings
about Israel in any way that they want, including but not limited
to criticizing Israel, lobbying against Act 710 itself, and even
advocating for boycotts.96 In fact, in this very case, the Arkansas
Times itself had done those things, and the State had no problem
with it.97 The court, however, felt that because that phrase “is
open to more than one plausible construction,” it was still too
ambiguous.98
The court did note that the district court had used the
appropriate canon of ejusdem generis to understand the meaning
of the phrase “other actions” in the statute.99 Ejusdem generis is
the principle of statutory construction which says that “when
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration
the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words.”100 Applied to the Act, the term “other actions” should
obviously be read to include only conduct similar in kind to the
terms that precede it: “refusals to deal” and “terminating business
activities,” i.e. non-expressive commercial activity. But then, in
a truly mystifying manner, the court decided not to follow the
correct canon of construction and instead to “look to the statute
as a whole to interpret it according to the legislative intent[].”101
95. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i) (2017).
96. Defendants-Appellees’ Brief at 4, Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d 453 (No. 19-1378).
97. Id. at 8.
98. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 464.
99. Id.
100. Hanley v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 333 Ark. 159, 167, 970 S.W.2d 198, 201
(1998).
101. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 464-65 (citing Simpson v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 2014
Ark. 363, at 3, 440 S.W.3d 335, 338).
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Incredibly, this reference to legislative intent was offered as a
reason for the court to disagree with the district court’s reading,
despite the fact that the legislative intent in passing the bill,
confirmed repeatedly by the legislature’s own representatives,
was clearly (and demonstrably, based on their relationship with
the Plaintiff-Appellees in this very case) for that section to be read
exclusively in the way that the district court did, i.e., as applying
only to non-expressive commercial conduct.
The only justification that the court seemed to give for the
decision to ignore both the text and the readily apparent
legislative intent was to note that “the State has not provided any
example of the type of conduct that, under their interpretation of
the Act, would fall in the ‘other actions’ category[,]”102 as if to
say that the concern about other discriminatory non-expressive
commercial conduct could not really be the reason for subsection
(3) and to imply that the State’s position was just apologetics.
This is a logically flawed and lazy argument.
First, the legislature does not have to specify every single
behavior that could be referenced, so long as it sufficiently
delineates the type of behavior being prohibited. In this instance,
the type of behavior being referred to is clearly, contextually,
discriminatory non-expressive commercial conduct.
Second, there are numerous behaviors that fit into that
category, i.e., cases where a party is discriminating in commercial
decision making against Israel or Israelis while not technically
refusing to deal or terminating business relations, and it was these
actions that the Arkansas Legislature clearly meant to cover.
Some easy examples of the kind of constitutionally
unprotected activity that the “other actions” clause covers could
include, but are not limited to, a refusal to give equal commercial
access/opportunities to an Israeli person or group (like the access
that was denied in the FAIR case that the court discusses at
length).103 That action is broader than a simple refusal to deal but,
if done for discriminatory reasons, would also fall under
subsection (3). Likewise, another type of behavior in that
category of “other actions” that are discriminatory non-expressive
102. Id. at 464.
103. See generally Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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commercial decisions would be the classic BDS tactic of a
conditional refusal to deal, i.e., a scenario in which a company
discriminatorily says that it will do business with Israelis but only
if the Israeli group or individual (as opposed to every other group
or individual it is willing to do business with) first meets a set of
conditions.104 Or, as the dissent points out, “consider the
following: a company begins charging overly-inflated shipping
prices for products shipped to Israel to reduce commercial
relationships with the country. While this is not a refusal to deal
or a termination of business activities, it is another ‘action . . .
intended to limit commercial relations with Israel.’”105
Finally, and seeing as the court was ostensibly looking for
legislative intent this whole time, perhaps most convincingly, the
Arkansas General Assembly’s very purposeful choice of
language actually points directly to the type of behavior it
intended to cover with the statute. Anti-boycott laws106 and antidiscrimination laws107 are “not the only federal law[s] implicated
by the BDS Movement[.]”108 As the 1976 House Boycott Report
and the accompanying Department of Justice analysis109
concluded, anti-Israel boycotts that affect U.S. businesses also
violate anti-trust laws.110 In fact, the phrase that the Arkansas
104. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin & Nissim Calderon, A Counterproductive Call to Boycott
Israel’s Universities, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 10, 2010), [https://perma.cc/5QPZ-TEHP]. A
prime and well publicized example of this process, which also belied the movement’s
underlying antisemitism, was the BDS movement’s 2015 attempted boycotting of JewishAmerican (non-Israeli) reggae star Matthew Paul Miller. The singer, also known as
“Matisyahu,” was scheduled to perform at the Spanish Rototom Sunsplash Festival in August
2015, but when the BDS movement got wind of his performance, its members pressured the
festival to demand that Matisyahu, the only Jewish artist invited, issue a statement in support
of Palestinian statehood as a condition for the opportunity to perform. That condition was
not placed on any other artist at the festival. See Donna Rachel Edmunds, Jewish Rapper
Matisyahu Banned by Israel Boycotters . . . Except He’s Not Israeli, BREITBART (Aug. 17,
2015), [https://perma.cc/8PFJ-7RV4].
105. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 468 (Kobes, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., EAA of 1977, supra note 30.
107. See, e.g., Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
108. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 97.
109. Written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, at the time an Assistant Attorney
General at the Department of Justice. See Arab Boycott: Hearings on H.R. 5246, H.R. 12383
and H.R. 11488 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies & Com. L. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 68-74 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
110. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 97.
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Legislature used in subsection (1) of Act 710, a “refusal to deal,”
comes directly from the anti-trust caselaw.111 In passing the
Sherman Antitrust Act:112
What the government was most concerned with was a
scenario where, due to pressure from the Arab League, one
United States entity would refuse to deal with another entity
that was being targeted by the Arab League for having
relations with Israel. Such a refusal to deal would not only
have damaging effects on United States commerce and
competition, it would, in essence, be a private usurpation of
the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate
commerce. In the House Legal Analysis, [later-to-be]
Justice Scalia cited to Fashion Originators Guild of America
v. F.T.C [] in support of his argument that such boycotts
are prima facie illegal. . . . In the same way, the BDS
Movement’s activities put the regulation of commerce into
private, indeed hostile, foreign hands.113

That concern over a secondary/tertiary refusal to deal that is
at the heart of the Sherman Antitrust Act is a perfect description
of yet another type of “other actions” that are discriminatory but
non-expressive commercial activity. Seen in this light, the most
obvious reading of the statute is that the Arkansas General
Assembly intended and indeed incorporated all of the regular and
contextually appropriate anti-trust meanings of “refusal to deal,”
including other related non-expressive coercive business actions
undertaken with the same discriminatory intent. Again, the
legislative findings state that:
(4) It is the public policy of the United States, as enshrined
in several federal acts, to oppose boycotts against Israel, and
. . . Congress has concluded as a matter of national trade
policy that cooperation with Israel materially benefits United
States
companies
and
improves
American
competitiveness.114
111. See e.g., Kathryn A. Kusske, Refusal to Deal as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act: Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1984); see
also Kenneth Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1-2 (2002) for an overview of Sherman Act principles, especially as
they relate to group boycotts.
112. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7.
113. Greendorfer, supra note 11, at 99-100.
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-1-501(4) (2017) (emphasis added).
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In the definition section, subsection (1), the legislature
referenced a classic refusal to deal as an example of the kind of
behavior that would obviously fall under the statute.115 Then it
clarified in subsection (3), for those who may not be familiar with
this area of law, that, consistent with the legal and historical usage
of the term “refusal to deal” in this very context, if a party were to
take “other actions that are intended to limit commercial relations
with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel”—for
example, if they were to make business decisions designed to
force or coerce another party to refuse to deal with the target of a
boycott (i.e. a secondary or tertiary boycott), even while never
engaging in the actual boycott themselves, that too would be the
kind of discriminatory commercial action that (aside from the
federal concerns) would be (a) problematic under Act 710, and
(b) not entitled to First Amendment protection.116 Outsourcing
discrimination does not make it better,117 and the Arkansas
Legislature had every right to include that concern, decades old
in the context of anti-Israel boycotts, in its deliberate
considerations.
Regardless, the divided Eighth Circuit panel felt that the
legislature had not been clear enough about its intent to limit the
statute to non-expressive activity.118 While it is not uncommon
for courts to find a statute void for vagueness, in this instance it
really looks like the court set out to find the statute vague for
voidness.119 Then, incredibly, instead of being content with
merely casting the language as ambiguous, the court offered as
“proof” of the legislatures’ real intent the fact that the statute:
[P]ermits the State to consider specified “type[s] of
evidence” to determine whether “a company is participating
115. § 25-1-502(1)(A)(i).
116. See generally Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456
U.S. 212 (1982); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Briggs &
Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984).
117. See generally Greendorfer, supra note 11; see Marc A. Greendorfer, The
Inapplicability of First Amendment Protections to BDS Movement Boycotts, 2016 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 112, 113 (2016).
118. Ark. Times LP v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2021).
119. See generally Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 629 (1970); see id. at 667 n.178 (“A keen analysis of the partisan use of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine may be found in Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L REV. 67, 75-85, 98-115 (1960).”).
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in a boycott of Israel.” This evidence includes the
company’s own “statement that it is participating in boycotts
of Israel.” Additionally, evidence that a government
contractor “has taken the boycott action” in association with
others . . . can be considered to enforce the Act. At a
minimum, therefore, a company’s speech and association
with others may be considered to determine whether the
company is participating in a “boycott of Israel,” and the
State may refuse to enter into a contract with the company
on that basis, thereby limiting what a company may say or
do in support of such a boycott. In this way, the Act
implicates the First Amendment rights of speech, assembly,
association, and petition recognized to be constitutionally
protected boycott activity.120

The only problem with that reading, as the dissent forcefully
points out, is that this very line of reasoning was firmly rejected
by a unanimous Supreme Court:
The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary
use of speech . . . to prove motive or intent.121
....
Here, a company only engages in a boycott of Israel if its
“other actions are intended to limit commercial relations
with Israel, or persons or entities doing business in Israel or
in Israeli-controlled territories.” The better (and
constitutionally permissible) understanding of the permitted
use of speech here is that it may establish the element of
intent. The prohibited conduct is still commercial.122

The majority’s fierce determination to find some reading of
the statute that could be problematic, while ignoring clear
language and precedent, is truly bizarre. The text, history, and
application of the law make it clear that the legislature only ever
intended to do exactly what the statute says, i.e., regulate
discriminatory non-expressive commercial activity. Even in this
very case, the Arkansas Times itself actually did publish multiple
articles critical of the Act, and the State was still more than willing
to do business with it so long as the paper would certify that its
120. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 465.
121. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
122. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 468 (Kobes, J., dissenting) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 25-1-502(1)(A)(I) (2017)).
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non-expressive commercial activity was in fact nondiscriminatory.123 The court’s refusal to acknowledge even the
possibility that the legislature intended to legislate within
constitutional bounds, hidden away in footnote 12 of the opinion,
is nothing short of remarkable:
The district court relied upon the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance to conclude that “other actions” referred to purely
commercial conduct. Constitutional avoidance is the
“bedrock principle” that “where a statute is susceptible of
two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, [the court] is to adopt the latter” out
of respect for the legislature, assumed to legislate “in the
light of constitutional limitations.” But “the canon of
constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after
the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is
found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and
the canon functions as a means of choosing between them.”
When considering the whole Act, as Arkansas law requires,
there is but one permissible interpretation—that the Act
restricts speech in addition to economic refusals to deal with
Israel.124

That line, which is at the crux of this entire decision, is
astounding. Not only is there clearly, demonstrably, explicitly,
another permissible interpretation—all of the evidence actually
suggests that this other interpretation is the correct one! Again,
as the dissent explains in no uncertain terms:
In Arkansas, “[t]he first and most important rule of statutory
interpretation is that a statute is presumed constitutional and
all doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.” To
honor this principle, “[i]f it is possible to construe a statute
as constitutional, we must do so.” (“All statutes are
presumed constitutional, and if it is possible to construe a
statute so as to pass constitutional muster, this court will do
so.”). That is plainly possible here, and I would “construe

123. Id. at 460, 470.
124. Id. at 466 n.12 (emphasis added) (first quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885, 892-93 (8th Cir. 2013); and then quoting Saxton v. Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2018)).
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[the] statute with a limiting interpretation to preserve [its]
constitutionality.”125

Still not done, in yet another effort to find a problem with
the statute’s application, the majority continued its dubious
reading of the facts by claiming that “the certification makes no
effort to provide the Act’s definition of ‘boycott of Israel,’ leaving
it to the contractor to determine what activity is prohibited.”126
As an aside, it is hard to even know what to respond to that
patently false statement, because the certification form itself is
literally attached to the opinion as an appendix, and it very plainly
begins with the words: “Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated §
25-1-503[.]”127
Regardless, having observed that a contractor could perhaps
misread the statute as applying to protected speech, the court next
considered whether the Act imposed a restriction outside of the
program itself, because even if it did implicate speech, the State
would be justified in regulating speech that fell within the
contours of the contractual relationship.128 Of course, looking at
and reading it objectively, Act 710 is clearly designed to “define
the limits of the State’s spending program,” by making sure that
the State only does business with people making sound business
decisions.129 But having concluded that the law could be misread
as applying to protected speech as well, the court circularly found
that the condition therefore “seek[s] to ‘leverage funding to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.’”130
In a final twist of omission, even supposing arguendo that
the wording in that subsection of the Act did impose on protected
First Amendment activity, the court declined to consider the
traditional balancing test used in unconstitutional conditions
cases. That test, first established in Pickering v. Board of

125. Id. at 469 (Kobes, J., dissenting) (first quoting Booker v. State, 335 Ark. 316, 325,
984 S.W.2d 16, 21 (1998); then quoting Reinert v. State, 348 Ark. 1, 4, 71 S.W.3d 52, 52
(2002); and then quoting Ark. Hearing Instrument Dispenser Bd. v. Vance, 359 Ark. 325,
331, 197 S.W.3d 495, 499 (2004)).
126. Id. at 466.
127. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 470.
128. Id. at 467.
129. Id. (alterations in original) (quotation omitted).
130. Id. (quotation omitted).
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Education,131 and later clarified in Connick v. Myers,132 balances
the public employee or contractor’s speech rights to comment on
matters of public concern against the government’s interest in
operational efficiency.133 As the Supreme Court has noted:
In striking that balance, we have concluded that “[t]he
government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively
and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant
one when it acts as employer.” We have,
therefore, “consistently given greater deference to
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of
employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify
restrictions on the speech of the public at large.”134

As applied to Arkansas Act 710, the test would clearly favor
upholding an anti-discrimination bill that also has strong business
efficiency considerations (because it targets a friendly trade
partner and those who support it in a way that the State considers
risky)135 against the secondary and tertiary boycotting of a foreign
nation, which is not even necessarily related to a “matter of public
concern,”136 and the conducting of which the Arkansas public

131. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
132. 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). While Pickering dealt with public employees, for our
purposes Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr and O’Hare Truck Service,
Inc. expanded Pickering to the private sector. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569; Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 700 (1996); O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 721 (1996).
133. See generally Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public
Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133 (2008).
134. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673, 675
(1994)); Greendorfer, supra note 12, at 65–66.
135. For example, a contractor might use a less efficient or more costly means of
fulfilling its contractual duties to the government because it wished to avoid using an Israeli
firm or product. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
136. See D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards
for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 258-59 (1990). See also Greendorfer, supra
note 12, at 66-67 (“The typical Pickering case involves individuals who are speaking on a
matter of local (or, at least, domestic) concern, such as the functioning of school districts,
public hospitals, or local law enforcement. Certainly, such speech is valuable and important
to the functioning of a robust and healthy democracy. Economic attacks upon companies
that do business in a foreign nation to protest that foreign nation’s policies, however, have
remote and nebulous connections to the interests of a state and its citizens.”).
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itself finds deeply offensive.137 The Eighth Circuit, however, did
not apply the test.138
And so, in conclusion, all that the Eighth Circuit really did
do was two things:
First, and most importantly, the court restated the obvious;
limiting discriminatory non-expressive commercial activity does
not violate the First Amendment.
Second, having forced an ambiguous reading onto a
subsection of the Act, such that it could potentially be misapplied
to limit discriminatory expressive activity, the court remanded the
decision back to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with that ruling.139 It did not strike down the law as
unconstitutional. It reversed the granting of the State’s motion to
dismiss and asked the district court to reconsider whether the
Arkansas Times’s request for a preliminary injunction, at least as
applied to subsection (3), might in fact be appropriate.140
V. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT
Despite being remanded to the district court, this was an
obvious win for the State of Arkansas, which never intended to
limit anything but non-expressive commercial activity in the first
place. It is important to understand that nothing about the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion in any way damages the core tenet of anti-BDS

137. See Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 121 (2000) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 152) (factoring community relations into a Pickering-Connick
analysis).
138. The test did briefly come up in the 8th Circuit’s en banc rehearing of this matter
after one judge asked why the government’s ability to act as proprietor and choose whom to
do business with was not dispositive. The ACLU’s rather weak attempt to respond focused
on analogizing this case to the Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 and United States v. Treasury Emps.,
513 U.S. 454 (1995) cases, arguing that when the government is imposing an ex ante
restriction on expressive activity (which again it is not doing here, but for argument’s sake),
it should have to articulate a compelling interest and show how the proposal would help
eliminate a real harm. See generally Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing, Ark. Times
LP v. Waldrip, No. 19-1378 (8th Cir. argued Sept. 21, 2021), [https://perma.cc/64YNXLD4] [hereinafter Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing]. That answer was weak, of
course, because even on the ACLU’s own terms and understanding, the government of
Arkansas has done just that, explaining clearly its desire to eliminate this particular form of
discrimination.
139. Ark. Times LP, 988 F.3d at 467.
140. Id.
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legislation, or even the statute at the heart of this case. Indeed,
the principle upon which Arkansas Act 710 and similar laws rest
has actually been upheld and will be upheld once again:
discriminatory commercial purchasing decisions are not
protected under the First Amendment.141 As it relates to this bill,
under Arkansas law the provisions of a statute are severable, and
so even if subsection (3) were to be found invalid, the rest of the
statute is still fully constitutional and fine.142
***
After this Article was accepted for publication, Arkansas
filed a petition appealing to have this case reheard by the entire
Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, which was granted,143 and the case
was reheard shortly before this Article went to print.144 At the
hearing145 the judges focused on the dueling interpretations of
Claiborne and FAIR, but perhaps the most telling moment came
in a short discussion related to the technicalities of the
certification form itself.
141. See Aaron Bandler, Federal Appeals Court Sends Arkansas Anti-BDS Law to
Lower Court, JEWISH J. (Feb. 16, 2021), [https://perma.cc/WKW4-WQ4M] (“[S]tate antiBDS laws have always been about refusals to deal, not pro-BDS speech, so the decision
upheld much more than it rejected. Thus 8th Circuit ruling leaves intact not just the principal
part of Arkansas’s anti-BDS law, but also provides a strong precedent for the
constitutionality of such laws across the country, which quite clearly target pure business
conduct, not merely ‘supporting’ boycotts. Ironically, the plaintiff was not engaged in any
kind of Israel boycott—neither a refusal to deal, or even verbal support for it. They just
brought it as a test case, obscuring the fact that no one but the 2 8th circuit judges had read
‘any actions’ that way. While BDS champions will try to spin this as a win, the decision will
in fact keep anti-BDS laws on the books across the country.”) (quoting Eugene Kontorovich
(@EVKontorovich) TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2021, 4:13 PM), [https://perma.cc/9P5W-TBFW]).
142. See Eugene Volokh, The Eighth Circuit’s Narrow Decision About the Arkansas
BDS Statute, REASON (Feb. 14, 2021, 1:05 PM), [https://perma.cc/5RWU-LU6] (“Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this Code, in the event any title, subtitle, chapter,
subchapter, section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, subparagraph, item, sentence,
clause, phrase, or word of this Code is declared or adjudged to be invalid or unconstitutional,
such declaration or adjudication shall not affect the remaining portions of this Code which
shall remain in full force and effect as if the portion so declared or adjudged invalid or
unconstitutional was not originally a part of this Code.”) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2117 (2016)).
143. See generally Order Granting Petition for en banc Rehearing, Ark. Times LP v.
Waldrip, (8th Cir. June 10, 2021) (No. 19-1378), [https://perma.cc/2DE8-JSYN].
144. U.S. CT. APPEALS EIGHT CIR., SEPTEMBER 20-21, 2021 ORAL ARGUMENTS VIA
TELECONFERENCE OR VIDEOCONFERENCE 4 (2021), [https://perma.cc/6NHS-2CP7] (case
reheard on September 21, 2021).
145. See generally Oral Arguments During en banc Rehearing, supra note 138.
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Judge Kelly, who had written the majority opinion in
February, asked Arkansas Solicitor General Nicholas J. Bronni if
perhaps by using the term “boycott” (instead of, for example, the
term “refusing to purchase”), the State of Arkansas had made the
whole matter more complicated, because while the certification
does admittedly refer back to the statute and its clear definition, it
does not specifically refer to the definition section of the statute,
and so some lay person might not read the definition and might,
therefore, misunderstand what the State actually meant to
regulate.146 Bronni answered that the statute and the form were
fairly self-explanatory and conformed to the vernacular
understanding of boycott.147 More importantly, as he explained,
Arkansas did not “redefine” the word boycott as Judge Kelly had
suggested—Claiborne itself made clear that there are protected
and non-protected aspects contained within the term boycott,
which is why Arkansas used the correct legal term and even took
the additional step of clarifying exactly what aspect it was
referring to.148
While the en banc decision is still forthcoming, for all of the
reasons listed above—including the clear rules of statutory
construction; the canon of constitutional avoidance; the list of
discriminatory, non-expressive “other actions” that subsection (3)
does cover, and the clear intent of the legislature not to target
expressive actions as demonstrated in its interactions with this
very plaintiff in this very case—it is more than likely that a
majority of judges faithfully applying the law would reverse the
Eighth Circuit panel and reinstate the district court’s reading and
accompanying decision to dismiss.
And even if we were to ignore all of the above, i.e., even if
First Amendment protections were to somehow apply to that
“ambiguous” clause, or even to anti-BDS laws generally, the
146. Id. at 17:20.
147. Id. at 17:34.
148. Id. at 18:26. In his rebuttal, Brian Hauss, the attorney for the ACLU, picked up
on this argument to try and make the claim that even if the people signing it knew what the
term boycott meant, the fact that someone else reading their certification might also
misunderstand and miss the definition, should be enough to turn the certification form itself,
a mere statement of fact, into a compelled ideological expression. Id. at 38:48. That
argument has no limiting principle and, thankfully, did not appear to gain any traction at all,
even from the judges sympathetic to his cause.
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court should still uphold the law as constitutional. Under the
standard free speech balancing test appropriate in this context, a
state is certainly at liberty to decide not to fund a discriminatory
movement that is antithetical to American foreign policy and to
the state’s own interest in the efficient conduct of its business,
especially if that discriminatory movement is not clearly directed
at public concerns and has the potential to undermine the
government’s relationship with the community.
At worst, based on Judge Kelly’s questions, the State will
have to go back to the district court for further proceedings
pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s original decision and may have
to amend subsection (3) of its definition section to further clarify
that the words “other actions,” like the two subsections before it,
are only dealing with non-expressive commercial activity.149
There is no loss there, however, because that is all Arkansas ever
wanted to do all along!
And that is why legislatures in all the other states that have
passed anti-BDS bills do not have to be concerned that their laws
will be called into question by the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in this
case. Because despite what they may have heard, Arkansas Act
710 was actually substantially upheld and will be once again.

149. The legislature may even decide to amend the certification form itself, if we take
the hypothetical misinformed, lay person argument seriously.
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SLAVERY AND THE HISTORY OF
CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED POWERS
Jeffrey Schmitt*
INTRODUCTION
In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln
declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere
with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I
believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination
to do so.”1 Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War,
Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus”
on slavery.2 According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated
powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery
within the states.3 Legal scholars who support the modern reach
of federal powers have thus conventionally argued that the
Constitution is a living document that changes over time outside
the formal amendment process. Bruce Ackerman, for example,
contends that the constitutional moment of the New Deal
effectively amended the Constitution by expanding the reach of
implied powers.4
A growing number of revisionist scholars, however, argue
that the modern reach of federal powers can be justified without
*

Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I would like to thank
Christopher Roederer, Erica Goldberg, Patrick Sobkowski, and the participants of the
American Constitutional Society Constitutional Law Forum for their helpful feedback and
suggestions.
1. Abraham
Lincoln,
First
Inaugural
Address
(March
4,
1861),
[https://perma.cc/LBV7-NTSZ].
2. See Louisa M. A. Heiny, Radical Abolitionist Influence on Federalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 180, 184-86; Id. at 190-91 (explaining that
it was unclear whether Lincoln could end slavery in the states and that Lincoln had no
intention of changing the “current constitutional structure”).
3. See, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT
THE NATION’S FOUNDING 162 (2018); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING
REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY
16 (Ward M. McAfee ed. 2002).
4. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN: WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991).
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resorting to a living Constitution. Scholars like Richard Primus
and David Schwartz look to the history of the founding, early
congressional debates, and Marshall Court decisions to argue that
no subject is off-limits from federal regulation.5 Moreover,
progressive originalists like Jack Balkin contend that the
historical purpose underlying Congress’s enumerated powers is
to empower the federal government to regulate any subject that
the states cannot.6 Many of the most influential scholars in the
field thus contend that constitutional history supports virtually
unlimited federal power.
This Article argues that the revisionist account of federal
powers is inconsistent with the constitutional history of slavery.
In sum, the national consensus—the idea that Congress had no
power to regulate slavery within the states—was a litmus test for
constitutional meaning prior to the Civil War. The Founders,
early Congress, and federal courts all rejected any interpretation
of federal powers that could have justified the regulation of
slavery within the states.7 In particular, the Commerce Clause,
which is the basis for most federal regulation today, did not
empower Congress to regulate intrastate economic activity.8 This
was not because, as is sometimes argued,9 the economy was less
interconnected in the early republic. Instead, Congress and the
courts rejected the modern approach to the commerce power
precisely because southern plantations produced cash crops for
5. See generally DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1-4 (2019)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION]; David S. Schwartz, An Error
and an Evil: The Strange History of Implied Commerce Powers, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 930
(2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, An Error and an Evil]; Richard Primus, “The Essential
Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV.
415, 417 (2018) [hereinafter Primus, The Essential Characteristic]; Richard Primus, The
Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567, 568-69 (2017); Richard Primus, Why
Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2016); Richard Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, 124 YALE L. J. 576, 578-79 (2014); Richard Primus, Reframing Article I,
Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003, 2003-04 (2021).
6. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 140, 155 (2011); Jack Balkin, Commerce,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 78-89.
8. See infra Part III. The National Consensus in the Courts.
9. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the New Deal approach to the Commerce Clause merely “appl[ied] preexisting
law to changing economic circumstances”).
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interstate and internal trade.10 In fact, constitutional objections to
federal power blocked federal initiatives that would be at the core
of the commerce power today, such as the construction of
interstate roads and canals.11 In the constitutional debates over
these projects, slavery always lurked in the background.
Although legal scholars often distinguish historical practices
from constitutional meaning,12 no such legal sleight of hand can
save the revisionist accounts of federal powers. The revisionist
scholars present their theories as being consistent with the
principles of the original Constitution, early congressional
practice, or landmark Marshall Court decisions. In doing so, they
ignore or minimize slavery’s pervasive influence on the original
Constitution. Especially at this time of racial reckoning, legal
scholarship should present an accurate account of how slavery
shaped constitutional history.
In fact, slavery’s ubiquitous influence on the Constitution of
1787 demonstrates why history should not be dispositive in
matters of constitutional interpretation.13 However, as Justice
Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation hearings vividly demonstrate,
the revisionist account threatens to provide moral cover for those
who pretend that originalism is a neutral and bipartisan theory.14
Legal scholars thus should stop advancing implausible historical
arguments in a vain attempt to convince conservative justices to
abandon federalism. Instead, any convincing defense of federal
power requires scholarship that justifies a living Constitution and
convinces the legal community (and public at large) to reverse the
rising influence of originalism. By arguing that slavery was
10. See infra Part II. The National Consensus in Antebellum Politics.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
12. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. &
HIST. REV. 809, 811 (2019) (arguing that constitutional scholars “properly ignor[e] certain
facts” about history when constructing legal doctrine).
13. This Article is not a comprehensive attack on originalism. The many flaws of
originalism have been detailed elsewhere. See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH
(2018). In fact, originalism may be a defensible approach to the Reconstruction
Amendments, which were created with the purpose of eliminating slavery.
14. Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2 Transcript, REV (Oct. 13,
2020), [https://perma.cc/6V5R-ZKL9]. Justice Barrett defended her commitment to
originalism by saying that it “is not necessarily a conservative idea.” In fact, she explained,
“there is a school of . . . progressive originalism” that has gained increasing influence in the
academy.

2 SCHMITT.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:22 PM

644

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

central to the structure of the Constitution of 1787, this Article
attempts to accomplish the latter.
This Article is divided into five Parts. Part I examines how
the national consensus on slavery shaped federal powers at the
Founding. Part II explores how slavery influenced Congress’s
understanding of its powers prior to the Civil War. Part III argues
that the national consensus profoundly shaped the Marshall and
Taney Courts’ jurisprudence on federal powers. Part IV
summarizes the revisionist history of federal powers and argues
that it is inconsistent with the constitutional history of slavery.
Part V discusses why this debate is important and explores how
the constitutional history of slavery should shape constitutional
interpretation today.
I. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS AT THE FOUNDING
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
recognized that “the great division of interests in the United States
. . . did not lie between the large & small States: it lay between
the Northern & Southern.”15 Although slavery was a national
institution at the time of the Founding, the Revolutionary War put
it on the path to gradual extinction in the North.16 Many
Americans recognized the hypocrisy of fighting a war for liberty
while denying it to those held in bondage.17 Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island therefore all passed gradual
abolition legislation during the 1780s, and Massachusetts
abolished slavery by judicial decree in 1783.18
In the South, however, slavery was too deeply rooted to be
dislodged by abstract principles of liberty.19 While enslaved
15. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911).
16. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 261 (2016).
17. Id. at 259-60.
18. Id. at 260; RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 311 (2009). Pennsylvania’s law, for example, only freed people
who were born after its enactment when they reached the age of twenty-eight. Slaves were
therefore expected to pay for their own freedom through decades of forced labor.
19. Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware each debated gradual emancipation proposals
and passed legislation that authorized masters to manumit their slaves without legislative
approval. Virginia even freed slaves who had served in the war for their masters, declaring
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people were less than three percent of the population of the North,
they represented approximately forty percent of the population
and one-third of the wealth of the southern states.20 Not only was
the southern economy dependent on slave labor, but southerners
also could not imagine an interracial society without the
institution.21 Thomas Jefferson expressed a common sentiment
when he said that, if the races lived together without slavery,
“[d]eep rooted prejudices” would cause “the extermination of the
one or the other . . . .”22
The delegates to the Convention therefore understood that
the national government would have no power to interfere with
slavery in the states.23 Several delegates from the Deep South
emphatically declared that their states would never join a union
that threatened the future of slavery. For example, when the
Committee of Detail wrote the first draft of the Constitution,
Charles Cotesworth Pickney of South Carolina warned that, if the
committee failed “to insert some security to the Southern States
agst. an emancipation of slaves” he would “be bound by his duty
to his State” to oppose it.24 Northern delegates were unwilling to
see if the South was bluffing. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
asserted that the “morality or wisdom of slavery” was a matter
only for “the States themselves,”25 and Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts told the Convention that it “had nothing to do with
the conduct of the States as to Slaves . . . .”26 From the very
that men who “contributed towards the establishment of American liberty and independence
should enjoy the blessings of freedom as a reward for their toils and labours . . . .”
KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 261(quoting BEEMAN, supra note 18, at x).
20. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 266-67.
21. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 15.
22. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 147 (Philadelphia,
Prichard & Hall, 1787). Patrick Henry likewise said: “As much as I deplore slavery, I see
that prudence forbids its abolition” because it was not “practicable, by any human means, to
liberate them without producing the most dreadful and ruinous consequences[.]” 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 590-91 (Philadelphia, Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 1891).
23. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 2; KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 294.
24. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911). Thomas Lynch declared that “[i]f it is debated, whether their slaves are
their property, there is an end of the confederation.” 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 1080 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906).
25. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 364.
26. Id. at 372.
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beginning, the Framers understood that the state governments
would have complete independence on matters relating to slavery
within the states.27
Although the Framers shared a basic assumption that the
new federal government would have no power over slavery, the
Convention was nearly undone over conflicts regarding the
international slave trade and the manner in which slaves would be
counted for representation in Congress.28 As Madison would later
tell Jefferson, South Carolina and Georgia “were inflexible on the
point of the slaves.”29 The Deep South was especially committed
to preserving the international slave trade. John Rutledge of
South Carolina declared: “If the convention thinks that [North
Carolina, South Carolina, and] Georgia will ever agree to the
plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the
expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such
fools as to give up so important an interest.”30 Because the
delegates from these states believed that their way of life
depended on continued access to slave labor, they threatened to
abandon the Union if the Convention did not meet their
demands.31
Bowing to Southern pressure, Northern representatives
struck a deal. They agreed to prohibit Congress from interfering
with the international slave trade for twenty years.32 In exchange,
the South agreed to grant Congress the power to regulate
commerce—a power they feared Congress could use to protect
manufacturing and East Coast shipping interests at the expense of
southern cash crops.33 Although many delegates found the slave
trade immoral, most seem to have agreed with Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut,34 who feared that, without compromise, the states
might “fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and most
27. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 31.
28. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 257-64, 283-86 (discussion of the southern states
asserting that they would not ratify a constitution without protections for slavery).
29. Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 32
(Gaillard Hunt ed., N.Y.: Putnam, 1904).
30. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 373.
31. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 315.
32. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 415.
33. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 287-89.
34. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 369-75.
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probably into several confederations[,] and not without
bloodshed.”35
When pushed on slavery, most delegates
compromised and voted in their self-interest rather than in the
interests of liberty.36
The Framers also sought to protect slavery within the states
with at least two fundamental features.37 The first was the
infamous Three-Fifths Clause, which allocated representation in
the federal government by counting enslaved people as threefifths of a person.38 If slaves had been counted equally, the North
and South would have had roughly the same population at the
time of the Founding.39 The Three-Fifths Compromise ensured
that, although the North would initially have a majority in the
House, the South would not be a helpless minority.40 In fact,
when Gouverneur Morris attacked the Three-Fifths Clause
because it would empower the South to control federal policy,
Pierce Butler responded that “[t]he security the Southn. States
want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which some
gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to
do.”41 Southerners fought for the Three-Fifths Clause in large
part because it gave them the power to protect slavery from
federal overreach.42
The second major structural protection for slavery was the
enumeration of Congress’s powers. Enumeration ensured that the
federal government had no power to interfere with slavery in the
35. Id. at 375.
36. For more detail on these constitutional compromises on slavery, see KLARMAN,
supra note 16, at 270-76, 287, 304; BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 207-18, 316, 326-33;
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 24-28, 32-35, 41; PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 12-18, 25-35 (2d. ed. M.E.
Sharpe Inc., 2001); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 64-73 (Cornell Univ. Press, 1977).
37. Many other provisions protected slavery. Examples include the Fugitive Slave
Clause, the Slave Trade Clause, and the duty to suppress insurrections. PAUL FINKELMAN,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 13-18 (Harv. Univ. Press
2018); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO
RATIFICATION 6-9 (Hill & Wang 2009).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
39. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 266.
40. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 68-69.
41. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 603-05.
42. Of course, the Three-Fifths Clause also gave the South a larger vote in the Electoral
College. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 301.
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states. When the Virginia delegation first introduced Resolution
VI of the Virginia Plan, Pierce Butler (of South Carolina) feared
that “we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers
of the States,” and he asked Edmund Randolph to explain “the
extent of his meaning.”43 Edmund Randolph, who had introduced
the resolution, “disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers
to the national Legislature,” and insisted that “he was entirely
opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions . . . .”44
Moreover, Luther Martin of Maryland (a small slaveholding
state) invoked slavery to explain why the national government
could not be trusted with such a power.45 Historian Michael
Klarman captures the scholarly consensus when he says that, “[i]t
is likely that every delegate in Philadelphia believed that
regulating a domestic institution such as slavery would exceed the
delegated powers of Congress.”46
The debates over Ratification confirm that the Founders
thought Congress lacked the power to regulate slavery within the
states. Federalist James Iredell, who would later serve as a
Supreme Court Justice, rhetorically asked the North Carolina
ratifying convention: “Is there any thing in this Constitution
which says that Congress shall have it in their power to abolish
the slavery of those slaves who are now in the country?”47 In
South Carolina, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared that the
South had “a security that the general government can never
emancipate them, for no such authority is granted, and it is
admitted on all hands, that the general government has no powers
but what are expressly granted by the constitution.”48 Madison
told the Virginia Ratifying Convention that “[n]o power is given
to the General Government to interpose with respect to the

43. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 53.
44. Id.
45. WALDSTREICHER, supra note 37, at 79.
46. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 294; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 19
(“Virtually everyone in 1787—and thereafter until the Civil War—fully understood that
Congress could not interfere with the ‘domestic institutions’ of the states . . . .”).
47. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 102 (Philadelphia, Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 1891).
48. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 124
(1788) (John Kaminski ed., 2021) [hereinafter THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
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property in slaves now held by the States.”49 In fact, AntiFederalist Luther Martin of Maryland, an antislavery southerner,
condemned the Constitution on the grounds that the federal
government lacked the power “to make such regulations as should
be thought most advantageous for the gradual abolition of
slavery, and the emancipation of the slaves which are already in
the States.”50
Southern Anti-Federalists generally responded by arguing
that Congress could indirectly undermine or weaken slavery
rather than by saying that the Constitution empowered the federal
government to emancipate directly. At the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, for example, George Mason and Patrick Henry
criticized the Constitution for failing to include any explicit
protection for slavery.51 Mason warned the Virginia ratifying
convention that, without such a protection, Congress could find a
way to undermine slavery, such as a tax on slaves so high “as it
will amount to manumission.”52 Patrick Henry similarly worried
that Congress could use its powers to weaken slavery and thus
slowly eradicate it.53 No prominent politician at the time of the
founding, however, seriously suggested that the Constitution
granted Congress the power to abolish slavery within the states.54
Given the Deep South’s intense commitment to the institution,
Anti-Federalists certainly would have so argued if they could
make even a plausible case for a federal power of emancipation.55
When Anti-Federalists complained that the Constitution
made them complicit in slavery, Federalists generally responded
by saying that slavery was an issue wholly reserved to the states.56
For example, Pennsylvania Federalist Tench Coxe stressed that,
49. Id. at 1339. Madison later said that the Congress could not emancipate slaves
within the states because “[t]here is no power to warrant it, in that paper. If there be, I know
it not.” Id. at 1503.
50. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 142 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
48, at 196).
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id. at 144 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 1338).
53. Id. at 149.
54. Id. at 158 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 1483).
55. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 302-03; DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE
COMMERCE POWER: HOW THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED
TO THE CIVIL WAR (2006).
56. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 121.
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because state laws regarding slavery “can in no wise be
controuled or restrained by the fꭀderal legislature,” each state had
the power not only to preserve slavery, but also to abolish it.57
In fact, Federalists who touted the antislavery potential of
the Constitution did not suggest any federal power to regulate
slavery. Instead, they argued that the Constitution put slavery on
the path to extinction by abolishing the international slave trade
and empowering Congress to halt slavery’s expansion into the
federal territories.58 They largely agreed with Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut, who justified the Constitution’s accommodation of
slavery by arguing that, “as population increases; poor laborers
will be so plenty as to render slaves useless[,]” so that “[s]lavery
in time will not be a speck in our country.”59
Although the founding generation agreed that Congress had
no power to regulate slavery within the states, the Constitution
does not explicitly protect slavery. In fact, the Constitution does
not use the term “slave” at all. Even the Fugitive Slave Clause
euphemistically refers to “Person[s] held to Service or Labour,”
and the Three-Fifths Clause counts “free Persons” and “three
fifths of all other Persons.”60 Historians have conventionally said
that the northern delegates wished to hide their complicity with
such an obviously unjust institution.61 In a compelling new book,
however, historian Sean Wilentz argues that there was a much
deeper meaning.62 He convincingly argues that, “the convention
took care to ensure that while the Constitution would accept
slavery where it already existed, it would not validate slavery in
national law[.]”63 Wilentz concludes that the Constitution thus
gave the states complete sovereignty over slavery—the federal

57. Id. at 130 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 836). New
England Federalist William Heath similarly responded to antislavery criticism by stating that
“[e]ach State is sovereign and independent to a certain degree, and they have a right, and will
regulate their own internal affairs.” Id. at 121 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 48, at 1371).
58. Id. at 132-33 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 463).
59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 371.
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
61. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 7-9.
62. Id. at vii.
63. Id. at xiii.
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government had no power to require it in the North or abolish it
in the South.64
In sum, the history of the Founding demonstrates that the
national consensus on slavery was a critical feature of the
Constitution. The records of the Convention make it painfully
obvious that South Carolina and Georgia insisted on some
assurance that the federal government could never abolish slavery
within the states.65 Northerners, however, were unwilling to
protect slavery explicitly, because they hoped that abolition of the
international slave trade, the power to ban slavery in the
territories, and continued white immigration would soon spell the
end of the institution.66 The Convention’s tacit compromise was
thus to empower Congress to ban the slave trade (in 1808) and
control the territories but give Congress no power to regulate the
domestic institutions of existing states. The Framers wrote this
compromise into the text through the enumeration of Congress’s
powers.
II. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN ANTEBELLUM
POLITICS
The national consensus on slavery exerted a powerful
influence on antebellum politics. Because approximately onethird of the southern population was held in bondage, economic
prosperity was heavily dependent on slave labor.67 Moreover,
because whites were paranoid about the possibility of slave
insurrections, they viewed any threat to slavery as a threat to their
personal safety.68 White southerners thus thought their economy,

64. Id. at 6. Wilentz thus emphasizes the antislavery potential of the Constitution.
Although the Constitution did not empower Congress to abolish it directly within the existing
states, Congress had the power to ban it in the territories and prohibit the international slave
trade. He thus argues that the Constitution did not use the word “slave” because many
Founders hoped slavery would quickly wither away.
65. Id. at 69.
66. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at xiii.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 13-15. Even though most white southerners did not own slaves, the potential
to become a slave owner was also an important part of white southern cultural identity. See
JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789-1861: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 12-13 (1963).
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personal safety, and very way of life depended on the
continuation of the institution.
White southerners, however, did not trust the federal
government to protect slavery. In fact, southern distrust of the
federal government increased over time as the population in the
North progressively exceeded that of the South.69 At the time of
the Founding, the southern population was roughly equal to that
of the North, and, although the Three-Fifths Clause decreased
southern representation, the South had 46% of the seats in the
House.70 Southern power in the federal government, however,
consistently decreased over time. By 1860, when Lincoln was
elected president, the southern states held only 35% of the seats
in the House.71 Although it sounds ironic today, white
southerners saw themselves as a minority group that was under
constant threat from a northern majority.72
Southern leaders thus looked to the Constitution for
protection. John C. Calhoun, the architect of nullification and a
leading voice in southern constitutionalism, warned that
legislation like the Missouri Compromise could never protect
southern interests.73 By contrast, he declared, “the Constitution
. . . is a firm and stable ground, on which we can better stand in
opposition to fanaticism, than on the shifting sands of
compromise. Let us be done with compromises. Let us go back
and stand upon the Constitution!”74 When sectional tensions
reached new heights in 1850 over the status of slavery in the
federal territories, then Representative Robert Toombs of Georgia
declared that the North had “brought us to the point where we are
to test the sufficiency of written constitutions to protect the rights
of a minority against a majority of the people.”75 Toombs warned
that the South would “stand by the Constitution and laws” for
protection, and he implicitly threatened secession if federal power
69. CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 12-13.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id.
72. Another key factor was rising antislavery sentiment in the North, especially in the
1830s. Id.
73. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1847).
74. Id. (statement of Sen. John C. Calhoun).
75. CONG. GLOBE, app. 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1850) (statement of Rep. Robert
Toombs).
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restricted slavery.76 In the words of Jefferson Davis, who would
later become the president of the Confederacy: “Our safety
consists in a rigid adherence to the terms and principles of the
federal compact. If . . . we depart from it, we, the minority, will
have abandoned our only reliable means of safety.”77 In sum, the
national consensus was a central principle of antebellum politics,
and political elites knew that any deviation from it would threaten
the stability of the Union.
The national consensus on slavery, moreover, was not an
isolated exception to otherwise broad federal power. Instead, all
federal powers were interpreted narrowly to preserve state
sovereignty over local economic and social issues, the most
important of which was slavery.78 In fact, southerners saw threats
to slavery from federal legislation that had nothing to do with the
institution, including the bank of the United States, internal
improvements, and tariffs.79 Rather than insist on expansive
federal power, advocates of this federal legislation tried to
reassure southerners that federal power could never threaten
slavery or state sovereignty more generally.80
Congress explicitly disclaimed any power to regulate slavery
within the states as early as 1790.81 The issue first arose when a
group of Quakers petitioned Congress to tax the international
slave trade, prohibit slaves from entering the federal territories,
and otherwise attack slavery “to the full extent of [its] power
. . . .”82 Southern representatives generally agreed with South
Carolina Representative William Loughton Smith, who
responded by asserting that the southern states “never would have
adopted” the Constitution if they thought it empowered the
76. Id. at 201 (statement of Rep. Robert Toombs).
77. Id. at 1614 (statement of Sen. Jefferson Davis); see also CARPENTER, supra note
68, at 141-44, 146 (arguing that most southerners relied on the Constitution to protect
southern rights in this era).
78. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War,
43 RUTGERS L. J. 405, 421, 429-30 (2012) (concluding that the South “insisted on limitations
on the national government precisely because . . . . [n]o other institution was so vulnerable
to hostile legislation at the national level”).
79. See id. at 425.
80. See, e.g., id. at 421, 423.
81. CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 142.
82. See e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1224-26 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); LIGHTNER,
supra note 55, at 38.
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federal government to interfere with slavery.83 Representative
Thomas Tudor Tucker went so far as to declare that the petition’s
“unconstitutional request” to interfere with slavery “would never
be submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war.”84
Although some spoke out in defense of the right to petition and to
end the slave trade in 1808, no one in Congress advocated for a
federal power to regulate slavery.85 The House ultimately voted
to refer the matter to a committee, which issued a report stating:
“Congress ha[s] no authority to interfere in the internal
regulations of particular States” regarding slavery.86
The leading politicians of the North readily admitted that
federal power was too limited to pose a threat to slavery within
the states. Daniel Webster, New England’s leading champion of
federal power, said that “Congress has no authority to interfere in
the emancipation of slaves. This was so resolved by the House in
1790 . . . and I do not know of a different opinion since.”87
Moreover, in his first inaugural address, President Lincoln
likewise declared:
The maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and
especially the right of each State to order and control its own
domestic institutions [i.e., slavery] according to its own
judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power
on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric
depend.88

In fact, no mainstream politician prior to the Civil War publicly
argued that Congress had the power to regulate or abolish slavery
within the states.89
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 82, at 1243-44.
84. Id. at 1240. Many other southern representatives made similar statements. See,
e.g., Richard S. Newman, Prelude to the Gag Rule: Southern Reaction to Antislavery
Petitions in the First Federal Congress, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 571, 582-86 (1996).
85. See Newman, supra note 84, at 588-90. For more on slavery’s influence on the
rights of speech and petition, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
121-22 (Duke Univ. Press ed., 2000).
86. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1465 (1790). Similar resolutions were passed in the House
in 1836 and the Senate in 1838. See CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 142-43.
87. Newman, supra note 84, at 573 (quoting Webster).
88. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents:
Abraham Lincoln, PROJECT GUTENBERG (May 28, 2004), [https://perma.cc/C8UQ-KZ68].
89. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 36.
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Although historians recognize that the country’s intense
commitment to federalism was largely driven by a perceived need
to protect slavery, congressmen often avoided making the
connection explicitly.90 This is because northern and southern
statesmen alike understood that public debate over slavery was
extraordinarily divisive. After the first major debate over
slavery’s expansion in 1820, for example, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, “this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night,
awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the
knell of the Union.”91 When debates over slavery’s expansion
again threatened to tear the country apart in 1850, Stephen
Douglas, the leader of the Democratic Party in the North, pushed
through the Compromise of 1850 and “resolved never to make
another speech upon the slavery question in the halls of
Congress.”92 Although politicians often avoided the subject of
slavery, historian David Currie explains that “the slavery question
often lurked behind Southern insistence on strict interpretation of
federal powers . . . .”93
Slavery impacted every major debate over the reach of
federal power, including the First Congress’s debate over
Congress’s power to incorporate a national bank. Because the
text of the Constitution does not explicitly empower Congress to
incorporate a bank, the debate focused on the scope of implied
powers.94 Madison emerged as the leading opponent of the
bank.95 In sum, he contended that the bank was unconstitutional
because Congress’s implied powers included only those
necessary to effectuate the powers enumerated in Article I.96 He
warned that “[i]f implications, thus remote and thus multiplied,
90. See also id. at 35.
91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, LIBR. CONG. (April 22, 1820),
[https://perma.cc/W8E6-S7TK]. Jefferson lamented that agitation over slavery would
destroy the Union and make the Revolution a “useless sacrifice.” Id. His “only
consolidation” was that he would “not . . . weep over it.” Id.
92. CONG. GLOBE, app. 32d Cong., 1st Sess., app., 65 (Dec. 23, 1850) (statement of
Sen. Stephen Douglas).
93. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS,
1829-1861, at xii (2005); see also SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 5, at 35.
94. See id. at 202.
95. Id. at 203.
96. See id. at 208-09.
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can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach
every object of legislation . . . .”97 Although he did not say so
explicitly, antebellum readers would have understood this as a
warning that the bank bill would set a precedent for federal power
that could threaten slavery.98 In fact, in an obvious reference to
slavery, one representative noticed that “the opinions respecting
the constitution seem to be divided by a geographical line.”99
As some revisionist scholars have stressed,100 many
representatives responded to Madison by arguing that Congress
was not limited to its enumerated powers or that Congress could
legislate for the “general welfare.”101 These men, however, did
not argue that Congress had unlimited regulatory power. Instead,
according to historian Jonathan Gienapp, American elites often
did not view the Constitution “strictly, or even primarily, as a
text” until approximately 1796.102 Many elites thus saw the
Constitution as an abstract set of principles, much like the
unwritten British constitution.103 Under this approach, the text
was merely illustrative of a system that balanced competing
powers and interests rather than strictly enforceable like a
statute.104 Congress thus could legislate according to the spirit, as
opposed to the letter, of the powers enumerated in Article I.105
The debates show that representatives on both sides of the
debate agreed that the spirit of the Constitution limited federal
power so as to preserve state sovereignty over domestic
institutions like slavery.106 William Loughton Smith, a proponent
of the bank, asserted that no one would ever accept the idea that

97. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 86, at 1899.
98. See JOHNATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 207 (2018).
99. Id. at 212.
100. See Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5, at 460-61. Primus’s
arguments are addressed below. See discussion infra Part V.
101. See GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 203, 218.
102. See id. at 10.
103. See id. at 23. Other scholars agree with Gienapp’s assessment. See LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11-12 (2004); see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1990).
104. See GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 62-63.
105. Id. at 92.
106. See id. at 203, 217, 222.
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“whatever the legislature thought expedient was therefore
constitutional.”107 Fisher Ames similarly said that he “did not
contend for an arbitrary and unlimited discretion in the
government to do every thing” and that implied powers must be
“guided and limited.”108 Even Hamilton, the foremost champion
of the bank, acknowledged that some subjects were beyond the
power of Congress and reserved to the states.109 Although the
bank’s supporters had a difficult time articulating the line
between legitimate and illegitimate implied powers,110 it would
be a mistake to assume that there was no such line. The larger
historical context suggests that the bank’s supporters were
attempting to assure men like Madison that the bank bill was no
threat to the national consensus on slavery.
Although the bank’s supporters won the battle over the bank,
they lost the debate over the meaning of the Constitution. In fact,
Gienapp concludes that, as early as 1796, Madison’s textualist
approach to enumerated powers dominated elite thinking.111
Elites thus embraced the idea that Congress was limited to its
enumerated powers (as supplemented by implied powers), which
could be best understood by excavating original meaning.112
Because the national consensus on slavery pervaded the original
meaning of federal powers, this approach to constitutional
meaning dictated that federal powers were narrow in scope.
The debates over internal improvements further reveal
slavery’s ubiquitous influence on federal powers. Today, no one
doubts that Congress can build and regulate interstate
transportation under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.113 In
fact, the modern Court identifies interstate transportation as a core
Commerce Clause concern.114 Before the Civil War, however,
the states and private companies built most roads and canals

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 222.
Id. at 203, 217.
GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 202, 244.
Id. at 222.
See id. at 10, 203.
Id. at 330, 332.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
Id.
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because many political actors thought Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to build internal improvements.115
Using veiled references to slavery, presidents from Jefferson
to Polk cited constitutional concerns when vetoing internal
improvement bills. In 1824, for example, Thomas Jefferson said
that he “most dreaded” a federal power over internal
improvements, because it would imply that Congress could
“make the text say whatever will relieve them from the bridle of
the States.”116 Moreover, in his last act as President, Madison
vetoed a bill to fund improvements (the Bonus Bill of 1817) and
warned that “the permanent success of the Constitution depends
on a definite partition of powers between the General and the
State Governments . . . .”117 As late as 1846, President James K.
Polk warned that “[a] construction of the Constitution so broad as
that by which the power in question [over internal improvements]
is defended tends imperceptibly to a consolidation of power in a
Government intended by its framers to be thus limited in its
authority.” 118 For southerners like Jefferson, Madison, and Polk,
consolidation was dangerous not only because it threatened the
republic, but also because it threatened state sovereignty over
slavery.119
In telling moments, frustrated southern representatives
occasionally tied the constitutional debates over internal
improvements to slavery explicitly.120 Representative John
Randolph of Virginia, for example, warned that, if Congress had
115. See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC
WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 49,
79 (2001).
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (Oct. 13, 1824), in 12 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 380-81 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
117. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents: James Madison, PROJECT GUTENBURG (Jan. 31, 2004), [https://perma.cc/M2787WSL].
118. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents: James Knox Polk, PROJECT GUTENBURG (May 28, 2004),
[https://perma.cc/W2WB-6XLG]. Polk argued that, while longstanding practice allowed the
federal government to build lighthouses and piers near the ocean to facilitate navigation,
Congress could not “advance a step beyond this point . . . to make improvements in the
interior” of the country. Id.
119. Many congressional representatives made the same arguments in debates over
internal improvements. See LARSON, supra note 115, at 67.
120. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 57; see also 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 1299 (1824).
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the implied power to build roads and canals, it could also
“emancipate every slave in the United States.”121 Nathaniel
Macon, a representative from North Carolina and former Speaker
of the House, similarly said, “if Congress can make banks, roads
and canals under the constitution; they can free any slave in the
United States . . . .”122 He thus warned that a broad interpretation
of federal power over internal improvements threatened to
“destroy our beloved mother N[orth] Carolina and all the South
country.”123
Other examples of slavery’s influence on constitutional
politics abound. During the nullification crisis of 1832, John C.
Calhoun argued that Congress lacked the power to impose a tariff
that had a disproportionate effect on the slave states’ cash crop
economy.124 Although President Jackson rejected the theory of
nullification, he devoted his second inaugural address to
reassuring the country that he defended state sovereignty over
local matters. Jackson stated that “the destruction of our State
governments or the annihilation of their control over the local
concerns of the people [i.e., slavery] would lead directly to
revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military
domination.”125 In one of the most famous speeches in the history
of the Senate, Webster similarly argued that southern fear of
federal encroachment on slavery was “wholly unfounded and
unjust” because such an encroachment would “evade the
constitutional compact and [] extend the power of the government
over the internal laws and domestic condition of the states.”126
Southern paranoia around federal power occasionally even
pushed Congress to limit federal protections for slavery. For
example, after Shadrach Minkins escaped from federal custody as
121. 41 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 120, at 1308.
122. EDWIN MOOD WILSON, THE CONGRESSIONAL CAREER OF NATHANIEL MACON
71-72 (1900).
123. Id. at 46-47.
124. See 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT
BAY: 1776-1854, at 255, 257 (1990); The Tariff of Abominations: The Effects, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, [https://perma.cc/MMX5-P3LA] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021).
125. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 108
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999).
126. SPEECHES OF HAYNE AND WEBSTER IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON THE
RESOLUTION OF MR. FOOT, JANUARY, 1830, at 44 (Redding & Co., 1852).
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a fugitive slave in 1851, President Millard Fillmore sought
authorization to call on the federal military and state militia to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.127 A strange combination of votes
from northern Whigs and southern Democrats, however, led
Congress to deny the President’s request.128 According to
Jefferson Davis:
[W]hen any State in this Union shall choose to set aside the
law, it is within her sovereignty, and beyond our power. . . .
[I]t would be a total subversion of the principles of our
Government if the strong arm of the United States is to be
brought to crush the known will of the people of any State in
this Union.129

The Charleston Mercury similarly warned, “the Boston riot
is to be used, as all Northern outrages are, as the occasion and
pretext for arming the General Government and especially the
Executive, with increased means of assailing the South.”130 In
fact, Senator Robert Rhett of South Carolina even went so far as
to declare that the proslavery Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was an
unconstitutional consolidation of power in the federal
government.131
Although some scholars argue that the Slave Trade Clause
implies a broad Commerce Power, or at least some power to
regulate slavery,132 such arguments rely on a modern reading of
the text rather than constitutional history. The Slave Trade Clause
of the Constitution prohibited Congress from banning the
international slave trade prior to 1808.133 When northern
representatives introduced the first bill to end the trade in January
127. Presidential Speeches: Millard Fillmore Presidency, February 19, 1851:
Message Regarding Disturbance in Boston, MILLER CTR., [https://perma.cc/J6EK-KJXS]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021); See Brendan Wolfe, Minkins, Shadrach (d. 1875),
ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., [https://perma.cc/K492-SR2E] (Feb. 12, 2021).
128. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 828 (1851); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong.,
2d Sess. app. 292.326 (1851).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 599 (1851).
130. The President’s Message, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Feb. 25, 1851. Cf. The
Picayune and Consolidation, NEW ORLEANS DELTA, quoted in DAILY PICAYUNE, Feb. 27,
1851 (arguing that supporters of the president’s proclamation “intended to prepare the public
mind for the idea of an absolute consolidated National Government, built upon the ruins of
State Governments”).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. app. 317–18 (1851).
132. See Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 955.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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of 1807, they “altogether denied” that the Commerce Clause
could apply to slavery.134 Instead, they relied on Congress’s
power to “define and punish offenses against the law of
nations.”135 Using the Commerce power, they asserted, would be
“at war with our fundamental institutions” presumably because it
would imply that Congress could regulate the interstate slave
trade and perhaps even slavery within the states.136
The Slave Trade and Commerce Clauses arose again during
the Missouri Crisis. James Tallmadge, Jr., of New York,
provoked the crisis in 1819 by proposing that Missouri’s
admission to the Union be made conditional on its abolition of
slavery.137 The proposal’s supporters primarily argued that
Congress’s power to regulate the territories and admit new states
authorized Congress to impose conditions on Missouri’s
admission.138 Some northerners, however, also relied on the
Slave Trade and Commerce Clauses.139 Because the Slave Trade
Clause was merely a prohibition on ending the trade for a period
of years, they argued, some other provision of the Constitution
must have granted Congress the power to enact a ban.140 The
most natural source of such power was the Commerce Clause,
which confers power over both international and interstate
commerce.141
Southerners like Madison, however, replied that the Slave
Trade Clause implied only that Congress could ban the
international slave trade.142 If the Framers or Ratifiers had
thought that Congress had a similar power over the domestic slave
trade, Madison contended, the South surely would have
objected.143 Southerners further demanded that Congress allow
134. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 271 (1807).
135. Id.
136. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 45-46. They further stated that it was “abhorrent to
humanity” to call people articles of commerce. Id.
137. See JOHN R. VAN ATTA, WOLF BY THE EARS: THE MISSOURI CRISIS: 1819-1821,
at 1 (2015).
138. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 49.
139. See id. at 49-52.
140. See id. at 51.
141. See id. at 51-52.
142. See From James Madison to Robert Walsh Jr., 27 November 1819, Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, [https://perma.cc/8YHJ-4WLR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
143. Id.
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slavery to expand on terms equal to those of free labor.144 The
Missouri Compromise, which allowed slavery in Missouri but
banned it north of the new state’s southern border, did not resolve
the constitutional debate.145 The nation thus could not even agree
on whether Congress could ban slavery in the territories or
regulate the interstate sale of slaves. In this context, it was a basic
assumption that Congress had no power to regulate slavery
directly within the southern states.
Although not as common or well known, some northerners
also sought to limit federal power to preserve a state’s right to
abolish slavery. In his famous senatorial campaign against
Stephen Douglas in 1858 and his successful run for the presidency
in 1860, Lincoln repeatedly warned that a southern-dominated
federal government could force slavery into the North.146 Most
dramatically, after the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the
federal Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional in 1854, it declared
that state sovereignty trumped the power of the United States
Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction.147 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
explained that state sovereignty was paramount and warned that,
if the state lacked the power to reject the federal Fugitive Slave
Act, “[t]he slave code of every state in the union [would be]
engrafted upon the laws of every free state . . . .”148 The
Wisconsin legislature adopted the same states’ rights stance, Ohio
nearly followed suit, and northern militia came close to
confronting federal marshals over a state’s right to exclude
slavery.149
In sum, slavery’s influence on antebellum federal powers is
difficult to overstate. On issues ranging from mundane details
like funding for the Cumberland Road to high-profile legislation

144. See VAN ATTA, supra note 137, at 14, 75.
145. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 57.
146. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 333 (1976);
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 451.
147. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 9 (1854).
148. Id. at 122.
149. For more on the Wisconsin decision and its context, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt,
Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315 (2007).
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like the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,150 slavery pushed the country
towards a narrow understanding of federal powers. It is no
accident that, aside from Marbury v. Madison,151 the Supreme
Court did not strike down a single federal statute until the Dred
Scott decision.152
III. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE COURTS
Slavery also deeply influenced the Court’s jurisprudence on
federal powers. Although the Court, like Congress, often did not
mention slavery explicitly, its influence is unmistakable. The
national consensus on slavery pushed the Court to adopt both a
narrow interpretation of federal authority and a broad
understanding of the states’ police powers.
Although legal scholars have conventionally read Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland as an
endorsement of expansive federal powers,153 his opinion actually
reinforces the national consensus on slavery. In McCulloch,
Justice Marshall provided the definitive interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause while upholding the
constitutionality of the bank of the United States.154 Although the
power to create a bank is not enumerated in Article I, the Court
held that it was implied from the powers to tax, spend, regulate
commerce, and support the armies and navies.155 In an oft-quoted
passage, Justice Marshall said: “Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
150. In the debates over the Fugitive Slave Act, Maryland Senator Thomas G. Pratt
moved to have the federal government indemnify slaveholders when the government failed
to return fugitives. In response, Jefferson Davis, the future president of the Confederacy,
asked: “If we admit that the Federal Government has power to assume control over slave
property . . . where shall we find an end to the action which anti-slavery feeling will
suggest?” See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Courts, Backlash, and Social Change: Learning from the
History of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 123 PENN STATE L. REV. 103, 129-130 (2018).
151. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147-48 (1803).
152. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 414, 416 (1857).
153. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 16-23
(collecting sources).
154. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 324 (1819).
155. Id. at 407.
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are constitutional.”156 He further explained that legislation is
“necessary” when it is “convenient, or useful” in the pursuit of
enumerated powers.157
Chief Justice Marshall, however, was careful to stress that
implied powers were limited in scope. He asserted that the federal
“government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers
granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.”158 For Justice
Marshall, this meant “that the powers of the [federal] government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended.”159 He
further stated that, “[i]n America, the powers of sovereignty are
divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to the other.”160 In other words, Justice Marshall said
that there are topics reserved to the states and thus prohibited from
the federal government. Although Justice Marshall does not spell
out the precise limits on federal power, he clearly contemplates
that federal legislation could be related to an enumerated power
and yet still be inconsistent with “the letter and spirit of the
constitution . . . .”161 As David Schwartz concludes in his recent
book on McCulloch, the language of the decision is “deeply
ambiguous” because it uses vague and indeterminate language
when describing both the scope and limitations of implied
powers.162
Looking beyond the language of the opinion, however, the
historical context strongly implies that the Court in McCulloch
did not have an expansive view of federal powers. The outcome
of the decision was never in question, as Congress had already
extensively debated the issue and the bank had become central to

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 421.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 405.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 421.
See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 5.
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the nation’s economic well-being.163 Yet, the Court decided the
case as the Missouri Crisis raged in Congress, and it had obvious
implications for slavery.164 For a Chief Justice who is famous for
his political acumen when ruling in cases like Marbury,165 it
would have been an especially inopportune moment to declare
that Congress had virtually unlimited federal powers.
In fact, Justice Marshall himself did not view McCulloch as
a precedent for expansive federal powers.166 Soon after the Court
announced its decision, the Richmond Enquirer published a series
of essays arguing that McCulloch’s reasoning threatened to
consolidate power in the federal government.167 In a remarkable
turn of events, Justice Marshall anonymously published a series
of responses in the Philadelphia Union168 and Alexandria
Gazette.169 In the words of legal historian Gerald Gunther:
[T]he thrust of Marshall’s response was to deny that charge
of consolidation, to insist, with more emphasis than in
McCulloch itself, that those principles did not give Congress
carte blanche, that they did preserve a true federal system in
which the central government was limited in its powers—
and that the limits were capable of judicial enforcement.170

For example, in his Friend of the Constitution essay of July
5, Marshall says, “[i]n no single instance does the court admit the
unlimited power of congress to adopt any means whatever, and
thus to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution.”171
163. See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 5 (1969) (“To conclude that the Bank was constitutional was to beat a moribund
horse.”).
164. Id. at 8.
165. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 53.
166. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 353.
167. See GUNTHER, supra note 163, at 55 (“If the Congress of the United States should
think proper to legislate to the full extent, upon the principles now adjudicated by the
supreme court, it is difficult to say how small would be the remnant of power left in the hands
of the state authorities.”). Although the authors used pseudonyms, the essays were probably
written by William Brockenbrough and Spencer Roane, both of whom were prominent
judges on the Virginia Court of Appeals and well-known for their Jeffersonian principles.
Id. at 1.
168. See Gerald Gunther, John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”: In Defense
and Elaboration of McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1969).
169. Id.
170. See Gunther, supra note 168, at 19.
171. Id. at 186-87. He further writes that “not a syllable uttered by the court[] applies
to an enlargement of the powers of congress. The reasoning of the judges is opposed to that
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Moreover, the Marshall Court adopted a narrow reading of
Congress’s implied powers in subsequent cases, rarely cited
McCulloch, and never cited its discussion of implied powers
when deciding other federalism issues.172 If the conventional
view of McCulloch as a precedent for expansive federal powers
is correct, the Court and Justice Marshall seem to have been
completely unaware.
Slavery’s influence on federal powers is perhaps most
evident in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
institution of slavery was deeply embedded within interstate and
international commerce. Slaves primarily produced cash crops
like tobacco, rice, and cotton that were bound for interstate and
international markets.173 Enslaved people were also important
articles of interstate commerce themselves, because masters in the
Upper South sold millions of slaves to fuel development in the
Deep South, where brutal conditions produced high mortality
rates.174 The interstate slave trade was thus key to slavery’s
expansion and an important feature of the southern economy.175
Revisionists who support the modern reach of the Commerce
Clause thus cannot simply rely on changing economic
circumstances.176 Because slave labor was local economic
activity that substantially effected interstate (and international)
commerce, modern doctrine would unquestionably empower
Congress to regulate or abolish slavery.
The antebellum Supreme Court, however, never suggested
that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to regulate any
aspect of slavery. Because Congress did not attempt to regulate
the interstate slave trade, the Court never had occasion to rule on
that issue. However, this lack of federal regulation was no
accident. In Slavery and the Commerce Power, historian David
Lightner concludes, “during both the drawing up of the
Constitution and the battle over ratification, it never entered the
restricted construction which would embarrass congress . . . but makes no allusion to a
construction enlarging the grant beyond the meaning of its ends.” Id. at 182.
172. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 59.
173. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 32.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
176. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 21.
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minds of most southerners that the Constitution gave Congress
the authority to outlaw the interstate slave trade.”177 Lightner
continues to explain that, although a faction of the abolitionist
movement thought Congress could regulate the interstate slave
trade, this position lacked any serious support in national politics
or the judiciary.178
Although the Court never staked out a position on the
interstate slave trade, it broadly interpreted state power over
slavery and clearly stated (albeit in dicta) that the commerce
power could not reach slavery within the states.179 Before
examining the Court’s decisions, however, it is important to
understand the context in which they arose. Each of the cases
discussed below implicate the State’s power to regulate the
interstate movement of people—passengers, immigrants, and
slaves. The Court, however, never ruled on the most contentious
such state law.
South Carolina’s Negro Seaman’s Act required all black
sailors who left their ships in a South Carolina port to be jailed
until the vessel left harbor.180 After Denmark Vesey’s attempted
slave insurrection in 1822, South Carolinians became paranoid
that outsiders, and especially free blacks, would incite revolt by
spreading dangerous ideas of freedom and equality.181 Many
other states followed suit with similar legislation targeting free
blacks and antislavery speech.182 White southerners believed
such legislation was essential to slavery’s survival and thus the
preservation of southern society.183
In Elkison v. Deliesseline, Justice William Johnson
challenged southern control over slavery by ruling that the Negro
Seaman’s Act was unconstitutional.184 While riding circuit,
Justice Johnson held that the law was unconstitutional because
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive
177. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 33.
178. See id. at 59.
179. See id. at 65, 68-69.
180. See id. at 66.
181. See MICHAEL A. SCHOEPPNER, MORAL CONTAGION: BLACK ATLANTIC
SAILORS, CITIZENSHIP, AND DIPLOMACY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 3 (2019).
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
184. 8 F. Cas. 493, 498 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
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in nature.185 Southerners, however, rejected the decision as an
attack on slavery, and South Carolina brazenly continued to
enforce the law.186 In a private letter, Chief Justice John Marshall
criticized Johnson’s decision and worried that Southerners would
“break” the Constitution before they would “submit” to Johnson’s
ruling,187 and the Supreme Court never intervened.
Justice Marshall issued his landmark decision in Gibbons v.
Ogden just one year after Johnson’s controversial decision in
Elkison.188 Gibbons arose from a challenge to an exclusive New
York license to navigate certain waters that connected the state to
New Jersey.189 In his argument for Gibbons, Daniel Webster
argued that the New York licensing law was invalid because, as
Justice Johnson had held while riding circuit, the Commerce
Clause granted Congress an exclusive power over interstate
commerce.190 However, despite Webster’s deserved reputation
as a nationalist, he interpreted the scope of the commerce power
quite narrowly. He acknowledged that a broad view of the
commerce power was possible by saying “[a]lmost all of the
business and intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally,
more or less, with commercial regulations.”191 However, he
rejected the argument that Congress could regulate local matters
merely because they were “connected” to interstate commerce.
Instead, he argued, the Commerce Clause should be interpreted in
light of its underlying purpose. This purpose, he said, was simply
the elimination of “embarrassing and destructive” trade barriers
between the states that had existed under the Articles of
Confederation.192 Interpreting commerce in light of this purpose,
he argued, meant that federal power was limited to the regulation
of trade and navigation.193
185. Id. at 495.
186. SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 47.
187. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 66-67.
188. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186 (1824).
189. Id. at 1-2.
190. Id. at 186.
191. Id. at 9-10.
192. Id. at 11.
193. In his article, The Gibbons Fallacy, Richard Primus contends that Webster urged
the Court to hold that Congress had the exclusive power to regulate all “domestic commerce
as one integrated system . . . .” Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 583-84. When
combined with federal exclusivity, Primus says, such a broad reading of the commerce power
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Webster warned that a more expansive interpretation of
commerce would be dangerous to federalism and state
sovereignty. He argued that a broad view of commerce as
extending to all economic activity would:
[A]cknowledge[] the right of Congress, over a vast scope of
internal legislation, which no one has heretofore supposed to
be within its powers. But this is not all; for it is admitted,
that when Congress and the States have power to legislate
over the same subject, the power of Congress, when
exercised, controls or extinguishes the State power; and,
therefore, the consequence would seem to follow, from the
argument, that all State legislation, over such subjects as
have been mentioned, is, at all times, liable to the superior
power of Congress; a consequence, which no one would
admit for a moment. The truth was, he thought, that all these
things were, in their general character, rather regulations of
police than of commerce, in the constitutional understanding
of that term.194

In this quote, Webster is saying that the mere possibility of
federal regulation over local activities was “a consequence which
no one would admit for a moment” because the Supremacy
Clause would allow Congress to overrule the states.195 Of course,
federal supremacy over local conditions would also violate the
national consensus on slavery—something that Webster clearly
invoked when he warned that, if Congress and the states had a
concurrent power over commerce, federal law could overrule
state commercial legislation, including New York’s ban on
slavery.196 He thus urged the Court to view commercial
legislation narrowly, so that the federal government had no power

would have invalidated most state economic legislation. Id. at 584. Webster, however, said
nothing of the sort. The “God-like Daniel” and “Expounder of the Constitution” would never
have made such an impractical argument, and its strains credulity to suggest otherwise. See
ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 9, 162, 613 (1997) (using
Webster’s nicknames). Instead, as explained above, Webster understood that federal
exclusivity would require a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. See Gibbons, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) at 14 (“[T]he words must have a reasonable construction, and the power should
be considered as exclusively vested in Congress, so far, and so far only, as the nature of the
power requires.”).
194. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 19 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id. at 20-21.
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to interfere with state legislation enacted under the police
power.197
In Gibbons, Justice Marshall found a way to adopt the basic
thrust of Webster’s argument while still preserving the national
consensus on slavery.198 With Justice Johnson’s recent decision
on the Negro Seaman’s Act likely on his mind,199 Marshall did
not adopt Webster’s argument that the federal commerce power
was exclusive. Instead, he held that New York’s exclusive license
was invalid because it conflicted with a federal steamboat
license.200 The federal license was valid, Justice Marshall held,
because the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
“prescrib[e] rules for carrying on” the “commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations . . . .”201
Although Justice Marshall held that commerce included
navigation, he followed Webster by saying that the Commerce
Clause did not extend to that “which is completely internal” to a
state.202 This was true, he said, because “[t]he enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the
exclusively internal commerce of a State.”203 In other words,
because the Commerce Clause grants Congress power only over
commerce “among” the states, the text implies that Congress has
no power over intrastate commerce.204 But Marshall did not leave
this point up to implication. He further says that the:
[G]enius and character of the whole government seem to be,
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the

197. Id. at 19-20.
198. Id. at 239-40.
199. See SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 6-7 (asserting that Gibbons and other
Commerce Clause cases “were adjudicated with an eye towards the effects on the Seamen
Acts”).
200. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 24, 27.
201. Id. at 189-90.
202. Id. at 193-95.
203. Id. at 195.
204. Id. Presumably, Justice Marshall must have thought that using the Necessary and
Property Clause to reach internal commerce would similarly violate the text of the Commerce
Clause. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
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States generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular State . . . .205

Marshall continues to say that “[s]uch a power [over
intrastate conduct] would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary.”206 Because Marshall elsewhere uses the word
“convenient” when interpreting the Necessary and Proper
Clause,207 his statement strongly implies that Congress cannot use
that Clause to expand the commerce power to reach intrastate
commerce. If any doubt remained, he further stated: “completely
internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved
for the State itself.”208 As Webster forcefully argued, state power
is not “reserved” when the federal government can overrule state
legislation.209 Gibbons is thus best understood as holding that
Congress’s commerce power, even when supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, did not apply to intrastate
commerce.210
Justice Marshall’s cautious approach to federal powers
should come as no surprise. Marshall was a wealthy Virginian
205. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 194.
207. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
208. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
209. See id. at 31, 34-35.
210. In The Gibbons Fallacy, Primus asserts that Marshall’s opinion is relatively
consistent with modern doctrine on the scope of federal power. See Primus, The Gibbons
Fallacy, supra note 5, at 591. According to Primus, although the Commerce Clause does
not directly extend to intrastate commerce, Gibbons holds that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows Congress to reach local commerce as an implied power. Id. at 574-75.
According to Primus, this distinction was important to Marshall because he believed that the
Commerce Clause made federal power over interstate commerce exclusive, whereas the
Necessary and Proper Clause was not. As a result, the states had concurrent power over local
commerce but no power to interfere with interstate trade. Id. at 591. Although Primus
presents a creative argument, it is not historically accurate. Marshall did not invent an
ingenious argument for federal exclusivity over trade and concurrent authority over local
economic activities, as Primus contends. See id. at 590-92. Instead, Marshall found a way
to adopt the basic thrust of Webster’s argument while still preserving the national consensus
on slavery. See id. at 584-85, 613. As explained above, Justice Johnson had declared that
South Carolina’s Negro Seaman Act was unconstitutional because Congress had the
exclusive power to regulate interstate and international commerce. See supra notes 185-88
and accompanying text. Marshall thought Johnson’s decision was unwise because he knew
that the South would never tolerate any interference with state authority over slavery, and
many Southerners thought restrictions on free blacks were necessary to maintain control over
the enslaved. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. Although Marshall said that
Webster’s argument for exclusivity had “great force” he was probably unwilling to adopt it
because of the national consensus on slavery. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
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who bought and sold hundreds of enslaved people throughout his
lifetime.211 According to historian Paul Finkelman, “in slavery
cases, Marshall’s opinions were cautious, narrow, legalistic, and
hostile to freedom.”212 Moreover, in his biography of Justice
Marshall, Kent Newmyer similarly states that Marshall’s
approach to “federalism deferred to the states on the question of
slavery.”213 Justice Marshall probably had no inclination to
challenge state sovereignty over slavery through an expansive
interpretation of implied federal powers. When Marshall said that
federal legislation must be consistent with the “spirit of the
constitution,”214 he may very well have had state sovereignty over
slavery on his mind.
The Taney Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
similarly supported the national consensus on slavery. In Mayor
of New York v. Miln, the Court broadly interpreted the state’s
police power to include the power to regulate the entry of
immigrants because doing so was necessary to guard against the
introduction of “moral pestilence” as well as physical disease.215
The reference to “moral pestilence” was not lost on the southern
states, which had used similar language to justify racial
“quarantine” laws like the Negro Seamen Acts and prohibitions
on abolitionist literature.216 In fact, New York warned the Court
that any ruling against its immigration law would call into
question “a class of laws peculiar to the southern states,
prohibiting traffic with slaves, and prohibiting masters of vessels
from bringing people of colour in their vessels.”217 Slavery thus
pushed the Court in Miln to interpret state police powers broadly
and to reject federal exclusivity over the entry of immigrants.218
The Taney Court returned to the issue of slavery and the
Commerce Clause in Groves v. Slaughter.219 The case arose
211. FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 31.
212. See id. at 28.
213. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 434 (La. St. Univ. Press 2001).
214. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819).
215. 36 U.S. 102, 142-43 (1837).
216. See SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 106-07.
217. Miln, 36 U.S. at 109.
218. See id. at 111-12.
219. 40 U.S. 449, 464 (1841).
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when Moses Groves purchased slaves from Robert Slaughter and
used a promissory note as partial payment.220 Groves, however,
claimed that the note was invalid because Mississippi’s
constitution stated, “[t]he introduction of slaves into this state, as
merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the
first day of May, 1833.”221 Despite the plain meaning of the text,
the Court held that the Mississippi Constitution was not selfexecuting and thus, required legislation to go into effect.222 The
Court thus bent over backwards to avoid ruling on slavery.223
Justice John McLean of Ohio, however, wrote separately to
address the parties’ argument that federal power over interstate
commerce was exclusive.224 McLean was easily the most
antislavery justice on the Court, and he would later dissent in the
Court’s two most consequential proslavery opinions: Prigg v.
Pennsylvania225 and Dred Scott v. Sanford.226 Justice McLean
declared that “[t]he power over slavery belongs to the states
respectively. It is local in its character, and in its effects[.]”227 A
state therefore could ban the sale of slaves into its territory
because “the transfer or sale of slaves cannot be separated from
this power” over slavery.228 Although a state could not ban the
importation of cotton or fabrics from other states, McLean said,
the sale of slaves was different because “the Constitution acts
upon slaves as persons, and not as property.”229 Moving beyond
doctrine, he went so far as to declare that a state’s power to ban

220. Id. at 455.
221. Id. at 451-52.
222. Id. at 500-01.
223. Id.
224. Groves, 40 U.S. at 503-04.
225. 41 U.S. 539, 658 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting).
226. 60 U.S. 393, 545 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting). Antislavery leader Salmon P.
Chase said Justice McLean was “a good man and an honest man, [whose] sympathies [were]
with the enslaved.” Salmon P. Chase, Letter to Charles Sumner (April 24, 1847), in 2 THE
SALMON CHASE PAPERS 149 (John Niven, ed. 1994). Chase would later serve as the
Governor of Ohio, U.S. Senator, Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln, and Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. For more on McLean, see generally FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(1937).
227. Groves, 40 U.S. at 508.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 507.
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slavery was “higher and deeper than the Constitution.”230
McLean’s opinion shows why the federal consensus was nearly
universally accepted—it not only protected slavery in the South,
but it also preserved freedom in the North.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney felt compelled to respond.231
Like Justice McLean, he said that the power to regulate slavery
“is exclusively with the several states[.]”232 Taney elaborated that
the states had the exclusive power “to determine their condition
and treatment within their respective territories: and the action of
the several states upon this subject cannot be controlled by
Congress, either by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or
by virtue of any power conferred by the Constitution of the United
States.”233 Taney did not justify his conclusion by saying that
there was a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause. Instead,
he said that Congress’s commerce power was so narrow that “the
regulations of Congress, already made, appear to cover the whole,
or very nearly the whole ground[.]”234
This Article’s discussion of slavery’s impact on the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is one, admittedly incomplete,
example of slavery’s influence on the Constitution. However,
this example shows that the Court was unwilling to interpret
federal power in a way that could challenge the national
consensus on slavery.

230. Id. at 508.
231. See id.
232. Grover, 40 U.S. at 508.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 509. Justice Baldwin also wrote separately, though he concluded that, if the
Mississippi ban on importing slaves were self-enforcing, it would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. See id. at 515-17. He narrowly defined “‘[c]ommerce among the states,’
as . . . ‘trade,’ ‘traffic,’ ‘intercourse,’ and dealing in articles of commerce between states, by
its citizens or others, and carried on in more than one state.” Id. at 511. He distinguished
this from the police power of the states, which, he said, “relates only to the internal concerns
of one state, and commerce, within it . . . .” Grover, 40 U.S. at 511. He further explained
that slavery within the states was “a matter of internal police, over which the states have
reserved the entire control; they, and they alone, can declare what is property capable of
ownership . . . .” Id. at 515. Justice Baldwin thus concluded that, although the Commerce
Clause extended to the interstate traffic in slaves, it could not reach intrastate economic
activity. See id. at 515-17.
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IV. THE REVISIONIST HISTORY OF FEDERAL
POWERS
The revisionist history of federal powers is a story of
constitutional redemption. According to this story, the Framers
created a national government that was capable of solving every
problem that required a national solution. The Marshall Court
then broadly interpreted federal power in canonical cases like
McCulloch and Gibbons. The proslavery Taney Court, however,
retreated from the true meaning of the Constitution by artificially
limiting federal power to protect state sovereignty over slavery.
The Court later continued to limit federal power to facilitate the
retreat from Reconstruction and establishment of Jim Crow.
When the Court dramatically expanded federal power in the New
Deal era, it was returning to the principles of the original
Constitution and the logical implications of the Marshall Court’s
great decisions. Although the revisionists tell a nice story, it is a
work of historical fiction.
A. The Enumeration Principle
A growing number of revisionist scholars argue that the
enumeration of Congress’s powers in Article I should not be seen
as a limitation on the scope of federal authority.235 These
revisionists acknowledge that Article I and the Tenth Amendment
limit Congress to its enumerated powers.236 They argue,
however, that Congress’s enumerated powers are broad enough
to leave nothing beyond the reach of the federal government.237
235. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 56; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 932; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 415-16; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 567;
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 1-4; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration,
supra note 5, at 576; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at 2003-05.
236. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at
26, 29; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 938; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 496; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 571;
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 6-7, 24; Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, supra note 5, at 581-82, 629-30; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra
note 5, at 2007, 2010.
237. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 56; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 932; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 415-16; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 567;
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In doing so, they challenge the conventional wisdom and
reasoning of several modern Supreme Court decisions that limit
the scope of the federal Commerce Power.238 In NFIB v. Sebelius,
for example, Chief Justice Roberts contends that “[t]he
enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because
‘[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’”239 I
will refer to this idea as the “enumeration principle.” Legal
scholars have advanced at least three different lines of reasoning
to argue that history does not support the enumeration principle.
None of these arguments, however, withstands scrutiny.
1. The Unimportance of Enumeration
Richard Primus, who has written several articles on the
enumeration principle,240 contends that we can be faithful to the
Founders’ design while still rejecting the enumeration principle
because the Founders cared far more about process limits—such
as elections and separation of powers—than doctrinal limitations
on federal power like enumeration.241 He further asserts that the
public rejected enumeration as an adequate safeguard for
individual rights when it demanded a bill of rights that would
impose external constraints on federal power.242 Because the
Founders’ real concern was in limiting federal power and
preserving individual rights, he argues, we can abandon the
enumeration principle in favor of more important process limits
and external constraints.243
As demonstrated above, however, white southerners saw
enumeration as a critical component of the Constitution’s
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 2-4; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration,
supra note 5, at 576; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at 2004-05.
238. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); see also NFIB v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 532-37 (2012).
239. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 534 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195
(1824)).
240. See e.g., Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5; Primus, The Gibbons
Fallacy, supra note 5; Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5; Primus, The Limits
of Enumeration, supra note 5; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5.
241. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 5, at 615-17. Primus calls this the
“internal-limits canon.”
242. See id. at 617-18.
243. See id. at 623-25.
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protections for slavery, and complete state sovereignty over
slavery—i.e., the national consensus—was perhaps the most
fundamental principle of the antebellum constitutional order.244
It may be true that some delegates to the Constitutional
Convention thought that the Three-Fifths Clause and Slave Trade
Clause were more significant,245 but the historical record shows
that most Founders were adamant about limiting the scope of
federal power.246
Moreover, public concern over the adequacy of enumeration
does not suggest that it was rejected or that it was so unimportant
that it can be ignored. Instead, history shows only that the
Framers sought overlapping devices to protect liberty, including
the separation of powers, enumeration, and the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the people did not trust any single method to protect
liberty does not mean that we can ignore any of them today.247
2. Rejection of Textualism
Scholars also object to the enumeration principle by pointing
out that some Founders and members of the early Congress did
not see the text as an enforceable document.248 Early uncertainty
about the nature of the Constitution, however, provides little
reason to reject the enumeration principle today. Although the
contested nature of constitutional meaning in the eighteenth
century is fascinating from the standpoint of history, the fact
244. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
245. In Reframing Article I, Section 8, Primus specifically addresses slavery’s impact
on the constitutional convention. Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at
2021-24. Following his earlier work, Primus argues that enumeration was not important to
southern delegates because they counted on structural provisions like the Three-Fifths Clause
to protect slavery. See id. However, Primus’s argument does not seriously engage with the
national consensus on slavery after the Founding.
246. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
247. A hypothetical may help to illustrate the point. Suppose that the Constitution had
originally granted a police power to Congress along with a bill of rights. Suppose further
that the people ratified the Constitution only on the understanding that subsequent
amendments would limit Congress to a list of enumerated powers. Under this hypothetical,
would it make sense to say that the courts could ignore the bill of rights in the original
constitution? Although such an argument would be highly problematic, it is like Primus’s
argument in every way that matters.
248. See Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5, at 462-69; SCHWARTZ,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 25.
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remains that the textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation, i.e., reading the text like an enforceable statute,
won out in Congress and the Courts by the turn of the nineteenth
century.249 More fundamentally, as explained above, even the
representatives who viewed the Constitution as an abstract
framework did not think that it was infinitely malleable.250
Although many representatives in the 1790s believed that the
Constitution merely created a framework for government,
complete state sovereignty over local economic activities was a
central component of that framework. There is simply no
historical evidence that any prominent public figure thought the
federal government had the power—enumerated or not—to
regulate slavery within the states.251 In other words, although
some representatives briefly rejected the enumeration principle in
the 1790s, none seem to have rejected the national consensus on
slavery or the fact that federal power was inherently limited.252
3. Slavery as an Exception to Inherently Broad Federal Powers
In The Spirit of the Constitution, David Schwartz attempts to
reconcile the conventional reading of McCulloch with the
constitutional history of slavery.253 According to Schwartz, the
Marshall Court “retreated from the more expansive ideas of
implied powers expressed in McCulloch” to keep the Court out of

249. GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 203.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 73-84. For example, Fisher Ames, a
proponent of the Bank and unenumerated powers, said that “he ‘did not contend for an
arbitrary and unlimited discretion in the government to do everything. . . .’” See GIENAPP,
supra note 98, at 203.
251. Although some representatives argued that Congress had the power to “legislate
in the general interest” during the bank debate. Id. at 210. The national consensus on slavery
implies that this “general interest” was distinct from local activities. In fact, many of the
bank’s defenders argued that Congress’s implied powers should be limited to national objects
that the states could not regulate. Id. at 218. Moreover, it is probably no coincidence that
southerners generally favored a narrower and textualist approach to federal powers during
the debate. Id. at 212.
252. See id. at 222 (Ames), 227-28 (Madison), 244 (Hamilton).
253. Although Schwartz acknowledges that McCulloch is “deeply ambiguous,” he
somehow concludes that “the logic of implied powers spelled out in McCulloch could, when
applied to the Commerce Clause, justify all present-day federal regulation of the economy.”
SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 4-5, 23.
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the growing controversy over slavery.254 The Taney Court, he
further asserts, then sought to “protect the constitutional position
of slavery” by “in essence, not overruling but actually reversing
the direction of McCulloch.”255 The Court’s doctrine of “reserved
state powers,” he further contends, emerged to accommodate state
control over slavery and Jim Crow.256 Schwartz thus argues that
the enumeration principle—the idea that there must be something
Congress cannot regulate—is an artificial constraint that should
be rejected as a relic of constitutional evil.257 In other words, he
concludes that, because slavery was an external constraint on
otherwise broad federal power, the Thirteenth Amendment
requires us to reject slavery’s influence on the Constitution and
return to a broad understanding of federal powers.258
Schwartz, however, gets it exactly backwards. Slavery did
not operate as an external constraint on otherwise broad federal
power. Instead, slavery was a powerful motivation for the
antebellum consensus that all federal powers were inherently
limited in scope. The abolition of slavery thus did not open the
way to a return to strong federal powers, because federal powers
were never understood to be expansive in the first place.259
Although abolition should have reduced the motivation to limit
federal powers in the future, it did not change the historical fact
that federal powers had always been limited in scope. Any
expansion of federal power thus must arise from the new powers
granted in the Reconstruction Amendments or an evolving (i.e.,
non-originalist) understanding of federal powers under the

254. Id. at 5, 87-88.
255. Id. at 87-88.
256. Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 933.
257. Id. at 934. Schwartz derisively calls the enumeration principle the
“‘mustbesomething’ rule.” Id. at 939.
258. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 98 (“[S]ome
of the justices seemed to view slavery as legally unique—as though there were a slavery
exception to the Commerce Clause . . . .”).
259. In fact, Schwartz acknowledges that Marshall’s decision in McCulloch was
ambiguous and could be read to endorse a more limited approach to federal powers. Id. at
5. After discussing the case, however, the remainder of the book appears to assume that the
nationalist reading of the decision is correct. If the narrower reading of the case is correct,
as this Article argues, then the Court did not “retreat” from anything. Instead, subsequent
Marshall and Taney Court decisions were perfectly consistent with both the founding and
McCulloch.
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original Constitution. Pretending otherwise is an attempt to write
the history of slavery out of the Constitution.
B. Living Originalism: Text and Principle
Focusing on the history of the Founding, progressive
originalists like Jack Balkin similarly argue that constitutional
history supports a virtually unbounded approach to federal
powers.260 In his book, Living Originalism, and a series of related
articles, Balkin advances a method of constitutional interpretation
he calls “text and principle.”261 As he explains, “[t]he basic idea
is that interpreters must be faithful to the original meaning of the
constitutional text and to the principles that underlie the text.”262
In referring to the “original meaning of the constitutional text,”
Balkin means the semantic or linguistic meaning of the words in
context.263 After finding this original linguistic meaning, he
argues, courts should construct doctrine that advances the text’s
underlying principles.264 These principles, he asserts, should be
defined broadly to create a framework that can change and adapt
over time.265 Under his approach, therefore, the Framers’
expectations of how the text would apply to concrete issues are
not binding today.266
Balkin contends that the principle underlying Congress’s
enumerated powers, including the Commerce Clause, is “to give
Congress power to legislate in all cases where states are
separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might
be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.”267 He
draws this principle from Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan,
260. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 138-40, 143, 146, 298; see
Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 3, 6, 12, 16-18; see Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551, 567-75 (2009); see Jack Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292, 297-98 (2007).
261. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 3.
262. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 260, at
551-52.
263. Id. at 551-52.
264. Id. at 553-54.
265. Id. at 553-59.
266. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 4-5.
267. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 140; Balkin, Commerce, supra
note 6, at 6.
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which Edmund Randolph introduced at the Constitutional
Convention.268 According to Balkin, the Committee of Detail
drafted Congress’s enumerated powers to effectuate this
principle, and Federalists like James Wilson used it to explain the
nature of federal power during the Ratification debates.269
The Founders, however, rejected Resolution VI precisely
because it violated state sovereignty and the national consensus
on slavery.270 As delegates like Pierce Butler of South Carolina
immediately recognized, Congress could have used Resolution
VI to justify the abolition of slavery by asserting that abolition
was in the national interest.271 In fact, it was commonly argued
that the threat of slave insurrections posed a threat to national
security, especially during times of war with foreign powers.272
As historians recognize, the Convention did not accept the
substance of Resolution VI; instead, the delegates voted to
approve it only as a placeholder so that the Convention could
move forward.273 The Framers did not even mention Resolution
VI when debating the scope of the powers drafted by the
Committee of Detail, and there is no record of its mention during
the debates over Ratification.274 The enumerated powers were not
meant to reflect Resolution VI because the Framers understood
that, to preserve state sovereignty (over slavery), Congress’s
powers must be limited in scope.
Although it may be difficult to admit, the national consensus
on slavery was part of the principle underlying Congress’s
enumerated powers. As detailed above, the Founders agreed that

268. Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 8-9.
269. Id. at 8-10.
270. Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve
Collective Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 213435, 2137-39 (2012).
271. As explained above, when Resolution VI was first introduced, Pierce Butler (of
South Carolina) feared that “we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of
the States . . . .” I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 53.
Later in the debates, Butler explained that “[t]he security the Southn. States want is that their
negroes may not be taken from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a
very good mind to do.” Id. at 605.
272. Schwartz, An Error and An Evil, supra note 5, at 995-96.
273. Lash, supra note 270, at 2134; JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 177-78 (1996).
274. Lash, supra note 270, at 2138-39.
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Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the states. This
was true in the North as well in the South, during the Convention
and Ratification, and even among the most antislavery of the
Founders.275 The principle underlying federal powers thus could
better be stated as follows:
Congress has the power to legislate in all cases where states
are separately incompetent or where the interests of the
nation might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state
action (i.e., Resolution VI); provided, however, that the
states have complete and exclusive autonomy over intrastate
activities, regardless of their effects on interstate commerce
(i.e., the national consensus on slavery).

Of course, this principle is a relatively accurate statement of
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence prior to the New
Deal. It is also similar to the principle that Daniel Webster—the
nationalist “Expounder of the Constitution”—identified as a
lawyer in Gibbons.276 Although post-ratification history is
certainly not dispositive, this consistency is no coincidence. As
Balkin himself admits, post-ratification history is circumstantial
evidence of both text and principle.277 His failure to engage
seriously with the history of slavery in his work on living
originalism is thus particularly striking.
Balkin might object that the “principle” underlying the
Commerce Clause should be defined at a higher level of
generality than the national consensus on slavery. His theory
“views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance
that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time
through constitutional construction. The goal is to get politics
started and keep it going (and stable) so that it can solve future
problems of governance.”278 The national consensus on slavery,
however, is just this type of framework principle. Rather than
straitjacket constitutional meaning for all issues, it would simply
275. As explained above, opponents of slavery hoped that ending the international
slave trade and empowering Congress to ban slavery’s expansion into the territories would
destroy the institution.
276. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824). For more on Webster,
see REMINI, supra note 193, at 28-29, 162.
277. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 260, at
551-52.
278. Id. at 550.
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dictate the division of authority between the state and federal
governments. The Framers also saw it as a necessary condition
of ratification and peace within the Union.
Although the division of power dictated by the national
consensus may not fit Balkin’s policy preferences, produce
normatively desirable results, or match modern doctrine, it is hard
to explain why it is wrong under his theory of constitutional
interpretation. Balkin’s text and principle method purports to
look for the actual historical principles that guided the
Founders.279 Of course, the Founders also wanted to produce an
effective and just government. If these are seen as the underlying
principles, however, his method would better be called “text and
free-floating concepts of justice.” However, this would eliminate
any recognizable form of originalism from his theory of Living
Originalism.
Balkin takes other theories of originalism to task for their
inability to explain constitutional progress on issues like
segregation, women’s rights, and federal power.280 He also
argues that Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change is
unnecessary because the New Deal’s expansion of federal power
is perfectly consistent with the “Constitution’s original meaning,
its text, or its underlying principles.”281 His theory, however,
explains the reality of expansive federal power only by ignoring
the most obvious candidate for the actual principle underlying the
Commerce Clause and by fabricating an expansive alternative
that has little basis in history. Of course, using the national
consensus on slavery as a fundamental principle to interpret the
Constitution today would strike most people as illegitimate. It is
slavery’s very illegitimacy, however, that demonstrates why
constitutional doctrine should not be bound by the principles (or
intent) of the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution of
1787.

279. Id. at 551-53.
280. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 2.
281. Id. at 4.
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V. SLAVERY, ORIGINALISM, AND THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION
The scope of federal powers is one of the most significant
issues in constitutional law. In NFIB, the Supreme Court came
within one vote of striking down the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”), perhaps the most significant federal legislation of the
twenty-first century.282 In fact, by making Medicaid expansion
voluntary with each state, the Court invalidated a central
provision of the ACA and effectively prevented millions of
Americans from getting health insurance.283 The Justices who
voted against the ACA did so to protect “the independent power
of the States” in our federal system.284
The Obama
Administration’s expansive view of federal power, Chief Justice
Roberts warned, “would . . . permit[] Congress to reach beyond
the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.’”285 The Roberts Court could use the same reasoning to
strike down any new legislation that expands the role of the
federal government or its oversight of state programs. Just as the
Hughes Court gutted the New Deal before 1936,286 the Roberts
Court could impede urgently needed federal action on issues
ranging from climate change to pandemic relief.
The revisionist attempt to forestall this result is
understandable. History is influential to the Roberts Court, and
this is particularly true with respect to its federalism
jurisprudence.287 However, it is extremely unlikely that the
revisionist history of scholars like Balkin, Primus, or Schwartz
will convince the Justices to change course. Groundbreaking
work on the history of the Second Amendment, affirmative
action, and state action doctrine, to name just a few examples,
282. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 524 (2012).
283. Id. at 588, 599.
284. Id. at 536.
285. Id. at 554 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
286. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 201-02
(1994).
287. See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 533-34; Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854
(2014).
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have had little influence on the Court, notwithstanding the fact
that it is painstakingly researched and historically accurate.288
There is little reason to think that a highly contested revisionist
history of federal powers will fare any better. In fact, even the
Court’s self-identified originalist justices often ignore history
when it does not favor their preferred results.289
Moreover, at this moment of racial reckoning, with
widespread protests against systemic racism and a national debate
over teaching critical race theory, legal scholarship should not
ignore the constitutional history of slavery. The revisionist
history sees slavery as a temporary aberration that can be easily
excised from the Constitution, leaving a coherent and workable
framework for modern life. However, the hard truth is that it is
impossible to understand the Constitution of 1787 without
appreciating the pervasive influence of slavery. Because of the
South’s insistence on complete state autonomy over slavery—the
foundation of its social and economic system—federal powers
were extraordinarily narrow in scope. Pretending otherwise
threatens to obscure the country’s history of racial injustice and
treat it as a phenomenon of the past. The struggle for racial
justice, however, requires a clear-eyed view of the past of white
supremacy and its continuing effects.290 Without such an honest
assessment, the continuing structures of systemic racism can
never be eliminated.291
Recognizing slavery’s influence on the Constitution is not
only necessary to address the legacy of racial injustice, but it also
presents a powerful argument against any theory of constitutional
interpretation that makes historical purpose, principles, beliefs, or
practices dispositive of constitutional meaning.292 Any such
288. See, e.g., Chris Schmitt, Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33, 51-52 (2018); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV.
753, 798 (1985).
289. See SEGALL, supra note 13, at 3, 6-7, 169.
290. See, e.g., Charles W. McKinney, Jr., Beyond Dreams and Mountains: Martin
King’s Challenge to the Arc of History, 49 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 263, 282-83 (2018).
291. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our
Racial History, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 31 (2004) (“The historic serves as a guide to
understanding the present.”).
292. This does not describe all originalist methods of interpretation. An originalist
who believes in the distinction between interpretation and construction may not view historic
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theory must view modern constitutional doctrine, which allows
Congress to regulate local economic matters because they effect
interstate commerce, as illegitimate. Countless federal laws that
enjoy overwhelming public support, ranging from civil rights
protections to criminal laws against child pornography, are thus
unconstitutional from the standpoint of originalism. Admittedly,
most originalists argue that the courts should uphold nonoriginalist precedent under certain circumstances.293 The fact
remains, however, that most federal legislation would be
constitutionally suspect, and the Court may strike down any new
legislation that would expand federal power. An originalist Court
thus could strike down new legislation on critical issues requiring
a national solution, such as medical care or climate change, to
preserve a system that the Founders designed to protect state
autonomy over slavery. Stated simply, understanding the
constitutional history of slavery demonstrates why no one should
accept a strong version of originalism today.
Once originalism is rejected, it is far easier to articulate a
principled justification for a broad view of federal powers. As a
matter of text and logic, Primus’s critique of the enumeration
principle is correct. Rejection of the enumeration principle,
however, requires a dynamic approach to constitutional meaning.
While Primus’s theory may be faithful to the values of liberty and
limited government, it is not faithful to the historical
understanding of the Constitution. He undermines his larger
argument by saying otherwise.
Similarly, there is much to recommend in Balkin’s work on
text and principle. It works well for individual rights protections
that are stated at a high level of generality and that reflect
fundamental shared values, especially those in the Reconstruction
Amendments. As Balkin explains, our conception of how these
fundamental values apply to concrete issues changes over time.
For example, although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
purpose or practices as dispositive. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SOLUM & ROBERT BENNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 3 (2011). Of course, this critique also would
not apply to an originalist approach to the Reconstruction Amendments.
293. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007). However, the fact remains all such federal
legislation would be constitutionally illegitimate from an originalist standpoint.
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thought that segregation was consistent with equal treatment,294
this original expected application is not binding today. As the
Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, we now know that
segregation is incompatible with the principle of equality.295
However, Balkin is wrong to extend the text and principle
approach to the federal powers contained in the Constitution of
1787. This is because, rather than reflecting a fundamental shared
value like equality, the structure of federal powers reflected a
compromise that gave the states complete sovereignty to abolish
or protect slavery. In other words, the Founders sought to
preserve a state’s power to structure its social and political
institutions to enforce white supremacy. A dynamic, “living”
approach to constitutional interpretation thus is the only
legitimate approach to federal powers.
CONCLUSION
Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison famously condemned
the Constitution as a “covenant with death” and an “agreement
with Hell.”296 As Garrison recognized more than 150 years ago,
slavery exerted a profound influence on the structure of the
Constitution and its subsequent interpretation. In fact, from the
founding period until the Civil War, there was a national
consensus that the federal government had no power to interfere
with slavery in the states. Because slavery was a central
component of the country’s economic and social order, the
national consensus dictated that Congress’s powers were far more
limited in the past than they are today. In particular, American
elites agreed that Congress had no power to regulate local
activities merely because they had an effect on interstate
commerce. If Congress could regulate working conditions,
wages, or production, it could abolish slavery as well. Any theory
of constitutional interpretation that looks to original intent,
underlying principles, or early constitutional history therefore
must account for the national consensus on slavery.
294. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5-6 (2006).
295. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
296. See FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 11.
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There is an obvious injustice to using the national consensus
on slavery to interpret the Constitution. After all, slavery was
profoundly unjust, and the country fought its bloodiest war to see
it formally eliminated in the Thirteenth Amendment.297
Whitewashing constitutional history, however, is not the answer.
Instead, legal scholars should plainly acknowledge that the
Constitution’s basic meaning has changed over time. The living
Constitution should be celebrated and defended, not obscured by
a revisionist history that minimizes the Constitution’s complicity
with slavery.

297. Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S.
SENATE, [https://perma.cc/LXD6-MWFB] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
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NONLAWYERS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
LESSONS FROM THE SUNSETTING OF
WASHINGTON’S LLLT PROGRAM
Lacy Ashworth*
INTRODUCTION
Today, the number of attorneys in the world fails to serve the
number of people in need of legal assistance.1 Approximately
sixty percent of law firm partners are baby boomers, meaning
those in their mid-fifties to early seventies, and twenty-five
percent of all lawyers are sixty-five or older.2 These individuals
will predictably retire. Meanwhile, law school costs more than
ever. The average law student graduates $160,000 in debt only to
enter into the legal profession with an average starting salary of
$56,900 in the public sector and $91,200 in the private sector.3 It
is no surprise law schools have recently experienced lower
enrollment numbers.4 Again, we do not have enough lawyers
today to meet the legal needs of our citizens. With a significant
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Articles Editor for
the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author thanks Professor Jordan Woods,
University of Arkansas School of Law, for his invaluable guidance and encouragement
throughout the writing process. The author thanks the passionate, diligent, forthcoming, and
overwhelmingly kind individuals in Washington that were willing to provide their honest
insight into the LLLT program. Without these individuals and all those involved in the
LLLT program, this Comment would not have been possible. The author thanks her family
and Kyle for always believing in her and providing her love and support throughout law
school, and especially her father for selflessly listening to her proofread every sentence of
every draft, and for offering advice and encouragement along the way. In all sincerity, it
takes a village.
1. See discussion infra Part I.
2. Ida O. Abbott, Your Boomer Retirement Problem Won’t Just Fade Away, ATT’Y AT
WORK, [https://perma.cc/P2SM-KUBN] (July 7, 2020).
3. Melanie Hanson, Average Law School Debt, EDUCATIONDATA.ORG,
[https://perma.cc/R2E9-8Q6R] (July 10, 2021).
4. Id. I want to give credit to Interviewee 2 and Interviewee 5 for calling my attention
to the issue of retiring baby boomers. See Zoom Interview 2 with Ltd. License Legal
Technician Bd. Member/Active Ltd. License Legal Technician 4 (Nov. 23, 2020); Telephone
Interview 5 with Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. Member 1 (Dec. 28, 2020).
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percentage of our current lawyers reaching the age of retirement
and less individuals choosing to become lawyers, the amount of
unmet need will only continue to grow.
Recognizing the legal profession—in its traditional sense—
has proven unable to fulfill its duty of providing access to justice
to all, in 2012, Washington state effected the first-ever nonlawyer
license to practice law.5 An individual who attains the license
through education and training is called a Limited License Legal
Technician or “Triple-LT” (“LLLT”).6 In developing the license,
proponents hoped the LLLT would become the nurse practitioner
of the legal field.7 Because this license is the first of its kind, it
attracted the interest of several states and even areas beyond the
United States.8 Now, Utah and Arizona have implemented their
own nonlawyer paraprofessional programs,9 and other states are
considering doing the same.10
5. See Order in the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for
Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-1005, at 1 (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter
2012 Order for APR 28], [https://perma.cc/V72Q-GCBX]; see also Lyle Moran, Washington
Supreme Court Sunsets Limited License Program for Nonlawyers, A.B.A. J. (June 8, 2020,
3:35 PM) [hereinafter Moran, Article on LLLT Sunsetting], [https://perma.cc/X7VX-X95R].
6. Ralph Schaefer, Triple LT Rules ‘Onerous’, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 9, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/7HH3-5PLE]; Robert Ambrogi, Washington State Moves Around UPL,
Using Legal Technicians to Help Close the Justice Gap, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2015, 5:50 AM),
[https://perma.cc/R6B5-MBS8].
7. See Stephen R. Crossland & Paula C. Littlewood, The Washington State Limited
License Legal Technician Program: Enhancing Access to Justice and Ensuring the Integrity
of the Legal Profession, 65 S.C. L. REV. 611, 613-14 (2014); Chief Justice Barbara Madsen
& Stephen Crossland, The Limited License Legal Technician: Making Justice More
Accessible, NWLAWYER, Apr.-May 2013, at 23.
8. Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) Board Public Meeting with State
Supreme Court, TVW 01:16:03-01:16:17 (May 12, 2020, 12:00 PM),
[https://perma.cc/SFL8-RSJP] [hereinafter May 12, 2020 Meeting]. Such states include
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Washington D.C., Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, New York, and Vermont. Id. The outside areas include the Canadian provinces
of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, as well as Singapore. Id. at
01:16:18-01:16:25.
9. See Licensed Paralegal Practitioner, UTAH CTS., [https://perma.cc/Q5WX-5A5Y]
(Feb. 16, 2021) (referring to Utah’s paraprofessionals as “Licensed Paralegal
Practitioner[s]”); Lyle Moran, Arizona Approves Nonlawyer Ownership, Nonlawyer
Licensees in Access-to-Justice Reforms, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 28, 2020, 2:20 PM) [hereinafter
Moran, Article on Arizona Nonlawyer Licensees], [https://perma.cc/LM7U-FA4R] (referring
to Arizona’s nonlawyer licensees as “Legal Paraprofessionals”).
10. See Jason Tashea, Oregon Bar Considering Paraprofessional Licensing and BarTakers Without JDs, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 7, 2019, 10:49 AM), [https://perma.cc/73YH-M4T9];
see also Letter from Stephen R. Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., to
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Despite such interest, on June 4, 2020, eight years into the
program, the Washington State Supreme Court decided to end the
program by a seven-two majority vote.11
The majority
determined that while “[t]he program was an innovative attempt
to increase access to legal services . . . the overall costs of
sustaining the program and the small number of interested
individuals” deemed it an ineffective way to meet such needs.12
At that time, the cost of the program totaled $1.4 million and there
existed only thirty-eight active LLLTs.13 In “sunset[ting]” the
program, the Court allowed existing LLLTs to maintain their
licenses but disallowed the licensing of any new LLLTs after July
31, 2022,14 leaving “at least” 275 people in the process of
obtaining the necessary requirements either racing toward the
finish line or dropping out altogether—losing all invested funds.15
Ironically, only months before the sunsetting, the American Bar
Justices of the Washington State Sup. Ct. 2 (June 19, 2020) [hereinafter Letter in Response
to LLLT Sunsetting] (on file with the Author) (discussing California, New Mexico,
Colorado, Minnesota, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Ontario).
11. See Letter from C.J. Debra L. Stephens, Washington State Sup. Ct., to Stephen
Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., Rajeev Majumdar, President,
Washington State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, and Terra Nevitt, Interim Exec. Dir.,
Washington State Bar Ass’n 1 (June 5, 2020) [hereinafter Letter Notification of Sunsetting]
(writing on behalf of the Washington State Supreme Court, relaying that the majority voted
on June 4, 2020 to sunset the LLLT program); Moran, Article on LLLT
Sunsetting, supra note 5. Throughout this Comment, I also refer to the Washington State
Supreme Court as “the Court.”
12. Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
13. Daniel D. Clark, Treasurer, Wash. State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, WSBA
Treasurer’s Response to the LLLT Program Business Plan, PowerPoint slides 7, 19 (May 12,
2020) [hereinafter Clark PowerPoint] (on file with the Author) (this PowerPoint was
presented at the May 12, 2020 meeting between the LLLT Board, the Washington State
Supreme Court, and other members of the WSBA). Note that there were forty-four licenses
total, but only thirty-eight were active, with four inactive and one suspended. Id. at 7.
14. See Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1-2 (imposing the initial
deadline of July 31, 2021). Shortly after the sunsetting, the LLLT Board asked the Court to
reconsider its decision to sunset the program, or alternatively, to extend the deadline to
August 1, 2023 to allow those in the pipeline to complete the requirements and to allow the
National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) to complete its planned study of the LLLT
program. Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 6. See infra notes 38588 and accompanying text for more information on the planned NCSC study. Inevitably, the
Court met the LLLT Board in the middle, extending the deadline to July 31, 2022. Decision
to Sunset the LLLT Program, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/VU89-6Z4Y]
(Oct. 8, 2021).
15. Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 2, 4 (people in the
pipeline “can ill-afford to absorb the loss of money and time spent pursuing the LLLT
license”); Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 7.
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Association encouraged all jurisdictions “to consider innovative
approaches to the access to justice crisis in order to help the more
than eighty percent of people below the poverty line and the many
middle-income Americans who lack meaningful access to
effective civil legal services.”16
As the push for state-level innovation to meet unmet legal
needs is more prevalent than ever, it is critical for states to look at
Washington’s LLLT program, as it produced the first and longeststanding nurse practitioner-type professional to have entered the
legal profession.17 Because the Court deemed Washington’s
program ineffective,18 states must determine whether, with what
changes, and in what ways a nonlawyer paraprofessional program
might better achieve viability to carry out the intended purpose of
providing affordable legal services. Further, as nontraditional
solutions continue to be considered, future and existing attorneys
must prepare for change and look inward to see how they may
better support and assist in achieving the larger goal that is
providing affordable access to legal services to all. To aid in these
future considerations, this Comment serves as an analysis of the
LLLT program, discussing the lessons that may only be gleaned
from being the first and with the benefit of hindsight.19
To better understand the sunsetting of Washington’s LLLT
program, I conducted interviews with sixteen individuals with

16. DON BIVENS, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED
RESOLUTION 1 (Feb. 2020); see also AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION
115 (Feb. 17, 2020) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 115] (adopting Bivens’ submitted report); New
ABA Policies Endorse Expanding Access to Justice, Voting, A.B.A. (Feb. 24, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/8YTK-YRL3].
17. See Madsen & Crossland, supra note 7; Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra
note 11, at 1.
18. See Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
19. At the time of the writing of this Comment, the June 2020 decision to sunset the
LLLT program is somewhat recent. In fact, the decision has only been voiced by the
Washington State Supreme Court via a letter to the relevant parties. See Letter Notification
of Sunsetting, supra note 11. The Court has yet to provide a formal order officially
documenting the fate of the program, though that order is anticipated. So while those
involved have assuredly considered what went wrong with the program and how they might
have done better to sustain it, because the current priority is supporting those in the pipeline
working toward becoming LLLTs by the Court-imposed deadline, Washington has not yet
had the opportunity to conduct its own formal postmortem. Zoom Interview 13 with Wash.
State Bar Ass’n Exec. Leadership Team Member 4 (Jan. 8, 2021).
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key roles and unique involvement in the program.20 Such
individuals include active LLLTs, members of the LLLT Board
tasked with overseeing the program, previous members of the
Practice of Law Board that initially proposed the program, current
and former members of the Board of Governors (“BOG”) of the
Washington State Bar Association (“WSBA”), members of the
Executive Leadership Team of the WSBA, a family law
practitioner involved with the Family Law Section of the WSBA,
and family law professors that were involved in the development
and teaching of the LLLT curriculum.21 Some individuals wore
multiple hats; for instance, some were on the initial Practice of
Law Board that proposed the program, and later became members
of the LLLT Board.22 Some LLLT Board members were also
active LLLTs.23 These individuals were able to provide
perspectives from each of their respective roles.
Admittedly, the LLLT program and the concept of a
nonlawyer serving clients in the legal profession became a
political and controversial topic for Washington, as it was the first
state to follow through with it.24 The program had its supporters
and opponents from its inception.25 It too had people that were
once opposed and later became supportive of the program, and
20. Interviews were meant to be thorough, not copious. While most of the interviews
were one-on-one, two interviews involved more than one participant. The questions were
meant to elicit qualitative, not quantitative information, so while some questions were posed
to each interviewee, others differed depending on the person’s role in the program.
Interviews were conducted via Zoom and telephone. While five interviews were recorded,
the content of the majority of the interviews were documented using detailed notes.
21. When discussing a controversial topic such as this one, it is important to maintain
focus on the program being examined and to consider the message more so than the specific
messenger. Therefore, throughout this Comment, I omitted the names of the interviewees
and provided only their roles to give context to their perspectives.
22. See Zoom Interview 1 with Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. Member 1 (Nov.
23, 2020); Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4.
23. See Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4; Zoom Interview 3 with Ltd. License Legal
Technician Bd. Member/Active Ltd. License Legal Technician (Dec. 18, 2020); Zoom
Interview 4 with Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. Member/Active Ltd. License Legal
Technician (Dec. 18, 2020).
24. See Zoom Interview 9 with Fam. L. Professor/Ltd. License Legal Technician
Instructor 2 (Nov. 30, 2020) (believing the program fell apart for three political reasons);
Zoom Interview 12 with Wash. State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors Member 7 (Dec. 28, 2020);
Telephone Interview 16 with Wash. State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors Member 5 (Dec. 17,
2020).
25. See infra Section II.A and Part III.
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vice versa.26 Consequently, while the insightful thoughts of
sixteen individuals cannot be considered indicative of the feelings
of all of those involved in the program, the goal was to interview
people with different roles in and views on the program to
counteract a skewed narrative.27
This Comment will be one of the first in-depth inquiries into
the sunsetting of the LLLT program from the perspective of an
outsider and with the insight of some of the key players. It will
add to what surely will be a significant amount of scholarship, as
Washington and other states consider what happened with the
LLLT program and where to go from here. As the program has
been in the making for more than twenty years and has undergone
several changes in that time,28 this Comment does not purport to
take on all of the intricacies that impacted the program or led to
the sunsetting, but it voices the afterthoughts of those involved,
offers additional analysis and commentary on the reasons
provided by the Court in sunsetting the program, and works to
provide versatile and key lessons from the LLLT program that
may be used by other states in developing their own innovative
programs.
This Comment is divided into six parts. Part I discusses the
current breadth of the access to justice phenomenon that has led
to innovative programs being implemented nationwide, such as
Washington’s LLLT program. Part II provides the history of the
LLLT license, its requirements, and the LLLT’s scope of practice.
Part III surveys the legal profession’s reaction to the license. Part
IV discusses both the anticipated success of the program at its
inception and the success actually attained. Part V considers the
reasons behind the demise of the program, including
shortcomings of those tasked with supporting and administering
26. See infra Section III.B.
27. Note also that while interviewees will be able to provide essential information and
insight on the program through their roles, none can truly speak to the mindset of the voting
members of the Washington State Supreme Court that ultimately decided to sunset the
program, and no voice is indicative of all. Interviewee 12 noted that the Washington State
Supreme Court is very available for discussion, and that it is not uncommon for an individual
Justice to have a phone call with someone about court business and policies, so there are
likely conversations regarding the program of which we will never know the content. See
Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 15.
28. See infra note 44 and accompanying text; Ambrogi, supra note 6.
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the program and the structure and concept of the program itself.
Finally, Part VI offers some lessons from the LLLT program that
may be utilized by other states considering implementing similar
nonlawyer programs to be used as potential stones in gradually
bridging the access to justice gap.
I. THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE GAP
To understand the LLLT program as a proposed solution, it
is important to first grasp the gravity of the problem. Access to
justice is defined as the “ability of individuals to seek and obtain
a remedy through formal or informal institutions of justice for
grievances.”29 The access to justice gap is the difference between
the population’s legal needs and “the resources available to meet
those needs.”30 Considering indigent criminal defendants are
afforded the right to free legal representation, it is those in need
of civil legal aid that largely suffer the effects of the access to
justice gap.31
A 2017 study conducted by the Legal Services Corporation
found 71% of low-income households experienced at least one
civil legal problem within the year and received little or no legal
aid in handling 86% of those problems.32 The impact is most felt
by low-income households, as there are more than sixty million
Americans with family incomes below the 125% Federal Poverty
Line, bringing home $30,750 or less for a family of four.33
However, middle-income households are certainly not immune,
considering 40-60% of their legal needs also go unmet.34 These
legal needs are most prevalently related to family, health, estate,
consumer and finance, and housing law.35 The gap is especially
prevalent in family law, where 80-90% of cases involve at least
29. Leonard Wills, Access to Justice: Mitigating the Justice Gap, A.B.A. (Dec. 3,
2017), [https://perma.cc/69ZL-5QAP] (internal quotations omitted).
30. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 9 (2017).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Jennifer S. Bard & Larry Cunningham, The Legal Profession is Failing LowIncome and Middle-Class People. Let’s Fix That, WASH. POST (June 5, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/X6DE-B4E2]; see also Wills, supra note 29.
35. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 30, at 7.
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one self-represented party, and in many cases, both parties find
themselves without legal assistance.36
So, what is the cause of the justice gap? Many fingers point
to cost—the cost of obtaining legal aid generally, and the
complexities of necessary civil litigation that can yield delays and
additional costs.37 For instance, considering 75% of all monetary
civil judgements award less than $5,200, for most civil cases, it
would cost more for a litigant to obtain a lawyer than the potential
financial judgement rendered in the case.38 Even if the litigant
could afford to obtain an attorney for the matter, many attorneys
would choose not to take the case due to the low pay-out.39
Further, lawyers are encouraged, not compelled, to provide pro
bono (free) services under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.40 Most states do not require lawyers to report pro bono
hours.41
Therefore, considering many lawyers enter the
profession with significant debt and a comparatively low salary,42
working pro bono is likely either unfeasible or not made a
priority.
Regardless of the cause of the access to justice gap, with
citizens in every state suffering from an inability to obtain access
to justice for their important legal needs,43 it is fair to assume
every state can agree that the problem is serious enough to warrant
looking outside the box of which the public’s legal needs have
certainly outgrown.

36. NATALIE ANNE KNOWLTON, ET AL., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., CASES WITHOUT COUNSEL: RESEARCH ON EXPERIENCES OF SELFREPRESENTATION IN U.S. FAMILY COURT 1 (2016).
37. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF
CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS iii, v (2015) (“[I]n most jurisdictions state courts hold
a monopoly on procedures to enforce judgements.”); 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5,
at 4.
38. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 37, at iv, vi.
39. See id.
40. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2021).
41. Only nine states require their attorneys to report pro bono hours and Washington is
not one of them. Pro Bono Reporting, A.B.A., [https://perma.cc/9W29-FTFA] (Mar. 19,
2020).
42. See Andrea Fuller, et al., Law School Loses Luster as Debts Mount and Salaries
Stagnate, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 3, 2021, 8:01 AM), [https://perma.cc/NRY6-FZ3M].
43. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 30, at 7.
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II. DEVELOPING THE LLLT PROGRAM
A. The Practice of Law Board
Washington’s innovative thinking surfaced the first
nonlawyer license to practice law. The history of the LLLT dates
back to 2001, when the Washington State Supreme Court
developed the Practice of Law Board to respond to two major
concerns plaguing the state: unmet civil legal needs and the
unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”).44 The Practice of Law
Board consisted of thirteen court-appointed members who were
responsible for reviewing and reporting cases of UPL and
considering and recommending “new avenues for persons not
currently authorized to practice law to provide legal and lawrelated services that might otherwise constitute the practice of law
as defined in [Washington].”45 Any recommendations were to
first be forwarded to the WSBA BOG for “consideration and
comment at least 90 days before” being recommended to the
Court.46 The recommended program was to be created to increase
access to affordable legal services in a way that protects the public
and could be financially self-supporting “within a reasonable
period of time.”47 Note that the Court’s failure, unwillingness, or
inability to define what constitutes a reasonable period of time
would result in one of the program’s greatest points of
contention.48
In fulfilling its duty regarding UPL, the Practice of Law
Board heard terrible cases of people getting taken advantage of
44. WASH. GEN. R. 25; Ambrogi, supra note 6; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 12; Zoom Interview 8 with Fam. L. Professor/Ltd. License Legal Technician Instructor 1 (Dec.
15, 2020). However, keep in mind that those intimately involved discuss the history as going
back even further, to the WSBA committees formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s to
address UPL and “the growing number of people unable to afford professional legal help[,]”
which “was dramatically true in family law cases where courts in the 1970s began reporting
large increases in family law cases involving at least one party not represented by an
attorney.” Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 612-13.
45. WASH. GEN. R. 25(a), (b)(2)-(3). To address UPL, Washington first felt a more
specific definition of the practice of law was necessary. A WSBA committee proposed a
definition, which is captured in Washington’s General Court Rule 24. Crossland &
Littlewood, supra note 7, at 613; WASH. GEN. R. 24.
46. WASH. GEN. R. 25(b)(2).
47. Id. at 25(b)(2)(A), (E).
48. See infra Section V.A.1; see also infra note 389 and accompanying text.

3 ASHWORTH.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)
2/11/22 3:22 PM

698

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:4

when seeking aid from those unauthorized to practice law, who
were sometimes charging more than attorneys.49
While
committing UPL is a crime, the Practice of Law Board was
unsuccessful in getting prosecutors to bring charges against these
perpetrators, as some prosecutors felt that it was not a big deal
that someone was getting some help by a nonlawyer, and
moreover, the idea that someone should be punished for taking
money and business away from a lawyer would be hard to sell to
a jury.50 With nothing other than cease and desist letters and no
real way to ratify or deter the harm caused, the Practice of Law
Board existed as “a weapon without any ammunition.”51
Then, in 2003, Washington conducted its own civil access to
justice study.52 The Civil Legal Needs Study found that
“[a]pproximately 87[%] of low-income households experienced
at least one . . . civil legal need” in the past year, and low-income
households with civil legal problems averaged as many as 3.3
problems per year.53 Low-income individuals faced more than
85% of these problems without professional legal assistance.54
Most prevalently, these issues were related to housing, family,
employment, consumer, and public and municipal services.55
While low-income individuals were more likely to enlist an
attorney for matters relating to family law, they still only did so
30% of the time.56 Further, the study found women and children
have more legal problems than the general population, which was
especially true in family law.57 These results further solidified the

49. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 1-2 (discussing how immigrant farm workers
had some of the worst cases); Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 1.
50. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 1 (noting there were also anticompetitive and
antitrust problems disallowing the Bar from going after those committing UPL); Zoom
Interview 8, supra note 44, at 1-2; Zoom Interview 10 with Fam. L. Prac. 1 (Dec. 23, 2020).
51. Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 1.
52. TASK FORCE ON CIV. EQUAL JUST. FUNDING, WASH. STATE SUP. CT., THE
WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 5 (2003) [hereinafter CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS STUDY].
53. Id. at 23. In this study, low-income households are defined as those with incomes
at or below the 125% federal poverty line. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 33-35.
56. CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note 52, at 8.
57. Id.
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need for the Practice of Law Board to fulfill its duty to explore
ways to increase access to legal services.
With a twofold desire to protect consumers from UPL and
provide more people with access to justice, in 2005, the Practice
of Law Board “crafted a rule to create and regulate a new legal
professional.”58 As required by the Court, the Practice of Law
Board twice sent the proposed rule to the BOG for its
consideration and comment, but it voted to oppose the rule each
time.59 After undergoing revisions, in 2008, the rule was sent to
the Court, though it did not specify in which practice area these
licensed individuals would serve.60 With an eye toward the areas
with prevalent UPL and those determined to have high unmet
need by the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study, the Practice of Law
Board considered and consulted with expert practitioners in four
practice areas: family, immigration, landlord-tenant, and elder
law.61 So when the Court requested the Practice of Law Board
actually apply the proposed rule to a practice area in order to get
a better idea of its general application, it is no surprise that the
Practice of Law Board chose family law, evidenced by the 2003
Civil Legal Needs Study to be an area with immense need.62
The final proposal was sent back, and the Court sat silently
on the proposal for two years, placing it on its agenda for a vote
in 2010 and 2011, but tabling it each time.63 The Practice of Law
Board submitted further revisions in an attempt to address some
of the lingering concerns presented by the BOG.64 Then, on June
15, 2012, a six-three majority of the Court decided it was time to
adopt the LLLT Limited Practice Rule (“Admission to Practice
Rule 28” or “APR 28”) “to provide limited legal assistance under
carefully regulated circumstances in ways that expand the
58. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 613.
59. Id.; Ambrogi, supra note 6.
60. Ambrogi, supra note 6; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 2 (stating the Practice
of Law Board did not initially specify the practice area because they did not want to alienate
any of the WSBA sections).
61. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 4.
62. E-mail from Stephen Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., to Lacy
Ashworth, Ark. L. Rev. (Mar. 31, 2021) (on file with the Author).
63. Ambrogi, supra note 6; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that the Court
did not want to meet with the Practice of Law Board during this time).
64. Ambrogi, supra note 6.
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affordability of quality legal assistance which protects the public
interest.”65 The rule went into effect September 1, 2012,66 and in
March 2013, family law became the first official practice area.67
B. LLLT Requirements
Upon the creation of the LLLT program, the baton was
passed from the Practice of Law Board to a newly created LLLT
Board, tasked with maintaining the LLLT curriculum, creating
rules of professional conduct, determining the scope and
authorizations of the LLLT, and proposing new practice areas and
amendments to APR 28 to the Court for final approval.68
Financially, the program was to be subsidized by the WSBA
through bar dues until the program was self-supporting.69 In
developing the curriculum, the LLLT Board first had to consider
what would be the scope of the LLLT.70 The Board asked expert
family law practitioners which aspects of family law were
complicated and where it would be really significant to make a
mistake.71 These were the areas that would be left to attorneys.72
65. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(A); 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 6.
It is no secret among those involved in the LLLT program that Justice Barbara Madsen of
the Washington State Supreme Court was the program’s biggest advocate on the Court. It
seems to be more than coincidence that she sat as Chief Justice when, after two years, the
Court finally voted in favor of implementing the program in 2012. See generally Letter from
J. Barbara Madsen, Washington State Sup. Ct., to Stephen Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License
Legal Technician Bd., Rajeev Majumdar, President, Washington State Bar Ass’n Bd. of
Governors, and Terra Nevitt, Interim Exec. Dir., Washington State Bar Ass’n 1 (June 5,
2020) (on file with the Author) (this letter serves as her strong dissent to the Court’s decision
to sunset the LLLT program); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Become a Legal Technician, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4XXG-BPY6]; Madsen & Crossland, supra note 7, at 23;
Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 4.
66. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 12; WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28.
67. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 616.
68. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(C)(2) (listing additional responsibilities).
69. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1-2 (Owens, J., dissenting); Telephone
Interview 16, supra note 24, at 4.
70. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 616 (“Subject to some limitations, the
scope of practice generally includes the following areas: child support modification actions,
dissolution and legal separation actions, domestic violence actions, committed intimate
relationship actions, parenting and support actions, major parenting plan modifications,
paternity actions, and relocation actions.”).
71. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 3.
72. Id.
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It then engaged family law professors from Washington’s three
law schools to aid in creating the curriculum.73
A LLLT is defined as “a person qualified by education,
training, and work experience who is authorized to engage in the
limited practice of law in approved practice areas of law . . . .”74
Therefore, to ensure quality legal assistance, LLLTs must prove
competence through “education, examination, and experience.”75
LLLTs must have an associate degree or higher.76 They must
complete forty-five credits of legal coursework at an ABAapproved law school or an ABA-approved or LLLT Boardapproved paralegal program, and it is envisioned that they use
these credits to attain the requisite associate degree.77 However,
paralegals with ten or more years of experience working under
the supervision of an attorney can waive the associate degree
requirement and the forty-five credits of legal coursework
through the program’s waiver process.78 Every candidate must
complete fifteen credits in a specific practice area, and because
family law is the only area in which the LLLT may serve, the
fifteen credits consist of Family Law I, II, and III.79 For a student
attending full-time, this core education may be obtained in two
years.80 These courses are taught online to make the program
73. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 617; Telephone Interview 5, supra note
4, at 4; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 1; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 1.
74. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(B)(4).
75. Become A Legal Technician, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/BHJ4Y3QV] (Oct. 8, 2021).
76. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 617.
77. Id. The legal curriculum must include eight credits of Civil Procedure, three credits
of Contracts, three credits of Interviewing and Investigation Techniques, three credits of
Introduction to Law and Legal Process, three credits of Law Office Procedures and
Technology, eight credits of Legal Research, Writing, and Analysis, and three credits of
Professional Responsibility. Become A Legal Technician, supra note 75.
78. Limited-Time Waiver, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/9PBW-6MVK]
(Oct. 8, 2021).
79. WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN
BOARD TO THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS 16 (2016)
[hereinafter REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS]; See also Crossland & Littlewood, supra
note 7, at 617 (“five credits in basic family law and ten credits in advanced and Washington
law-specific topics.”).
80. Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 2 (making this estimation
under the assumption that the candidate does not enter the program through the waiver
process and is able to attend full-time, and that the community college offers the required
classes in the necessary order).
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more accessible and with the hope that individuals in rural
communities may obtain the license and remain to aid those in
need in their rural areas where attorneys are less prevalent.81
To be qualified by examination, candidates must pass a
general paralegal exam, a LLLT practice area exam, and the
LLLT professional responsibility exam.82 Finally, to be qualified
by experience, the candidate was required to complete 3,000
hours of substantive legal work signed off by a supervising
attorney.83 However, upon sunsetting the program, the Court
agreed to amend the required experience hours from 3,000 to
1,500 to make it easier for candidates in the pipeline to obtain the
license by the cut-off date.84 While decreasing the required hours
by half seems drastic, the LLLT Board had already determined
that 3,000 hours was unduly burdensome and that the same
benefit of thorough training could be experienced with 1,500
hours.85 Attaining the license costs approximately $15,000.86
With less debt than the average lawyer, the idea was that LLLTs
could provide a limited range of quality services at a more
affordable rate than attorneys, whose prices presumably reflect a
need to pay off law school debt.87
Upon obtaining the license, like attorneys, LLLTs become
members of the bar, they are required to pay bar fees, are subject
to discipline, are held to ethical standards outlined by rules of
professional conduct, are required to engage in continuing
81. See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 617-18; Telephone Interview 5, supra
note 4, at 1, 4; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 1; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at
2.
82. Become A Legal Technician, supra note 75.
83. REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 15.
84. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 7; Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme
Court’s LLLT Program Met its Demise, A.B.A. J. (July 9, 2020, 1:46 PM), [hereinafter
Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met its Demise],
[https://perma.cc/VY2W-9VFR].
85. STEPHEN CROSSLAND, LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN BD., REPORT OF THE
LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN BOARD TO THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT:
THE CHALLENGES OF BEING FIRST IN THE NATION Bookmark 5, at 6 (2020) [hereinafter
MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM]; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8;
Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 4; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 3.
86. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 8;
REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 26.
87. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 3.
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education, and are highly encouraged to deliver pro bono
services.88 The LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct state LLLTs
should aspire to complete at least thirty hours of pro bono service
and LLLTs showing fifty hours or more receive commendation.89
However, unlike most attorneys, LLLTs are also required to have
professional liability insurance.90 These requirements were
enacted to ensure consumer protection.91 After developing the
scope, curriculum, rules, requirements, and exams for LLLTs, the
first LLLT entered the legal profession through the waiver
process in mid-2015.92
C. LLLT Authorizations
When the Court first passed APR 28, LLLTs were
authorized to assist pro se (self-represented) litigants with “simple
legal matters[,] such as selecting and completing court forms,
informing clients of procedures and timelines, explaining
pleadings, and identifying additional documents that may be
needed in a court proceeding.”93 LLLTs may work in law firms,
have their own solo practices, or work with non-profit
organizations.94 The promise, at that time, was that LLLTs
“would not be able to represent clients in court or contact and
negotiate with opposing parties on a client’s behalf.”95

88. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 612; WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R.
28(I)(3), (K)(2); LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 6.1 (2015).
89. LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN RULES of PRO. CONDUCT r. 6.1 (2015).
90. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(I)(2); Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44 at 3.
Only Oregon and Idaho have malpractice insurance requirements for their attorneys. Susan
Humiston, Practicing Law Without Liability Insurance, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N,
[https://perma.cc/2726-P2PB] (last visited Oct.13, 2021).
91. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 612.
92. Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met its Demise,
supra note 84; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 3.
93. Madsen & Crossland, supra note 7, at 23; see also WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC.
R. 28(F) (listing LLLT authorizations).
94. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 8-9; see also Rebecca M. Donaldson,
Law by Non-Lawyers: The Limit to Limited License Legal Technicians Increasing Access to
Justice, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1, 2, 43 (2018) (finding, after interviewing a majority of the
first two cohorts of LLLTs and LLLT candidates, that LLLTs primarily planned to work in
law firms or maintain solo practices).
95. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 8.
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However, because LLLTs were unable to accompany their
clients in court, clients found themselves at a loss when the judge
asked questions about their LLLT-prepared documents.96 One
LLLT found herself preparing scripts for her anxious clients to
assist them in the courtroom.97 After having LLLTs practice in
the legal profession for four years, it became clear to LLLTs,
LLLT Board members, and others that submitted comments to the
Court that LLLTs would be better able to serve clients if they
could accompany them in court.98 On May 1, 2019, a close fivefour majority of the Court agreed and expanded the scope of the
LLLT under APR 28.99 Following this decision, LLLTs could
negotiate with opposing counsel on behalf of their clients and
accompany and assist them in depositions and certain court
hearings, where they could respond to direct questions from the
judge regarding factual and procedural issues.100 With this new
ability, LLLTs noticed their clients’ anxiety levels decrease, and
one asserted that with her present, her clients were no longer
badgered by opposing counsel.101
Yet, as suggested by the close majority decision, not
everyone was for the idea of allowing LLLTs into the courtroom.
While many were against the program from the start, others
turned against the program upon this expansion.102 The dissent
96. Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3; see also Telephone Interview 5, supra note
4, at 2.
97. Zoom Interview 6 with Active Ltd. License Legal Technician 2 (Nov. 23, 2020).
98. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 2; see also Zoom Interview 6, supra note
97, at 2; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3.
99. Order in the Matter of Proposed Amendments to APR 28—Limited Practice Rule
for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-1258, at 2 (May 1, 2019) [hereinafter
Order to Expand APR 28].
100. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R 28 app. at regul. 2(B)(2)(h); Order to Expand
APR 28, supra note 99, at 2 (González, J., dissenting); see also MARCH 2020 REPORT OF
THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 9 (aiding judges by listing the LLLT’s
permitted courtroom activities).
101. Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2.
102. See Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3 (noting the amendments seemed to
push the Court “just a movement too far.”); see also Dan Bridges, Treasurer’s Note: The
Cost of LLLTs, NWLAWYER, Sept. 2019, at 48-49; Telephone Interview 11 with Wash. State
Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors Member 1 (Dec. 21, 2020); Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24,
at 2. Note that Justice González was in the majority when the Court adopted APR 28 in
2012, but he authored the dissent to the Order expanding the program in 2019. Order to
Expand APR 28, supra note 99, at 1-2 (González, J., dissenting).
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believed the program had not proven itself to be a sustainable
business plan to meet unmet legal needs, and that expansion
should not be considered until evidence could be provided to
show otherwise.103 Moreover, the dissent felt the majority’s
decision “fundamentally change[d]” the program by allowing
LLLTs to do that which they were “never meant to.”104 This
sentiment was shared by lawyers and members of the BOG that
felt the LLLT Board, in getting the program approved and later
proposing to amend it, had essentially effectuated a bait and
switch.105 The majority of the Court, in approving the expansion,
had too backed out of their initial promise.106
III. REACTIONS FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY
Even today, doctors and nurse practitioners struggle to
coexist. Doctors question whether nurse practitioners are
qualified to aid patients in certain ways and the permissible scope
of nurse practitioners remains a topic of debate.107 It is no surprise
then, that lawyers would have similar concerns about what was
presented as the nurse practitioner of the legal profession.108
A. WSBA Family Law Section
In 2009, when the Washington State Supreme Court was
considering the Practice of Law Board’s program proposal, the
Family Law Section—existing as one of the largest and most

103. Order to Expand APR 28, supra note 99, at 2 (González, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1-2 (“LLLTs were never meant to legally advocate on behalf of a client.”).
105. See Bridges, supra note 102, at 50 (“[T]he program’s proponents made
representations, many of which were so quickly abandoned it is reasonable to ask if they
were ever intended to be kept.”); see also Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 1 (“The
program was pitching smoke and mirrors.”); Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 12.
106. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
107. See Where Can Nurse Practitioners Work Without Physician Supervision?,
SIMMONS UNIV., [https://perma.cc/Y2CM-X8PQ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021); Heather
Stringer, Nurse Practitioners Gain Ground on Full Practice Authority, NURSE.COM (July
24, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4WJK-S8F4] (noting twenty-two states allow nurse
practitioners to practice independently of doctors, suggesting the remaining twenty-eight
states disagree that they should be able to); Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2.
108. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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active sections of the WSBA109—discovered that the program
may enter the family law arena and wrote a letter requesting the
Court “resoundingly reject [it], in the strongest possible terms.”110
The Family Law Section felt that instead of helping with access
to justice, the program would “dilute resources” already available
that would benefit from “greater support from the Court, the Bar,
and the Legislature.”111
The Family Law Section did not believe LLLT services
would actually cost less than attorneys, noting that while the
education and training costs significantly less than law school,
LLLTs would still have to pay presumably the same office rent
and expenses as attorneys.112 Further, it disliked that there were
no controls on the rates that could be charged by LLLTs and that
the Practice of Law Board did not provide economic data
requested by the WSBA BOG regarding the cost of the program
itself and the prices LLLTs would likely need to charge to
maintain an office.113 The Family Law Section believed this
information was key to determining the economic viability of the
program.114
Further, it did not feel there was or would be enough interest
in this type of program to bring in the numbers necessary to make
it self-supporting.115 Believing candidates were to be experienced
paralegals, it did not believe long-time paralegals would want to
move to rural areas where services are most needed.116
Additionally, the LLLT was likened to Washington’s thenexisting Limited Practice Officer (“LPO”), which had hundreds
of candidates in previous years, but only fifteen applicants in its
most recent year, so the Family Law Section did not think the
109. Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 2; see also Zoom Interview 10, supra
note 50, at 1; Family Law Section, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/XQ8AFUVN] (Oct. 1, 2021) (providing further information on the Family Law Section).
110. Letter from Jean Cotton, Outgoing Chair, Fam. L. Section Exec. Comm.,
Washington State Bar Ass’n, to C.J. Charles Johnson, Washington State Sup. Ct. 1 (Apr. 28,
2009) (on file with the Author).
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Letter from Jean Cotton, supra note 110, at 4-5.
116. Id. at 4.
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LLLT program would conjure sufficient candidates.117 As the
Court inevitably cited a lack of interest as one of the two reasons
for sunsetting the program in 2020, this 2009 prediction was not
far off.118
The Family Law Section also noted that family law is one of
the most challenging practice areas and has incredibly high
stakes.119 It listed several potentially problematic scenarios that
may be caused by the proposed legal technician in providing
“inaccurate or inadequate” services.120 Instead of placing
resources into what it felt would be an unsuccessful and harmful
program, the Family Law Section asked that the Court support
and fund other projects it believed would better provide quality
services to low-income individuals.121 For instance, it suggested
increased support for Washington’s then-existing Courthouse
Facilitator program, which serves to help pro se litigants in
obtaining and completing the correct forms.122 It further
suggested supporting existing civil legal service programs that
allow attorneys to provide low and pro bono work, continuing to
work to simplify mandatory forms, and educating lawyers and the
public about the benefit of unbundled services.123
The Family Law Section was not alone in its feelings against
LLLTs serving in its practice area. As early as 2007, the Elder
Law Section of the WSBA and the National Academy of Elder
Law Attorneys expressed similar concerns about the quality of
services nonlawyers would provide and also suggested the funds
and efforts instead be used to expand and improve existing

117. Id.
118. See Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
119. Letter from Jean Cotton, supra note 110, at 5.
120. Id. (listing: (1) “loss of custody or contact with one’s children[;]” (2) “erroneous
child support obligation calculations[;]” (3) “inequitable or inaccurate allocation property
and liabilities in dissolutions[;]” (4) “misidentification of fathers[;]” (5) “waiver of parentage
challenges[;]” and (6) “lack of or inappropriate issuance of restraining or protective orders”).
121. Id. at 2-4.
122. Id. at 2-3. See generally Courthouse Facilitators: How Courthouse Facilitators
Can Help, WASH. CTS., [https://perma.cc/9R8T-D5TF] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021)
(providing more information on the Courthouse Facilitator program).
123. Letter from Jean Cotton, supra note 110, at 3-4. Unbundled services allow clients
to pay lawyers only for limited services rather than for the entirety of the representation.
Unbundled Legal Services, A.B.A., [https://perma.cc/2URR-X93W] (last visited Oct. 13,
2021).
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programs.124 However, despite such concerns, the Court decided
to adopt APR 28 and allow LLLTs to practice family law.125
Then, when the WSBA’s BOG voted to allow LLLTs, who were
now members of the WSBA, to join WSBA sections, several
members of the Family Law Section left to create their own group
called the Domestic Relations Attorneys of Washington
(“DRAW”), in which LLLTs were not allowed.126
The Family Law Section’s opposition toward the program
was believed by some to be none other than turf protection—a
desire to maintain its monopoly on providing family law services
in Washington.127 However, a family law practitioner stated that
the only time the Family Law Section discussed that LLLTs
would be taking away work from its members was when
discussing the risk LLLTs posed to young lawyers with little
experience and considerable debt that must charge the
minimum.128 Perhaps some members of the Family Law Section
came around, as one LLLT was elected to its executive board.129
Still, for many family law practitioners, the sentiment toward the
124. See Letter from Karl L. Flaccus, Chair, Elder L. Section, Washington State Bar
Ass’n, to Stephen Crossland, Chair, Prac. of L. Bd. 1-2, 4, 6-7, 11 (Oct. 5, 2007) (on file
with the Author); Letter from Erv DeSmet, President, Nat’l Acad. of Elder L. Att’ys, to
Stephen Crossland, Chair, Prac. of L. Bd. 2-4, 7 (Oct. 12, 2007) (on file with the Author).
125. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5. One interviewee believed that a major
problem with the program was that it was first initiated in family law. Telephone Interview
16, supra note 24, at 2-3. While he recognized that family law is an area of immense need
and that LLLTs should have entered that arena eventually, he did not think they should have
initially done so, because the Family Law Section, as one of the biggest and most involved
sections of the WSBA, had the ability to present strong opposition. Id. He noted lawyers in
family law are merely getting by, rather than earning an overflow of cash, so they were
largely offended and worried about the financial threat. Id. Seemingly responding to the
Family Law Section’s suggestion regarding Courthouse Facilitators, in the Court’s Order, it
discussed Courthouse Facilitators, saying that they serve the courts and not pro se litigants,
so there is a “gap” in the types of services available to pro se litigants. 2012 Order for APR
28, supra note 5, at 5. The Court also acknowledged the Family Law Section’s efforts in
providing public and pro bono services and working to provide more affordable rates, but
stated that because of the scope of the LLLT, LLLTs are unlikely to have “any appreciable
impact on attorney practice[,]” and noted, moreover, that “[p]rotecting the monopoly status
of attorneys in any practice area is not a legitimate objective.” Id. at 7-8.
126. Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 3; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3;
Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 6.
127. See Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 3; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23,
at 2; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3.
128. Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 4.
129. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 3.
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LLLT program remained unchanged.130 Upon the sunsetting of
the program, several family law practitioners held a huge party by
Zoom, phone, and text to celebrate that they could finally protect
their clients.131
B. Lawyers
While those involved in the WSBA’s Family Law Section
knew about the program, a member of the BOG estimated eighty
percent of the lawyers in Washington never heard of the LLLT,
and another admitted he was among the eighty percent until
joining the BOG.132 This estimation would make sense
considering there were only thirty-eight active LLLTs in the legal
profession at the time of sunsetting and they were only permitted
to work in family law,133 so lawyers in other practice areas who
were not actively involved in the WSBA or working with LLLTs
in family law would not have occasion to take notice of the
program.
Regarding the reactions of the estimated remaining twenty
percent, while some lawyers were in favor of the program, others
were emphatically opposed. Lawyers would show up to forums
meant to educate the public on the role of the LLLT only to assert
statements against the program that were not true, such as the
complaint that LLLTs do not need malpractice insurance,
suggesting future impacted clients would not have recourse for
mistakes made by LLLTs.134 One previous Practice of Law
Board member noted that involved proponents made efforts to
educate attorneys on the role of the LLLT to show how they
would not step on toes, and even a justice on the Washington State
Supreme Court authored a newsletter to that effect, but all
attempts to educate seemed to fall on deaf ears.135
Lawyers against the program affected LLLT candidates in
fulfilling their requirements. Recall that LLLTs needed 3,000
130. See Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 3.
131. Id.
132. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 9; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24,
at 1.
133. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 7.
134. Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 4.
135. Id.
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hours of legal work signed off by an attorney.136 Some attorneys
refused to certify that the LLLT had completed their hours.137
Upon entering the legal profession, some LLLTs faced
demeaning comments, suggestions that they did not know what
they were doing, and refusals to communicate that disadvantaged
their clients.138 Further, like the Family Law Section, some
county bar associations fought having LLLTs become
members.139
Luckily, not all LLLT-attorney interactions have been bad,
as many improved as LLLTs worked in the profession.140 One
LLLT stated she now gets referrals from family law attorneys.141
One stated that while some lawyers are demeaning and infuriated
that LLLTs exist, some are glad “to have a nurse practitioner on
the team if they need to go into surgery.”142 A member of the
LLLT Board stated that some family law practitioners that were
initially against the program now admit they find LLLTs help the
process for everybody, a sentiment also expressed by some judges
that have had the opportunity to run cases more efficiently and
cost-effectively with pro se litigants receiving assistance from
LLLTs.143 Further, as a number of LLLTs work in law firms,144
there would appear to be several collaborative, if not amicable,
relationships between LLLTs and their affiliating attorneys.145
136. REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 15.
137. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 6; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2
(because attorneys were not signing off on LLLT work, she created a contract binding her
supervising attorneys to sign off on her completed hours).
138. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2 (noting the less kind interactions were a
result of attorneys not knowing the role of the LLLT); Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at
2; Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 1; Zoom Interview 7 with Active Ltd. License Legal
Technician 1 (Nov. 28, 2020).
139. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 4; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at
1.
140. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 6.
141. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2.
142. Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 1.
143. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 2-3.
144. See Letter from Dan Bridges, Treasurer, Washington State Bar Ass’n Bd. of
Governors, to C.J. Mary Fairhurst, Washington State Sup. Ct. 2 (July 9, 2019) (on file with
the Author); Donaldson, supra note 94, at 43; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 1 (works
in a firm); Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 2 (worked in a firm, but is now solo).
145. See Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 1 (noting mutually beneficial
relationships between attorneys and LLLTs); Sart Rowe, Comment to Washington State Bar
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C. WSBA Board of Governors
Many members of the BOG also opposed the
implementation of the LLLT program. One LLLT Board member
asserted that the time in which it took the program to get approved
is indicative in and of itself of the resistance to the concept.146
Recall that in 2001, when the Washington State Supreme Court
created the Practice of Law Board to consider ways to provide
more individuals with access to legal services, it required the
Board first submit any recommendation to the BOG for
“consideration and comment” before submitting to the Court.147
If the Court instead required the Practice of Law Board to receive
the BOG’s approval before submitting the proposal to the Court,
the LLLT program would not have been implemented, and surely
would not have been expanded.148
As required by the Court, in 2006, the Practice of Law Board
submitted the first drafted legal technician rule to the BOG.149
The BOG unanimously voted against it, but left open the
possibility of revision and resubmission.150 In January 2008, the
Practice of Law Board submitted a refined version to the Court
and the BOG asked the Court to refrain from acting to allow it
time to “solicit feedback from members and formulate a
position.”151 In late 2008, the BOG again unanimously voted
against the rule.152 Even when the Court finally approved the
program in 2012, the BOG remained, for the most part,153
opposed.
Association, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6385-49RH] (stating he is a
family law attorney that has had good experiences with the quality of work from LLLTs and
has partnered with them on cases).
146. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 2.
147. See supra text accompanying note 46.
148. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 4.
149. Ambrogi, supra note 6.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. At one point in time, the WSBA and the BOG seemed in support of the program,
as evidenced by their voting to allow LLLTs to become members of WSBA sections, i.e.,
the Family Law Section. See Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 3; Zoom Interview 10,
supra note 50, at 3. However, one interviewee believed this vote took place when the Chair
of the LLLT Board was President of the BOG, and a major advocate of the program was
serving as Executive Director of the WSBA. Zoom Interview 10, supra note 50, at 3. Also,
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Before the program’s implementation, the BOG expressed
several client-centered concerns about nonlawyers practicing law,
“even in a ‘limited’ manner.”154 It worried that the limited
licensed individuals might represent clients in court and did not
believe they could be trusted to “identify nuances and risks
lawyers occasionally miss.”155 As the Court inevitably approved
APR 28 over the BOG’s objection and required the WSBA to
subsidize the program, members of the BOG likely took whatever
comfort they could in the initial assurances that LLLTs would not
represent clients in the courtroom and that LLLT fees would make
the program financially self-supporting in a reasonable period of
time.156 With these assurances, some BOG members supported
the program.157
However, the BOG reiterated opposition when the Court
voted to allow LLLTs into the courtroom in 2019, and when the
program was not producing the number of LLLTs necessary to
achieve financial independence from the WSBA in what the BOG
considered to be a reasonable amount of time.158 A deeper
discussion of the BOG’s financial concerns ensues in Section
V.A.159
In addition to these concerns related to LLLT scope of
practice, cost of the program, and time to attain self-sufficiency,
the BOG also voiced its concern that the LLLT program might
become a “pink collar” profession.160 Members of the BOG noted
it is important to recognize that there were some advocates on the BOG, one being their
liaison. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 3; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 1;
see also Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 10 (mentioning a BOG member who was a
big supporter).
154. Bridges, supra note 102, at 48.
155. Id.
156. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 8; WASH. GEN. R. 25(b)(2)(E).
157. See Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 1 (advocating for insurance
companies to cover LLLTs and for their acceptance into local bar associations); Bridges,
supra note 102, at 50 (noting “I am not against LLLTs as originally conceived.”) (emphasis
omitted); Letter from Dan Bridges, supra note 144, at 5 (noting the same).
158. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 2; Letter from Dan Bridges, supra
note 144, at 2; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 1; Zoom Interview 12, supra note
24, at 1.
159. See infra Section V.A.
160. Letter from Christina A. Meserve, Washington St. Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors,
to Sup. Ct. JJ., Washington State Sup. Ct. 1 (July 1, 2019) (on file with the Author); Bridges,
supra note 102, at 50.
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that a majority of LLLTs and LLLT Board members are women
and worried that this new limited profession was averting capable
women from going to law school.161
IV. SUCCESS OF THE LLLT PROGRAM:
ANTICIPATED AND ATTAINED
A. Anticipated
To determine the LLLT program’s success, it is important to
first define how it was meant to be measured. Yet, a debilitating
issue underlying the LLLT program was that there were differing
views on the role that LLLTs were intended to play and the
intended targets for their services. When there are different
expectations and definitions of success, of course there will be
conflicting opinions about whether those expectations have been
met. However, the only expectations that truly matter are those
voiced by the majority of the Washington State Supreme Court
when it decided to adopt the program in 2012.162
In the 2012 Order, then Chief Justice Barbara Madsen
addressed the hopes expressed by supporters of the program who
believed the LLLT program “should be a primary strategy to close
the [j]ustice [g]ap for low and moderate income people with
family related legal problems.”163 In response, Justice Madsen
emphasized the need to “be careful not to create expectations that
adoption of this rule is not intended to achieve.”164 She provided,
“depending upon how it is implemented . . . [the program] holds
promise to help reduce the level of unmet need for low and
moderate income people who have relatively uncomplicated
family related legal problems and for whom some level of
individualized advice, support and guidance would facilitate a
timely and effective outcome.”165 Justice Madsen referred to the
161. Letter from Christina A. Meserve, supra note 160, at 1; Letter from Dan Bridges,
supra note 144, at 6; see also MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85,
at Bookmark 2, at 3 (discussing this concern and noting that many LLLTs are paralegals and
most paralegals in Washington are female).
162. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1-2.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
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program as a “baby step” in meeting the legal needs of indigent
Washingtonians but admitted in the Court Order that “[n]o one
has a crystal ball[,]” signifying that even the Court could not say
for sure what the program would become.166
Some thought LLLTs were meant to work as solo
practitioners rather than in law firms, that they were meant to
provide services in rural communities where attorneys are less
prevalent, or that they would work for nonprofit organizations or
legal aid programs.167 Assuredly, there were various discussions
regarding the program before and during its implementation, so
such beliefs may rightfully stem from when and how the program
was initially or varyingly pitched.168 However, as impartial
reviewers without the benefit of being in the room when the
parties voiced their intentions, like a contract, we must look to the
four corners of the Court’s Order adopting APR 28 and APR 28
itself to determine the essential components of the LLLT
program.169
As the Court did not limit the LLLT’s job prospects—by
order or by rule—to rural areas or solo offices, it is assumed that
it did not intend to limit the LLLT in these ways.170 In fact, the
rule differentiates between that which a stand-alone LLLT can do
and that which a LLLT may do with attorney supervision,
demonstrating it was not out of the question that LLLTs would
work with attorneys.171 The prospect of LLLTs working in rural
communities has been discussed by the LLLT Board,172 but was

166. Schaefer, supra note 6; 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 8.
167. See Letter from Dan Bridges, supra note 144, at 2; Telephone Interview 11, supra
note 102, at 5; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 6, 9.
168. See Bridges, supra note 102, at 48.
169. See Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at 2-3 (noting that when a group makes a
decision, it is difficult to determine intent—perhaps some believed the program would only
be for low-income people, while others thought it would also serve moderate-income people
and that LLLTs would be able to work wherever they wanted—the most important thing is
what the rule says and the rule did not limit who they could serve or where).
170. See id.
171. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 8-9.
172. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark
2, at 2-3; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 1; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4.
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not fully addressed in the Court’s Order,173 and the prospect of
LLLTs working for nonprofit or legal aid organizations was
contemplated as a possibility in the Court’s Order, though not
listed as a requirement.174 Therefore, in summary, the LLLT
program was adopted with the hope that it would be implemented
in such a way that it would serve as a baby step in reducing the
unmet legal needs of low- and moderate-income individuals in
Washington.175
B. Attained
1. Quality Legal Services
Using the 2012 Court Order’s anticipations of the LLLT
program as a measuring stick, we now turn to whether and to what
extent the program can be considered to have succeeded in
providing quality services to low- and moderate-income
individuals. Quality concerns raised against the LLLT program
included that nonlawyers would not be able to provide quality
legal services to clients, that clients would be getting second-tier
services, and that clients would not be protected upon LLLT
malpractice.176 To combat quality concerns, APR 28 imposed
safeguards, such as stringent educational and supervised
experiential requirements, a professional responsibility exam, and
proof of malpractice insurance.177 Further, to dispel concerns that
LLLTs would go beyond their scope of practice and harm clients,
candidates were taught not only what they could do, but also how
to recognize that which went beyond their scope of practice.178
While some LLLTs felt the 3,000 hours of legal experience
should specifically be in family law rather than in any practice
173. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 9 (mentioning rural areas only to say
that attorneys in these areas are “barely able to scrape by[,]” so “[d]oing reduced fee work
through the Moderate Means program . . . will not be a high priority.”).
174. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 9.
175. See id. at 1-2, 4.
176. See supra notes 119-21, 134, 154-55 and accompanying text; Zoom Interview 8,
supra note 44, at 2, 4; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 8; Zoom Interview 12,
supra note 24, at 3.
177. See supra notes 75-83, 90 and accompanying text.
178. Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 7, at 617; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44,
at 2; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 4.
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area, they generally felt the curriculum and requirements wellequipped them to serve their clients in family law.179 Some
believed they were even better equipped than new family law
attorneys they interacted with and one noted having to educate
some newer attorneys about how things work in family law.180
Supporting their belief, family law professors who created and
taught the curriculum echoed that the fifteen family law credits
better equipped LLLTs in family law than most law school
graduates who only take three credits.181 A March 2020 report of
the LLLT program found “[o]ver 50% of all LLLTs have at least
[ten] years of substantive law related experience.”182 Interviewed
family law professors noted such long-time paralegals were even
better qualified.183 The report also indicated that, to that date, not
a single LLLT had been disciplined.184
2. Serving the Intended Target
While some, including a member of the Washington State
Supreme Court, have asserted the belief that LLLTs would only
serve low-income individuals,185 those involved in the initial
179. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 1; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2.
180. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 1; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2.
181. See Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at
1; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 3-4.
182. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 3, at
4.
183. Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2.
184. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 3, at
4.
185. Again, note that Justice González was a part of the majority decision to adopt
APR 28 in 2012, but authored the dissent to expansion in 2019. See Order to Expand APR
28, supra note 99, at 1-2 (González, J., dissenting). Interviewees discussed Justice
González’s public statement regarding the belief that the LLLT would only serve lowincome individuals. See Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3 (noting one of the schisms
on the Court was whether LLLTs were only meant to serve low-income people); Telephone
Interview 5, supra note 4, at 7. In his dissent, Justice González stated, “The LLLT program
was conceived as an effort to address the unmet civil legal needs of low-income
Washingtonians” and “[i]t did not take long to realize that the business model adopted by the
LLLT program was incompatible with meeting the needs of low-income individuals . . . .”
Order to Expand APR 28, supra note 99, at 1-2 (González, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
However, the majority decision in 2012 discussed LLLTs serving moderate-income
individuals as well. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1, 4, 6. This suggests even the
majority was unclear in 2012 about who the program would serve. Obviously, this important
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creation and proposal of the program insist it was always the
intent for the LLLT to serve low- and moderate-income
individuals.186 Again, supporting the latter is the 2012 Order in
which Chief Justice Madsen cites both low- and moderate-income
individuals as the intended targets.187
In 2020, the LLLT Board conducted a survey of twenty
responding LLLTs, who reported serving a total of 1,527 paid
clients mostly within 0-300% of the federal poverty level.188
Eighty-five percent of the respondents reported serving clients
within 0-200% of the federal poverty level.189 Twenty-nine
percent signed up for a WSBA program in which they agreed to
reduce their fees by half when serving clients within 200-250%
of the federal poverty level.190 The report found many LLLTs
offer free initial consults, sliding scale fees, and unbundled
services, and thirty-four percent of the twenty respondents
reported serving as many as 929 pro bono hours—more than
attorneys were on average reporting.191 LLLTs provide anecdotes
of their clients praising them for providing services at affordable
rates, and they report serving low- and moderate-income
individuals that, for the most part, cannot afford an attorney.192
discrepancy among the Court in particular would alter the view of whether the LLLT was
succeeding.
186. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 7; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 23; see also Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3-4. Interviewee 9 discussed how, from the
beginning, he talked to LLLTs about a business plan, and it was clear LLLTs would need to
serve middle-income as well as low-income individuals in order to earn a salary and pay
rent. Id. at 3. He noted it was ridiculous to think that LLLTs can only serve low-income
individuals and that they should be expected to do more pro bono work than lawyers. Id. at
4. He also noted that LLLTs did in fact report doing more pro bono work than lawyers and
emphasized the need to balance access to justice with the fact that LLLTs need to be able to
make a living wage. Id. at 4, 6.
187. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
188. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 3, at
3.
189. Id. at Bookmark 3, at 4.
190. Id.
191. Id.; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 1; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2;
see also Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 3 (discussing how there was only one LLLT in
her area, but she noticed the LLLT was very involved in the free advice clinic, as every time
she went, she saw the LLLT there); Michelle White, Comment to Washington State Bar
Association, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6385-49RH] (most LLLTs she
knows do a lot of flat fee, reduced rates, and pro bono work).
192. See Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 1-2; Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at
1; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2; Zoom Interview 7, supra note 138, at 2; see also

3 ASHWORTH.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)
2/11/22 3:22 PM

718

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:4

LLLTs report being busy and that the LLLTs they know are
busy.193 Some are working with technology and different
business models to find the most efficient way to serve their
clients.194
While these reports and testimonials provide some
reassurance that there are people being helped by LLLTs, it has
been suggested that anecdotal stories do not provide a sufficient
metric of success to determine the new profession’s overall
impact.195 While LLLTs and LLLT Board members express
confidentiality concerns in collecting client data,196 others assert
LLLTs could collect data without providing specifics in order to
more concretely gauge the program’s success.197 However,
notably, nowhere was it mandated that LLLTs be required to
report their prices or information regarding their clientele.198
A 2018 law review article suggested the original LLLT
model could work to serve moderate-income individuals at a rate
more affordable than attorneys but would come up short in
providing services at a rate low-income individuals can afford.199
The assertion was based on interviews and a study of thirty-six
respondents from the first two cohorts of LLLTs and LLLT
candidates.200 The article claimed that while LLLTs “[m]ost
frequently . . . reported that they planned to work with both lowand moderate-income clients[,]” a number of elements would
inhibit their ability to charge prices low-income individuals can
Donaldson, supra note 94, at 31-32 (providing a LLLT’s positive experience with a client).
I say “for the most part” because one LLLT stated that a good half of her clients fire their
lawyers and hire her due to the preference of using her services. Zoom Interview 6, supra
note 97, at 3.
193. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 1, 4.
194. Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 5; Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 2.
195. See Bridges, supra note 102, at 50; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 5;
Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 8-9.
196. Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that she told her clients that if they
wanted to, they could fill out a form providing information that would be used for LLLT
data, but she did not and could not force them to due to confidentiality concerns); Telephone
Interview 5, supra note 4, at 8.
197. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 8-9; Telephone Interview 11, supra note
102, at 5.
198. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5; WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28.
199. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 61, 65.
200. Id. at 17.
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afford: solo practitioners will incur office overhead no different
than lawyers, those working in law firms will have to sustain their
salaries while making their employment worthwhile to law firms,
and many in the first cohorts were previously paralegals that
aspired to bring in higher salaries as LLLTs.201 While these
potential inhibitors to serving low-income individuals are worthy
of consideration, it is important to note that the article surveyed
LLLTs and candidates that either had not yet entered the
profession or had not been in it for very long.202 The thirty-six
respondents’ uncertainty was exemplified in their doubt regarding
how to price their services.203
Nonetheless, considering many respondents reported a
desire “to expand access to justice in family law,” the article
remained optimistic that LLLTs could serve more low-income
individuals with some changes to the LLLT model.204 One of
which was allowing LLLTs to appear in court and negotiate with
opposing counsel so they may provide their clients “a more
comprehensive, seamless, and affordable experience . . . .”205
Recall that this change was implemented in 2019.206 Another
suggestion was that LLLTs could serve moderate- and highincome individuals to subsidize their taking on more low-income
clients.207 Still, the article noted, “[i]f the model can increase
access for moderate-income legal consumers who could not
previously afford civil legal services to meet their needs, the
model would do its part to close the justice gap.”208
201. Id. at 38, 41, 49-50, 62. The article also noted that while most of the interviewees
cited a desire to “expand access to justice in family law [as one of their reasons for becoming
a LLLT], they still predominantly intend to target clients who can afford to pay their rates—
rates lower than attorneys’ fees but not low enough for low-income populations to afford.”
See id. at 65; see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (the Family Law Section
expressing similar concerns with LLLT office overhead).
202. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 17 (stating the invitations to participate in her study
were sent in fall 2015). Recall that the first LLLT did not enter the legal profession until
mid-2015. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
203. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 20, 40.
204. Id. at 59-60, 65, 67, 71; see also Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 1-2 (stating
LLLTs are passionate not only about providing services at a lower rate, but also about
volunteering a lot of their time).
205. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 67-68.
206. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
207. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 68.
208. Id. at 72.
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Importantly, in considering whether the LLLT program has
succeeded in serving its intended target, we must reflect on what
we have: anecdotal stories, pro bono and clientele reports,
studies, and survey and interview responses. And we must still
acknowledge that which is lacking, as LLLTs were never made to
report on their services and the program never specifically
defined how it would gauge its success.209
V. THE DEMISE OF THE LLLT PROGRAM
In the Washington State Supreme Court’s letter informing
the Chair of the LLLT Board (and others) of the Court’s majority
decision to sunset the program, the Court cited two main reasons:
(1) the cost of the program and (2) the lack of interest in the
program.210 While those involved, and outsiders alike, may
speculate about other potential reasons for the program’s
sunsetting, such as a desire to maintain a monopoly on legal
services, avoid change, or prevent diversion from law school, it is
important to first consider the two reasons afforded by the Court
that chose to implement this program in the first place. This
section works to provide that analysis.
A. Cost of the Program
1. Cost Neutral in “A Reasonable Period of Time”
From the inception of the LLLT program, there was
controversy about who should fund the program and for how long
they should be required to do so. When the Washington State
Supreme Court ordered the adoption of the program, it ordered
the WSBA to subsidize it.211 Washington requires its attorneys to
be members of the Bar, thus, every lawyer in Washington was
made to pay for a program that some believed would serve as their

209. See infra Section VI.D. for a deeper discussion on the importance of gauging
success.
210. Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
211. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1-2 (Owens, J., dissenting).

3 ASHWORTH.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

2/11/22 3:22 PM

NONLAWYERS IN LEGAL PROFESSION

721

competition.212 In fact, in Justice Owen’s dissent to the Court’s
2012 Order, she stated that making the WSBA pay for the
program was not fair, that the Court was imposing a tax on
lawyers, and that doing so would reduce the amount the WSBA
could budget for other programs.213
However, the program was not supposed to be a burden on
the Bar forever; rather, from its inception, the program was
intended to be “financially self-supporting within a reasonable
period of time.”214 This was to be done through LLLT licensing
fees.215 In its 2012 Order, the Court asserted its “confiden[ce]
that the WSBA and the Practice of Law Board, in consultation
with this Court, will be able to develop a fee-based system that
ensures that the licensing and ongoing regulation of [LLLT]s will
be cost-neutral to the WSBA and its membership[,]” though it did
not specify at what time.216 Justice Owens felt the program’s
ability to be self-sustaining would depend, in large part, on the
number of licenses attained, and suggested that even the Practice
of Law Board was unsure LLLT fees alone would suffice to attain
cost-neutrality, since it also mentioned a reliance on
“commitments from the WSBA.”217
At the time of sunsetting, the WSBA had provided the
program nearly $1.4 million and the program was years away
from attaining cost neutrality.218 Just before the sunsetting, the
LLLT Board estimated that with an additional $986,588.65 and
eight more years, the program would produce enough licenses to
be self-sustaining.219 To some, the $1.4 million already expended
likely represented funding taken away from other assistance
212. Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2; Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 3
(believing it to be a design flaw to force attorneys to subsidize something they did not accept
and believed would serve as competition); Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 4 (stating the
problem is attorneys and their unrealistic fear that LLLTs would take work away from them);
Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3 (noting concerns from family lawyers that LLLTs
would take their livelihood); Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 3 (noting the LLLT
appeared as a financial threat to family lawyers).
213. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 1-2 (Owens, J., dissenting).
214. WASH. GEN. R. 25(b)(2)(E).
215. 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 11.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2-3 (Owens, J., dissenting).
218. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slides 2, 5, 13.
219. See id. at slide 8.
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programs better able to provide access to justice than the mere
thirty-eight active LLLTs at that time.220 To others, the $1.4
million amounted to one percent of the WSBA’s total budget and
was not that much considering Washington had to form the
program from scratch.221 Justice Madsen, a major supporter of
the program,222 also noted that several years ago, the WSBA
informed the Court that it takes approximately $1.4 million to
investigate and prosecute ten cases of UPL, which was a driving
force in “opening the practice of law” and “expand[ing] the
number of people who can be trained . . . .”223 While opponents
felt eight years was plenty of time for the program to achieve selfsustainability and that asking for a total of sixteen years was
violating the initial rule requiring it to achieve such status,224
proponents pointed to the fact that LLLTs had only been in the
profession for five years, which was not nearly enough time for
the program to build the momentum necessary to be cost neutral,
considering how other professions have developed over time.225
A member of the LLLT Board admitted it was a fair criticism
from the WSBA that the program was taking lawyer license fees
but stated that no one knew how much money the program would
take and that a disclaimer was provided to the Court prior to the
adoption of the program of such lingering uncertainty inherent

220. See generally supra Section III.A. Recall that the Family and Elder Law Sections
of the WSBA suggested to the Court that resources could be better spent on other programs
and efforts rather than the LLLT program. See supra Section V.A. Justice Owens expressed
similar concerns about reducing the budget for other programs. See 2012 Order for APR 28,
supra note 5, at 1-2 (Owens, J., dissenting).
221. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark
15, slide 4; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 4; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6.
222. See generally Letter from J. Barbara Madsen, supra note 65.
223. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 00:42:32-00:43:31. However, Justice
Madsen admitted she did not know how many UPL cases were related to work LLLTs were
already doing or work the LLLT Board was proposing LLLTs be allowed to do. Id. at
00:43:31-00:43:53. LLLT Board member Nancy Ivarinen responded suggesting there was
at least some overlap. See id. at 00:43:53-00:44:30.
224. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 13; see also Letter from Daniel D.
Clark, Treasurer & Dist. 4 Governor, Washington State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, to CJ.
Stephens, Washington State Sup. Ct. 4 (May 12, 2020) (on file with the Author).
225. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 02:02:42-02:03:34 (discussing nurse
practitioners); see also Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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with any new program.226 Perhaps this is why the Court never set
a specific date for the program to be cost neutral.
2. Poor Guardian of Mandatory Fees
A member of the BOG felt the LLLT Board was a poor
guardian of mandatory fees, and that it spent money with no sense
of accountability.227 It costs the WSBA “just shy of $10,000” to
hold the LLLT bar exam regardless of whether there is one or one
thousand test-takers, and it administers the exam twice a year.228
A member of the BOG believed that with the dwindling number
of test-takers, the LLLT Board might consider only having one
exam per year.229 Further, the LLLT Board researched the
possibility of expanding LLLTs into practice areas such as
bankruptcy and immigration law, which were areas of high need
but governed by the federal courts, resulting in unfeasibility and
the inevitable waste of time and money.230 There were inquiries
as to why the LLLT Board needed to meet monthly and take
retreats that required travel and lodging expenses when it was
only tasked with overseeing one program, as opposed to several,
like the BOG.231 To bring in more money from LLLTs
themselves, the BOG wanted LLLTs to pay the same bar dues as
lawyers, but the idea was rejected in favor of the argument that
LLLTs are more limited than lawyers, so their dues should reflect
such limitations.232
226. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 9.
227. See Bridges, supra note 102, at 50; see also Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at
3, 4.
228. Bridges, supra note 102, at 48; Letter from Dan Bridges, supra note 144, at 4-5.
229. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 3.
230. See id. at 7; Letter from Dan Bridges, supra note 144, at 5; Telephone Interview
11, supra note 102, at 2; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 4 (discussing the immense need
in immigration law, but how there would need to be a federal change to allow LLLTs to
serve as advocates in that arena).
231. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 14; see also Letter from Dan
Bridges, supra note 144, at 4; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 3; Zoom Interview
12, supra note 24, at 6.
232. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 4 (believing LLLTs should pay the
same dues as lawyers because they are not yet self-sufficient and their dues should reflect
that goal); Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 6 (believing LLLTs should pay the same
dues as lawyers, because even though they are more limited, they still have access to the
same resources that lawyers do). See generally License Fees, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N,
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On the other hand, the LLLT Board felt that it was the BOG
that was in charge of overseeing the funding for the program and
that it merely lived within its means.233 The LLLT Board needed
to meet more often because it was developing a new program
which required a lot more work and time.234 Notably, several
months before the program’s sunsetting, the LLLT Board did
attempt to mitigate the program’s financial burden on the
WSBA.235 The Board asked the BOG to allow the LLLT
education to be run through WSBA technology, which it believed
would be a cost benefit to the Bar.236 In theory, this change would
allow the cost of tuition to go directly to the program, rather than
to the law school or community colleges acting as middle-men
curriculum providers.237 This revenue could supplement LLLT
license fees, which had not yet allowed the program to attain selfsufficiency.238 Yet, in January 2020, the BOG voted twelve-one
against the proposal, listing antitrust reasons and the belief that it
would present a financial loss to the WSBA, rather than a gain.239
Regardless, the true issue did not seem to be money per se,
but rather, whether the program was producing the results
necessary to justify the money already expended and continued
expenditure. One member of the BOG stated that he did not
necessarily care that the program ever achieved cost neutrality, as
the goal is to serve the public.240 So, if the program costs $50,000
[https://perma.cc/NXL8-Q8Q5] (Oct. 8, 2021) (listing the fees for attorneys, LLLTs, and
other paraprofessionals in Washington).
233. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6.
234. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:56:45-01:57:20; Zoom Interview 1,
supra note 22, at 2 (discussing the hard work that occurred during retreats); Telephone
Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing the time that went into creating the foundation of
the program).
235. See May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:17:42-01:18:01.
236. See id. at 01:17:05-01:18:37, 01:54:30-01:54:54.
237. Id. at 01:17:53-01:18:36.
238. See supra Section V.A.1.
239. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:18:00-01:18:15; see also id. at
1:22:53-01:23:41 (BOG Treasurer also noting a lack of financial information); id. at
01:21:10-01:21:23 (BOG President also noting “that the private market should be able to
sustain [the education] and in fact the private market has been able to sustain [it]”); Zoom
Interview 12, supra note 24, at 11 (noting also that the WSBA is in the business of
licensing—not training—lawyers and LLLTs, so it was not within its mission or scope to do
so).
240. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 13.
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or $75,000 per year, that would be a great use of Bar dues, so long
as the public is actually being served.241 The question was
whether the LLLT program was making or could make the
difference the money intended it to even with an additional one
million dollars and eight years.242 Inevitably, a majority of the
Court felt the program did not warrant the additional
expenditure.243
B. Small Number of Licenses
1. Efforts to Promote the Program
One reason cited for the lacking number of LLLTs was that
the program was not properly promoted. Several interviewees
and others have suggested that increasing public awareness of the
program and better marketing it as a potential career and resource
would have aided in its success.244 However, LLLT Board
members were caught up in creating the foundation of the
program, and more pertinently, they worried about promoting the
LLLT as a potential resource to those in need of legal services
when they did not have enough LLLTs to provide such
services.245 They wanted to get more LLLTs in the pipeline
before increasing marketing.246
Of course, there were efforts to promote the program as a
potential career. The Chair of the LLLT Board spoke on a
paralegal podcast, at events, and at almost all of the Washington
241. Id.
242. See generally Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13 (expressing doubt that the
additional expenditure and time would generate the interest necessary to allow the program
to be self-sustaining and emphasizing the low numbers achieved up until this point).
243. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 11.
244. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 5; Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2;
Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6; Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 3; Zoom
Interview 7, supra note 138, at 2-3; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2-3; Telephone
Interview 11, supra note 102, at 2; Rowe, supra note 145 (noting that the public has “little
idea” of what the LLLT is and “[p]ublic outreach is key”); Synth Surber, Comment to
Washington State Bar Association, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/638549RH] (“LLLT needs to be promoted more.”).
245. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 5; Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 2
(stating they were worried that because there were so few LLLTs, they would “bait and
switch” those in need of legal services); Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6.
246. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 5; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6.
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community colleges with paralegal programs to tell paralegal
candidates that if they did one more year of schooling for an
additional $3,000 they could broaden their business horizons by
becoming LLLTs.247 The LLLT Board sent a representative to a
statewide high school counselor meeting to let the counselors
know about the LLLT as a potential career option to promote to
students.248 Further, discussed in the LLLT Board’s March 2020
report to the Court were LLLT “rack cards,” existing as “the first
print materials created specifically for the public to raise
awareness of LLLT services.”249 At that time, 500 cards had been
distributed to locations such as libraries and courthouses.250
Although there were approximately 275 people working toward
the license at the time of sunsetting, there were still only thirtyeight active LLLTs,251 so perhaps such educational efforts earlier
on and to a greater extent would have resulted in more LLLTs
providing services in Washington by the time of sunsetting.
2. LLLT Curriculum and Requirements
While the LLLT requirements were created to diminish
quality concerns, some may have been so stringent that they
deterred potential candidates.252 First, to complete the 3,000
hours of substantive legal experience, it would take the candidate
a minimum of eighteen months of working forty-hour weeks, and
that is assuming all eight hours of every working day are approved

247. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 7-8; Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at
1 (stating that she discovered the LLLT program at an event where the Chair spoke, which
solidified her decision to become a LLLT).
248. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 7.
249. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 4, at
5.
250. Id.
251. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
252. See Donaldson, supra note 94, at 33-34 (discussing how some interviewed nonparalegal LLLT candidates expressed “doubts and frustration about the ability to achieve
[the LLLT] prerequisites before taking the exam[]” and noting that if these doubts were
presented by people that inevitably opted to pursue the license, they could have deterred
those otherwise interested in the license that opted not to pursue it).
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by the supervising attorney as constituting “substantive” work.253
Meaning, if the candidate showed up to work nine hours, but only
five and a half were considered by the supervising attorney to be
substantive, the timeline for reaching the 3,000-hour threshold
would only be prolonged.254 While attaining thorough experience
is necessary to protect the public, this daunting time commitment,
initially set by the LLLT Board in exercising “an abundance of
caution[,]” actually served as an unnecessary deterrent to people
interested in pursuing the license.255 The LLLT Board believed
the same benefit of thorough training could be experienced with
1,500 hours, and proposed this change in its March 2020 report to
the Court.256
Significantly, when Arizona’s task force proposed the Legal
Paraprofessional (“LP”) to the Arizona Supreme Court, it stated
that it “deliberately did not pattern” its program on the LLLT, “in
part because of [the] program’s high experiential learning
requirement.”257 Utah only requires its Licensed Paralegal
Practitioner (“LPP”) to complete 1,500 substantive hours,258 and
Oregon is considering the same for its Licensed
Paraprofessional.259 Arizona and Utah require some of the hours
to be in the specific practice area in which the licensee plans to
work,260 while Washington made no such distinction.261
Lessening the hours to 1,500 earlier on would have made the
253. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 3, at
4; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 5 (defining “substantive hours” as work otherwise
performed by an attorney).
254. This example was provided by Interviewee 2. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at
5.
255. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 13.
256. Id.; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4,
at 4.
257. Moran, Article on Arizona Nonlawyer Licensees, supra note 9.
258. Licensed Paralegal Practitioner, supra note 9; MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE
LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 13.
259. Tashea, supra note 10.
260. ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 7-210(E)(3)(b)(9)(a)(iv) (2021) (requiring
applicants entering with the education combination under (9)(a) to obtain one year of
substantive experience under the supervision of an attorney in the area of practice sought);
Licensed Paralegal Practitioner, supra note 9 (requiring 500 of the 1,500 hours be in family
law when that is the area sought, or 100 of the hours be in debt collection or forcible entry
and detainer if those are the areas sought).
261. See WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(B)(7), app. at regul. 9; REPORT: THE
FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 15.
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LLLT license more attainable, attracting more candidates.
Further, having a number of those hours in family law, as
suggested by existing LLLTs,262 would have aligned with the
quality initiative and even better prepared LLLTs for practice.
Second, while earning the LLLT license costs much less than
the average student pays to go to law school, financial aid was not
made available to LLLT candidates for the fifteen credits of
family law, which has been estimated to cost approximately
$3,750.263 The LLLT Board hoped to be able to obtain financial
aid for candidates throughout their LLLT education, but because
it existed as a new program and because of the way it was offered,
doing so was beyond the Board’s control.264 This deficiency
certainly impacted the program’s numbers, as it limited the
license to those financially able to pay for the family law credits
on the front end.265
Third, the program’s waiver process only allowed paralegals
to waive the required associate degree and forty-five core credits
if they had ten or more years of experience.266 Many of the first
cohorts and a significant portion of existing LLLTs were
paralegals that entered the program through the waiver process.267
In its March 2020 report to the Court, the LLLT Board requested
that the Court consider lessening the ten-year waiver requirement,
noting Utah set its waiver requirement at seven years.268 The
Board hoped this change would bring in more paralegals
262. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
263. REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 25-26. But see Zoom
Interview 2, supra note 4, at 6 (estimating the LLLT education to cost closer to $5,000).
264. REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79, at 25; Zoom Interview 2, supra
note 4, at 6.
265. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 34; THOMAS M. CLARKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
CTS. & REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN PROGRAM 8 (2017)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE LLLT PROGRAM] (citing a lack of financial
aid as a potential deterrent).
266. Limited-Time Waiver, supra note 78.
267. See Donaldson, supra note 94, at 57 (noting twenty-nine of the thirty-six
interviewed LLLTs and LLLT candidates previously or currently worked as paralegals);
MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 3, at 4 (noting
over fifty percent of existing LLLTs have ten or more years of substantive legal experience);
Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2; Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2.
268. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 14.
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interested in the program and aid in numbers.269 Without the
change, paralegals with less than ten years of experience would
have to take on more of the required curriculum, a commitment
that surely would not be as appealing to those with seven, eight,
or nine years of experience.270
Fourth, it is important to consider that LLLT candidates must
be willing to take a risk in pursuing a profession that is the first
of its kind, as they lack guidance on whether it will be fruitful for
them. The financial and time commitments only increase the risk
candidates must be willing to take.271 One LLLT stated that some
people did not become LLLTs because they were waiting for
changes to be made to the program, for its tweaks to be worked
out, and to see how LLLTs fared in the workforce272 (i.e., for the
risk to subside). This wait-and-see approach was surely another
culprit leading to less LLLTs than intended in the five years in
which the program was producing licenses before the sunsetting.
3. Limited to Only One Practice Area
The LLLT Practice Rule, APR 28, never mentions family
law.273 It merely states what LLLTs are permitted to do in
“approved practice areas.”274 Listed as the first responsibility of
the LLLT Board is “[r]ecommending practice areas of law for
LLLTs, subject to approval by the [] Court[.]”275 From this
language, there is no doubt that when the Court implemented the
269. See id. at Bookmark 5, at 6; Zoom Interview 14 with Wash. State Bar Ass’n Exec.
Leadership Team Member 1-2 (Jan. 8, 2021).
270. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark
5, at 6 (describing the ten years as a barrier keeping experienced paralegals from entering
through the waiver process).
271. Donaldson, supra note 94, at 33; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 3.
272. Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 3; see also Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97,
at 1 (stating that she became a LLLT after seeing the results of Washington’s Civil Legal
Needs Study but discussing how if she had read APR 28 more finely, she might have waited
for them to make the program more robust before doing it).
273. Family law and “domestic relations” are mentioned in the Appendix of APR 28,
which was adopted August 20, 2013, and amended several times. See WASH. ADMISSION
TO PRAC. R. 28 app. at regul. 2(B). But family law is not mentioned in APR 28, as appended
to the 2012 Court Order adopting it, nor is it in the current version of APR 28. See generally
2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at app. 1-8; WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28.
274. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(A), (B)(4), (C)(2)(b)-(c).
275. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(C)(2)(a).
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program, it anticipated that LLLTs might serve in areas beyond
family law. Proposers asserted it was always the mission of the
LLLT program to expand into other practice areas, and for
existing LLLTs to be able to return and complete a few courses
to get certified in another area if they wished.276
Accordingly, pursuant to APR 28, the LLLT Board made
proposals to the Court to expand into areas such as consumer,
money, and debt, low-level estates (which they called “family
documents”), elder, unemployment, residential tenant and debt
assistance, administrative law, and eviction and debt
assistance.277 The Board also discussed LLLTs helping with
matters such as stepparent adoptions and adult guardianships for
parents of adults with special needs.278 Immigration and
bankruptcy were also discussed with the Court, though they were
unfeasible due to issues with federal preemption.279 When
deciding which practice areas to propose the LLLT Board asked:
(1) Is there a need? (2) Can we properly educate, prepare, and
regulate LLLTs in this area? (3) Can LLLTs make a living with
this practice area (i.e., is it a good adjunct to a LLLT practice)?280
In considering need, the LLLT Board looked to the results
of Washington’s 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study, and later, a 2015
study regarding specifically low-income individuals.281 It
worked closely with subject area experts, volunteer lawyer
programs, legal clinics, and legal aid groups to see who was
276. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4-5.
277. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmarks
11, 12 (proposing administrative law, residential tenant and debt defense assistance, and
eviction and debt assistance); Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing “family
documents” and administrative law); Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing
consumer, money, and debt and unemployment law); Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 4
(discussing elder law).
278. E-mail from Nancy Ivarinen, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. Member, to Lacy
Ashworth, Ark. L. Rev. (Apr. 18, 2021, 1:42 CT) (on file with the Author) (Ivarinen’s
specialty on the LLLT Board was proposing new practice areas).
279. Id.; see also Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 4 (discussing the immense need
in immigration law and the federal roadblock); Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at
2 (discussing immigration and bankruptcy law); Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 7
(discussing bankruptcy law).
280. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4-5.
281. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4.
See generally CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY UPDATE COMM., WASH. STATE SUP. CT., 2015
WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY UPDATE (2015).
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coming through their doors.282 For the most part, the Board had
the support of these groups.283 The Board was also approached
by legal professionals that felt LLLTs would be able to aid in their
area.284 For instance, the Chief Administrative Law Judge asked
the Board for LLLTs to aid in administrative law.285 Despite
proposals being made every year, the Court inevitably rejected
expansion into new practice areas.286
Perhaps some of these practice areas were ill-conceived
because they required the program to break the barrier of federal
law.287 Perhaps some were rejected because they involved nonforms-based practice areas, contrary to the structure of family
law.288 While administrative law seemed like a good fit and they
had the head judge’s support to back it up, this area was not
pitched very long before the sunsetting.289 Perhaps, in this
instance, it was merely too late to sway the Court, considering it
decided to sunset the program a few months later.290
Regardless of the reason for the rejected proposals, the
program’s existing only in family law surely impacted the number
of licenses. Just as some would-be candidates were waiting for
kinks to be worked out and to see whether LLLTs fared well in
the legal profession, many were waiting to become LLLTs with
the hope that the program would expand into other practice
areas.291 First, not everyone is interested in family law, and
moreover, it would be difficult for a LLLT to run a solo practice
in a rural area providing services in family law alone.292
282. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 2; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5.
283. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 2.
284. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5.
285. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 4; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5;
MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 5, at 5.
286. See Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 3-4.
287. See Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 7; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at
4; Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 2.
288. See Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 4; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at
2, 14; see also Zoom Interview 7, supra note 138, at 3 (believing the LLLT Board proposed
practice areas too soon and too broadly).
289. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark
11; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 7; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 3-4.
290. See Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 4-5.
291. Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 3.
292. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 5, at
5; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 2; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 3.

3 ASHWORTH.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)
2/11/22 3:22 PM

732

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:4

Therefore, to carry out the hope expressed by LLLT proposers to
have LLLTs provide services in rural areas, they would arguably
need to be multi-certified.293 Consequently, limiting the program
to family law had the ability to hinder the program not only in
attaining licenses, but also in reaching its full intended potential
in providing widespread access, including in rural communities.
For these reasons, some interviewees regretted that the
program did not start with more than one practice area and
commended Utah for starting its LPP program with three practice
areas: family law, forcible entry and detainer, and debt
collection.294 In effecting its program on January 1, 2021,
Arizona went even further, allowing its LPs “to practice in
administrative law, family law, debt collection and landlordtenant disputes, with limited jurisdiction in civil and criminal
matters.”295 Oregon plans to start its Licensed Paraprofessional
program with family and landlord-tenant law.296 Other states
should consider the impact expansion into multiple practice areas
may have on a limited license program by looking to these other
states as more data becomes available.
4. Low Exam Passage Rate
A month before the June 2020 sunsetting, the passage rate
for the LLLT bar exam was calculated at 35.7%.297 For context,
Washington’s J.D. bar exam passage rate was 57.3% in 2020 and
68.5% in July 2019.298 Of course, if approximately two-thirds of
293. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 1; MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT
PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 2, at 2-3, Bookmark 5, at 5.
294. Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 5-6; Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 4;
Licensed Paralegal Practitioner, supra note 9.
295. Moran, Article on Arizona Nonlawyer Licensees, supra note 9.
296. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 13.
297. Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 7; see also LLLT Exam Results, WASH.
STATE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/6CRM-K2RR] (Oct. 8, 2021) (providing the LLLT bar
exam results for the last five exams).
298. See Persons Taking and Passing the 2020 Bar Examination, BAR EXAM’R,
[https://perma.cc/44A2-ZJQQ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021) (providing the February 2020
exam passage rate of 48%, the July 2020 exam passage rate of 86%, and the September 2020
exam passage rate of 38%—all percentages being inclusive of all test-takers, not just firsttimers); July 2019 Washington Bar Exam Pass Rates, JD ADVISING, [https://perma.cc/G3T99DJF] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
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LLLT candidates fail to pass the requisite examination, there are
far less LLLTs then there would be if all those obtaining the
educational requirements actually entered into the workforce.
Therefore, the low exam passage rate certainly played a role in
the limited number of licensed LLLTs.
The low exam passage rate raised questions for the LLLT
Board and law professors teaching the curriculum. The LLLT
Board wondered whether the exam was done appropriately,
whether the curriculum was being presented well, and whether it
should be prescreening candidates in some way to better assure
their ultimate success.299 Professors and LLLT candidates were
provided a study guide to aid in preparing for both the
professional responsibility and LLLT bar exams.300 One
professor stated that she ensured students learned the contents of
the study guide and beyond, so to her, that so many LLLTs were
not passing raised questions as to whether the information on the
study guide aligned with what was actually being tested on the
exam.301 The professor did not know who was grading the bar
exams, let alone whether they were being graded fairly.302
Initially, the LLLT Board received training on exam-writing
to assist it in creating the LLLT bar exam.303 Later, it had
assistance from an organization called Ergometrics that worked
in conjunction with the LLLT Board’s exam committees, which
were made up of LLLT Board members and other volunteer legal
professionals.304 The WSBA administers the exam and the
grading is done by the exam committee.305 The LLLT bar exam
is long and supposedly created to be just as difficult as the J.D.
bar exam, though only in the area of family law.306 The exam
299. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6.
300. Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2-3; LLLT Examination, WASH. STATE BAR
ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/EM4U-PQG7] (Oct. 8, 2021).
301. Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2-3
302. Id. at 3.
303. E-mail from Bobby Henry, Reg. Servs. Dep’t, Washington State Bar Ass’n, to
Lacy Ashworth, Ark. L. Rev. (Apr. 8, 2021, 12:33 CT) [hereinafter E-mail from Bobby
Henry 2] (on file with the Author).
304. Id.; Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269, at 2.
305. E-mail from Bobby Henry 2, supra note 303; Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269,
at 2.
306. See Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 7; Telephone Interview 11, supra note
102, at 7; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 10.
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consists of a 135-minute essay session, a 120-minute performance
session, and a 90-minute multiple choice session.307 One
professor found it was more difficult for those with only an
associate degree that lacked experience as a paralegal in family
law to attain the license and pass the exams, as he believed their
writing was not sufficient to do so.308 He felt this shortcoming
knocked out “a good third” of the possible candidates.309
In contrast, as noted by members of the BOG, upon taking
the bar exam, law students typically have seven years of
schooling to develop writing and thinking skills.310 One BOG
member questioned that if these tests are meant to gauge
competence and two-thirds of candidates cannot pass after
fulfilling their LLLT education, what does that say about the
program?311 While the low passage rate fairly breeds such
skepticism, considering that LLLTs are taught more than the
average law student in the field of family law,312 it may be that a
lack of competence is not the true culprit.
Unlike J.D. candidates who have their pick of numerous bar
preparation materials and courses before taking the bar exam,
LLLTs are afforded only a study guide listing general topics that
are supposed to align with the contents of the exam.313 While not
discussed among interviewees, it should be noted that law
professors teaching law students have studied for, taken, and
passed the J.D. bar exam.314 They are able to speak to law
students regarding the process and tailor their course exams and
307. LLLT Examination, supra note 300.
308. Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 2, 5.
309. Id. at 5.
310. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 7; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24,
at 10.
311. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 10.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
313. E-mail from Bobby Henry, Reg. Servs. Dep’t, Washington State Bar Ass’n, to
Lacy Ashworth, Ark. L. Rev. (Apr. 8, 2021, 10:52 CT) [hereinafter E-mail from Bobby
Henry 1] (on file with the Author). One LLLT who passed the LLLT bar exam her first time
stated she made her own bar preparatory materials, and she gave those materials to another
LLLT. Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 4. As she understands it, there are nine bootleg
copies of her materials floating around, and she was happy to have been able to do that for
others. Id.
314. How Do I Become a Law School Professor?, FINDLAW, [https://perma.cc/38UGQZY6] (June 20, 2016).
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teaching styles to better prepare students to take the bar.315
Meanwhile, law professor teaching LLLTs lack familiarity with
the LLLT bar exam grading process.316 The only resource
provided to professors to assist them in preparing LLLTs is the
same study guide that is supposed to align with their exam—
which the professor has neither taken nor seen.317 Consequently,
to better enable professors to prepare LLLTs for their bar exam,
they should be made privy to its contents.
Further, while it may be unfeasible for the entity writing and
grading the bar exam to provide LLLTs with more substantive bar
preparation materials,318 with so few candidates able to pass the
exam, it is imperative to find an ethical way to do so.319 And, as
one professor felt subpar writing skills played a role in the low
exam passage rate,320 perhaps the LLLT program could have
better incorporated opportunities for writing development. For
this reason, paraprofessional bar preparatory materials should
also include practice essays.
Lastly, if the LLLT bar exam is really as substantively
difficult as the J.D. bar exam in the area of family law, perhaps
such difficulty should be reconsidered. While it is important, in
the interest of client protection, that LLLTs be competent and that
their competency be tested, LLLTs are neither law school
graduates nor are they permitted to do that which an attorney can
do in family law after passing the bar.321 Regardless of difficulty
and these other factors, it may be necessary to take a second look
to assure the actual LLLT bar exam aligns with both the
curriculum being taught and the duties of LLLTs upon passing.
If these elements do not align, LLLTs are handicapped, and their
315. See Emmeline Paulette Reeves, Teaching to the Test: The Incorporation of
Elements of Bar Exam Preparation in Legal Education, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 645, 646 (2015).
316. Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2-3.
317. See id.
318. E-mail from Bobby Henry 1, supra note 313 (noting “as the licensing agency and
administrators and writers of the exam, it would not be appropriate for the LLLT Board or
the WSBA to develop an exam prep program[]” and “bar exam prep is provided by the law
schools or private companies for the same reason”).
319. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 15,
slide 9 (discussing the low exam passage rates and noting that a “licensing exam prep
course[]” could increase exam passage rates).
320. Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 5.
321. See generally supra Sections II.B., II.C.
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bar exam passage rate is doomed from the start. If they do,
considerations must be made for how to better assure LLLTs can
prove competence in the examination room.
5. Lack of Support from the Legal Community
Another reason that may have led to the program’s inability
to attract LLLT candidates is that it was not supported by the legal
community.322 As previously discussed, from its inception, the
LLLT program had its opponents.323 At forums to educate the
public on LLLTs, some lawyers would express their disapproval
of the program, and some lawyers would not sign off on LLLT
work and disrespected LLLTs once they entered the profession.324
There was opposition to the program even before its
implementation and expansion of scope.325 Recall that after the
WSBA voted to allow LLLTs to become members of the Family
Law Section, some family law practitioners left to create their
own group in which LLLTs were not allowed.326 Exclusion and
criticism further carried over onto forums such as listservs and
Facebook.327

322. See Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 2 (in speculating why there were so few
LLLTs, she discussed the tremendous push back from attorneys about the program, while
noting that on the other end of the spectrum, some LLLTs were being hired by attorneys to
work in their firms); Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3 (finding the constant resistance
from the Family Law Section to be one of three political reasons leading to the program’s
downfall); Zoom Interview 6, supra note 97, at 3 (discussing how the adversarial dynamic
with the WSBA was deeply threatening to people); Zoom Interview 7, supra note 138, at 2
(discussing how there were not enough people speaking positively about the program);
Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 5 (noting hostile audiences made up of lawyers
against the program); see also supra Part III.
323. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part III.
324. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part III.
326. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
327. Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at 3; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2
(listservs made LLLTs out to be secretaries dabbling); Alisa Bagirova, Comment to
Washington State Bar Association, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/638549RH] (stating she is a family lawyer and her experience with LLLTs is that they charge as
much as she does and “lots of times” they fill out forms incorrectly); see also White, supra
note 191 (responding that she apologizes and does not know a single LLLT charging attorney
rates, and most she knows do flat fee, reduced rates, and pro bono work, and also noting
“[w]e all want to do our best for our clients and learn from any mistakes we make.”).
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When there are already so many inherent risks and reasons
to be skeptical about investing time and money into a new
profession, the fact that it was not well-received likely did not
help attract candidates, especially those practicing the wait-andsee approach.328 In the May 12, 2020 meeting between the LLLT
Board and the Court, a member of the Board expressed her hope
that “over time[,] once we have the support and once we have the
vocal welcoming into the bar community . . . we’re going to see
more people wanting to take a chance and . . . join us.”329 Of
course, this did not happen, as the program was sunsetted less
than a month later.330 Hopefully, other states can learn from the
impact a lack of support from the legal community can have on
the number of people willing to take on a new legal profession.
Perhaps they will reap the benefits only hoped of in Washington.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
It is easier and faster to edit than to create.331
Aside from providing background information on the access
to justice gap and on the LLLT program itself, up until this point,
this Comment has discussed the shortcomings of the program and
those tasked with supporting and administering it, it has presented
the concerns of the BOG, other members of the legal community,
the Washington State Supreme Court, the LLLT Board, and
others involved, and it has analyzed the overarching reasons
provided by the Court for sunsetting the LLLT program. This
section works to summarize some of the lessons alluded to above,
and to provide and expound on some of the other suggestions
offered by interviewees when asked what would help the next
328. See supra text accompanying note 272.
329. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:53:50-01:54:09.
330. See Letter Notification of Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
331. I give credit specifically to interviewees 13 and 14, who similarly stated this
concept, and to many other interviewees who alluded to the same, which gave me the idea
to start this section in this way. See Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269, at 2 (noting it is
faster to edit than to draft and now other states can look at Washington’s rule and edit rather
than draft it); Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at 2-3; see also Kirsten Jordan, Bag of
Tricks: It’s Easier to Edit Than Create, PEOPLERESULTS (Oct. 12, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/6RRL-6PXC].
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state better succeed in developing a sustainable nonlawyer
program.

A. Ensure Oversight and Objectivity
As previously discussed, the LLLT program became a
political and controversial issue in Washington, as most firsts
do.332 Although the purpose of the LLLT was to take a “baby
step” in the direction of providing better access to civil justice,333
the program grew to mean more than that for Washington. Being
in favor of the program seemed to translate into being in favor of
other concepts, such as access to justice, or racial equality—an
association that deterred some people from questioning the
program.334 Still, there were questions about the objectivity of
the LLLT Board and its need for oversight.
Regarding objectivity, there was the concern that because a
few members of the LLLT Board were being paid to teach LLLT
courses, they had a financial interest in the program that could
impact their decisions in overseeing the program.335 Also,
because Washington was the first, and much thought, work, and
advocacy went into the initial proposal and development of the
program, there existed the belief that such passionate advocacy,
without outside oversight, impacted the LLLT Board’s ability to
be the “objective shepherd the program need[ed].”336
Further, there was uncertainty about whether the LLLT
program was meant to have oversight beyond that of the Court
and the LLLT Board. In the Court’s 2012 Order adopting APR
28, it stated the LLLT Board would have the authority “to oversee
the activities of and discipline certified [LLLT]s in the same way
the [WSBA] does with respect to attorneys.”337 APR 28 stated
the Bar was to “provide reasonably necessary administrative
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See supra text accompanying note 24.
See supra text accompanying notes 166, 175.
Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
Letter from Dan Bridges, supra note 144, at 6.
2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 3.
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support for the LLLT Board[]”338 but what that support should
entail beyond funding the program seemed unclear. Because the
program was adopted by Court Order, it was considered the
Court’s program.339 While the Court did not mandate the WSBA
not to question the program, the BOG was told by a ranking
WSBA member that it was not to question it, and moreover, the
BOG did not feel doing so would be fruitful.340 It was not until
several years into the program that the Court expressed to the
BOG that it was not only allowed, but it was expected to conduct
oversight of the LLLT program, because if the BOG was not
overseeing the program, who was?341 It was following this stamp
of approval that the BOG began looking into what the provided
money was able to procure in terms of licenses.342
Consequently, when the WSBA brought financial concerns
and questions to the doorstep of the LLLT Board in 2019, they
were viewed as a symbol of lost support.343 The LLLT Board
began looking for funding elsewhere and crafting a more concrete
business plan to show how and when the program could achieve
self-sufficiency and what, theoretically, would need to occur to

338. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRAC. R. 28(C)(4).
339. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 4; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24,
at 5.
340. Telephone Interview 11, supra note 102, at 4; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24,
at 5.
341. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 5 (believing the conversation had taken
place two or three years ago [from this December 2020 interview] at the BOG’s annual
meeting with the Court in April, but not knowing for sure).
342. Id. at 6.
343. See Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing how budget concerns were
not brought to the LLLT Board until October 2019); Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 56, 8 (also discussing how budget concerns were not brought to the LLLT Board until October,
and noting that if the financial concerns were brought to the Board earlier, it would have
looked for other funding earlier, and because it operates on a fiscal year, the Board believed
it would have at least a year to address the budgetary concerns); see also Telephone Interview
16, supra note 24, at 2 (noting he encouraged the LLLT Board to create a plan for financial
self-sufficiency because the WSBA had budgetary concerns and a group was against the
program). See generally Letter from Daniel D. Clark, Treasurer, Washington State Bar Ass’n
Bd. of Governors, to Steve Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. (Nov. 15,
2019) (on file with the Author) (discussing that the program was intended to be “cost revenue
neutral to the WSBA budget[]” and that the program had not met this goal, and inviting
Crossland to attend the BOG’s Budget and Audit Committee meeting to discuss collaborative
ways to solve the financial issue—noting the letter was “not meant to be considered an
adversarial communication . . . .”).
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do so more quickly.344 For instance, if the Court approved
expansion into other practice areas, lessened the hours of
experience from 3,000 to 1,500, and lessened the years required
for paralegals to enter through the waiver process—all of which
are changes to the program for which this Comment advocates.345
These proposals and the developing business plan were
submitted to the Court in the LLLT Board’s March 2020 report,
in which it also noted how “[t]he recent difficulties in determining
points of authority between the BOG and LLLT Board hinder our
ability to work efficiently.”346 While many of the changes
proposed by the LLLT Board would have helped in increasing
numbers, attaining self-sufficiency was still nine years and nearly
one million dollars away, and even this 2029 projection was
assuming the Court approved the Board’s proposals and that the
Board’s assumptions were correct.347 And, because the Board’s
plan to fundraise in order to attain more substantial outside
funding was so new, the WSBA’s obligation to subsidize the
program appeared indefinite.348 The proposal and plan, though
thorough and outwardly promising, seemed to come too late for
Washington, as the Court decided to sunset the program only
months after being presented with the detailed plan.349 Similarly,
344. See MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark
6, at 8 (stating “[t]he LLLT Board is exploring fundraising as a way to help offset WSBA’s
costs for administering the program . . . .”); Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269, at 1; see
also Letter from Steve Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd., to Washington
State Bar Found. Bd. of Trs. 1 (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the Author) (requesting that the
Foundation “create a LLLT fund to enable the LLLT Board to seek contributions from
potential donors and grantors and securely manage funds obtained.”).
345. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 6, at
8; Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269, at 1-2; see also infra notes 355-61 and accompanying
text.
346. MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 5, at
7.
347. Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slide 8; see also May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra
note 8, at 00:55:40-00:56:42 (noting that the LLLT Board provided data backing its
assumptions to show their likelihood).
348. See generally Letter from Kristina Larry, President, Washington St. Bar Found.,
to Steve Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd. (Apr. 10, 2020) (on file with
the Author) (responding to and denying the LLLT Board’s request to create a LLLT fund).
349. See Letter from Stephen R. Crossland, Chair, Ltd. License Legal Technician Bd.,
to JJ. of the Washington Sup. Ct. 2 (April 22, 2020) (on file with the Author); MARCH 2020
REPORT OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note 85, at Bookmark 15; Letter Notification of
Sunsetting, supra note 11, at 1.
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while budget concerns and calls for collaboration were brought to
the LLLT Board in late 2019,350 they too seemed to come too late
to be truly fruitful for the program, as there was uncertainty about
oversight and an underlying opposition between the program’s
key entities that had been building up since it was initially
proposed.351
When administering any new program, it is important to
have passion, but equally important is the ability to have freeflowing questions and ideas, objectivity, and oversight. Such
principles elicit trust in the decisions and decisionmakers and
assure the program is reaching its full potential for the purpose
for which it was designed. Plausibly, if the LLLT Board, the
WSBA, and the BOG recognized or had been better appraised of
the BOG’s intended role in conducting oversight of the program
from its initial implementation, the administrative minds of the
BOG and the passionate minds of the LLLT Board could have
collaborated sooner, more effectively, more objectively, and
potentially with less hostility, to foster better reactions toward the
program and potentially its financial sustainability, in order to
carry out the intended purpose of providing more people with
access to justice.
Perhaps then, the Court’s confidence, as expressed in its
2012 Order, “that the WSBA and the Practice of Law Board, in
consultation with this Court, w[ould] be able to develop a feebased system that ensure[d] that the licensing and ongoing
regulation of [LLLT]s w[ould] be cost-neutral to the WSBA”
would not have been so ill-founded.352 Of course, for this
collaboration to be fruitful, the BOG would have had to better
support the program at its inception, because as previously
mentioned, if the decision to approve the program was in the
hands of the BOG in 2012, it would not have been
implemented.353 Therefore, it remains paramount for the Court to
have the power of final approval.
350. See supra note 343 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Daniel D. Clark,
supra note 224, at 2 (discussing his “attempt[] to work in good faith collaboration with the
LLLT Board.”).
351. See generally supra notes 146-150 accompanying text.
352. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 11.
353. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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B. Change the Program
There were many aspects of the program itself that hindered
it from reaching its full potential in numbers. Having lesser
numbers surely impacted the perception of the cost of the
program, and in conjunction, the amount of support coming from
the WSBA.354 To better assure a nonlawyer program achieves
greater numbers, support, and sustainability—all of which are
greatly intertwined—other states should consider the following
program changes. Note first, while many of these changes were
considered or proposed by the LLLT Board or other observers
throughout the life of the program, in learning from Washington,
these changes should be employed upon initial implementation:
(1) Promote the program vigorously and immediately—as a
career and as a resource to potential clients;355
(2) Set the experiential hours at a number that fosters
sufficient training and competency, while still ensuring
feasibility. To allow for this balance, take a page out of Utah and
Arizona’s prequel and require at least some of the hours to be in
the area the nonlawyer will work upon entering the legal
profession.356 As the nurse practitioner and doctor relationship
has shown, quality concerns will always be a point of contention
between professional and paraprofessional.357 This change can
be further used as a sword in fighting against quality concerns;
(3) Again, in learning from changes made by Washington’s
successors, start the program with multiple practice areas to
attract candidates interested or experienced in different areas of
law, and to better allow solo practitioners to stay financially afloat
while charging reasonable prices, recognizing overhead may be
similar to attorneys.358 This is especially true in attempting to
fulfill the goal of offering limited services in rural areas, where
the ability to provide legal services in multiple areas may be the
only way for a rural nonlawyer to maintain a solo practice;359
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See generally supra Section V.A.
See supra Section V.B.1.
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 392-93 and accompanying text.
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(4) Find a way to provide candidates with resources to assist
them in passing their competency exams, including essay-writing
resources (as are provided to law students).360 Also, assure the
classroom curriculum aligns both with the exam and the actual
duties of the nonlawyer upon entering the legal profession.
(5) Get rid of as much risk as possible. Recognizing starting
a new profession is risky in and of itself, find a way to ensure
financial aid is available through the curriculum provider.361
The LLLT Board cannot be considered negligent for not
incorporating these addendums when crafting the rule in 2005, or
when the Court adopted it in 2012, just as it could not have
foreseen that such alterations would be helpful when creating the
program from scratch. Importantly, upon realizing that the
program could be aided by certain changes, the LLLT Board
made various proposals, many of which were rejected.362 This
reality brings me to the next point.
C. Work to Stick to the Original Idea, but Forewarn Change
The legal community either turned against or became even
less in favor of the LLLT program when the LLLT Board, through
proposals for expansion of scope and expansion into other
practice areas, worked to develop the program into something it
initially was not—succeeding in the former expansion only by a
five-four majority vote.363 Note this shift in support. The BOG
swallowed the idea of the program upon its implementation only
after being promised that LLLTs would not enter the
courtroom.364 It retracted such support once the LLLT became
something more.365 Seven of nine members of the Court
approved the program when the scope of the LLLT was more
limited, but when the Court was voting to allow LLLTs to provide
aid to clients during negotiations, depositions, and in the
360. See supra notes 313-20 and accompanying text.
361. See Donaldson, supra note 94, at 67 (similarly discussing how developing more
scholarship opportunities could attract more candidates, especially those from “lower income
backgrounds”).
362. See generally supra Section V.B.3.
363. See supra notes 99, 102-06, 156 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
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courtroom, that vote changed, only earning the support of five
members.366
While radical change is certainly the only way to fully close
the access to justice gap, states must consider what is feasible,
because as many interviewees noted, the legal profession is
resistant to change.367 Changing the program from its original
form surely played a role in its lack of support, and its lack of
support surely played a role in its inevitable sunsetting.368 While
Washington is unique because it was the first to permit
nonlawyers to practice law, other states have the benefit of
already having the concept of nontraditional programs lingering
in the legal profession, as other states have adopted or considered
similar programs and the ABA has publicly called for
innovation.369 Still, as the legal profession remains selfregulating,370 other states must consider the potential impact that
the lack of support from attorneys, who are tasked with
approving, implementing, administering, and funding these
programs, can have. On the other hand, states must balance the
need to be able to change an implemented program when it is not
working or producing the intended results, as the LLLT Board
and the majority of the Court did, at least in finding LLLTs could
be more useful to clients with an expansion in scope.371
Therefore, while Washington understandably could not and
arguably should not have had to stick to its program’s original
idea, or guarantee that it would remain static when creating it
from scratch, other states can learn from the shift in support that
366. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
367. Zoom Interview 8, supra note 44, at 3-4 (noting that due to the nature of the job,
attorneys are always looking for something to oppose); Zoom Interview 9, supra note 24, at
6 (stating it all comes down to the facts that courts develop slowly, the law develops slowly,
and lawyers do not like large-scale change, they like incremental change, so future states
considering similar programs have to look at it as “incremental change”); Zoom Interview 4,
supra note 23, at 2-3 (believing the Court’s sunsetting the program sent the message that it
will “do anything to maintain the status quo”); Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 3 (stating
that for a program like this to succeed, the legal profession would need to adapt as the medical
profession has and to look at issues in a new way).
368. See generally supra Sections II.C., III.C., V.B.5.
369. See supra notes 5, 16 and accompanying text.
370. Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the
Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2005).
371. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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occurred in Washington upon changes to the program and try to
better determine from the outset what their nonlawyer
paraprofessional will do. Then, they can promote the program in
a uniform way and in a way that assures everyone knows what the
program is and that it is subject to change for the purpose of
meeting the overarching goal of providing more people with
access to legal services.372 The legal profession must also take
responsibility in understanding that programs need to be changed
to better achieve their intended purpose. However, this
transparency and forewarning may at least allow the legal
profession to prepare for such changes, whether or not they agree
with them.
D. Monitor Through Data Collection
Another apparent point of disconnect between the LLLT
Board and the BOG was whether and how LLLTs could collect
data about their services. As discussed in Part IV, the BOG did
not believe LLLT and client testimonials alone sufficed to show
that LLLTs were actually increasing access to justice.373 While
LLLTs and LLLT Board members expressed confidentiality
concerns,374 a member of the BOG believed there to be several
non-privileged statistics that could have been provided to justify
the program: number of divorces, success rates, case counts,
outcomes, prices, and other information if LLLTs asked their
clients to waive confidentiality.375 A member of the LLLT Board
stated there were antitrust problems with its asking LLLTs for
certain information, including how much they make.376 The only
information that it has is the limited information some LLLTs
have voluntarily provided.377 An interviewee felt that because
there was information that LLLTs could have provided without

372.
concerns.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Doing this would hopefully dispel the “bait and switch” and “smoke and mirrors”
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 8-9.
Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
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issues of confidentiality, that LLLTs were not providing such data
leads one to consider why.378
Relevantly, in the 2020 ABA resolution encouraging
innovative thinking to aid in the access to justice crisis, the ABA
called for “the collection and assessment of data regarding
regulatory innovations, both before and after the[ir] adoption . . .
to ensure that changes are data driven and in the interests of
clients and the public.”379 The ABA resolution further stated:
The collection of such data is critical if the legal profession
is going to make reasoned and informed judgments about
how to regulate the delivery of legal services in the future
and how to address the public’s growing unmet legal needs.
We need to experiment with different approaches, analyze
which methods are most effective, and determine which
kinds of regulatory innovations best provide the widest
access to legal services, best provide continuing and
necessary protections for those in need of legal services, and
best serve the interest of clients and the public.380

As expressed by the ABA, the ability to use data to measure
the success of a program in providing access in a way that protects
the public is imperative.381 Of course, it cannot go understated
that Washington was the first, and that it created its program long
before the ABA encouraged innovation and data collection.382
Still, while BOG and LLLT Board members disagree about what
information is feasible to attain when neither the 2012 Court
Order nor APR 28 require LLLTs to report such data, they both
seem to agree that future states should come up with some kind
of system at the outset of the program that outlines how
administrators plan to gauge their program’s success.383 To better
appease both sides of the equation, this should be done in a way

378. Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 8.
379. RESOLUTION 115, supra note 16, at 3.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See 2012 Order for APR 28, supra note 5, at 12 (drafted in 2012); RESOLUTION
115, supra note 16, at 4 (drafted in 2020).
383. See Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 4; Telephone Interview 11, supra note
102, at 6; Zoom Interview 12, supra note 24, at 8-9.
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that avoids confidentiality and antitrust concerns, but results in
more than voluntary information from willing LLLTs.384
Notably, while the LLLT program lacked a specific system
for measuring success, there have been some studies of the LLLT
program by outside entities and within the program itself.385 In
fact, the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) is currently
conducting a study of the LLLT program.386 While the study was
planned prior to the program’s sunsetting, the NCSC still plans to
follow through with it, and LLLT Board members hope the
results, coming from an outside entity with the goal of improving
the court system, will help establish the program as viable, though
they wish the Court would have waited for such impartial results
prior to sunsetting.387 While there are limitations to the
information the NCSC may obtain due to the state system and the
need to obtain the consent of LLLTs and their clients, the NCSC
is getting input from judges, lawyers, LLLTs, and clients to
determine the impact and viability of the program.388 Other states
should consider the results upon completion.
E. Develop Clear and Mutual Expectations

384. The ABA resolution cited Utah’s Unlocking Legal Regulation project as one
example of an effort to collect and analyze data: “Among other initiatives, the project will
‘[a]ssess and support pilot projects for risk-based regulation in Utah and other states,
including identifying metrics and conducting empirical research to evaluate outcomes.’”
RESOLUTION 115, supra note 16, at 3 (citing Unlocking Legal Regulation, UNIV. DENVER
INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS., [https://perma.cc/YMM5-7U59] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2021)). While providing data may seem intrusive and yet another burden that the
paraprofessional must take on in addition to all those that come with being a part of a new
profession, at least until the program proves itself, such data collection is essential to assure
the program is working as intended. If the data results are positive, then this requirement
would help prove the program as viable sooner and may increase support from those tasked
with funding the program, even if the program is not self-sustaining as quickly as anticipated.
385. See generally PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE LLLT PROGRAM, supra note
265; REPORT: THE FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 79; MARCH 2020 REPORT OF THE LLLT
PROGRAM, supra note 85; Donaldson, supra note 94.
386. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 8; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8;
Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 7.
387. See Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 1; Telephone
Interview 5, supra note 4, at 8; Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8; Zoom Interview 2,
supra note 4, at 7.
388. Zoom Interview 1, supra note 22, at 8-9; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at
8.
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Though it comes last, this section presents, in my opinion,
the true crux of the problem with Washington’s LLLT program.
Perhaps the program’s greatest issue was that no one seemed to
be on the same page—about who, where, how, in what practice
area, for what purpose, and under what oversight the LLLT would
serve. The program was required to be self-supporting in a
reasonable period of time, but proponents, opponents, and even
members of the Court seemed to be on different pages as to what
constituted reasonable.389 Until attaining such status, the program
was to be subsidized by the WSBA, but there was disconnect as
to how much money the program should be expending in the
meantime.390 A member of the LLLT Board believed that if
people could grasp just how much it would cost to implement this
type of program, that would be one less criticism, because
finances would not come as a shock.391 Now, administrators can
look at Washington and see that it cost them $1.4 million to
develop and administer the program from scratch in an eight-year
period and they can use these figures in determining projected
funds and time allocations for future programs from their
beginning.392
There were also different notions about how long the
program was actually producing licenses and able to generate
funds. The BOG pointed to the fact that there were only thirtyeight active LLLTs produced in an eight-year period,393 while the
LLLT Board and proponents stressed the considerable amount of
preparation that went into the first three years of the program and

389. See supra Section V.A.I.; see also supra notes 47-48, 158 and accompanying text;
May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:56:03-01:56:23 (discussing why the LLLT Board
believed their time estimations for achieving cost neutrality to be reasonable).
390. See discussion supra Section V.A.
391. Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 9.
392. Id.; see also Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that different states
spend differently, so other states should look at the details of the costs within Washington,
rather than just the number, but finding that the money and time spent in Washington can
give other states a sense of the scope).
393. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slides 7, 9, 13; see also Letter from Dan
Bridges, supra note 144, at 1 (this letter was written almost a year earlier, so the numbers are
different, but it illustrates the same point, mentioning “[f]or $2 million dollars [sic] spent
over 7 years, there are only 35 actively licensed LLLTs . . . .”).
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that the first LLLT did not enter the profession until mid-2015.394
Further, recall that the first cohort and many of the first LLLTs
were long-time paralegals that entered the program through the
waiver process, rather than by undergoing the usual, longer
course of completion.395 As the program continued, more and
more candidates were non-paralegals who had to complete the
entirety of the program’s requirements, which is estimated to take
a minimum of three and half years, but can take much longer for
a candidate unable to attend full-time.396 Members of the LLLT
Board believed the Court and opponents misunderstood the
program’s timeline for moving candidates through the pipeline.397
Significantly, saying thirty-eight active LLLTs in eight years398
versus thirty-eight active LLLTs and 275 people in the pipeline
in five years399 surely has a different ring to it.
Importantly, for any future nonlawyer program to survive,
all key entities must support the program. One of the reasons
support was lacking in Washington was because there were so
many differing views on what the program would and should be.
In summary, as one insightful interviewee stated, we all believe
in access to justice, we just have different ideas about how to get
there, so if people can go into this type of program with shared
and realistic expectations, they are more likely to be successful.400
CONCLUSION

394. May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:52:54-01:53:17; Zoom Interview 2,
supra note 4, at 3-4; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 6; Zoom Interview 13, supra
note 19, at 2.
395. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text; May 12, 2020 Meeting, supra
note 8, at 01:52:24.
396. Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that it can take
much longer for a candidate with family or financial demands, or if he or she struggles in
finding work experience); see also Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2-3 (noting it takes
many candidates a while to become a LLLT because they are older, on their second
profession, and with kids and other responsibilities).
397. See Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10, at 3, 5; May 12, 2020
Meeting, supra note 8, at 01:52:24; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at 2; Zoom Interview
1, supra note 22, at 6; Zoom Interview 2, supra note 4, at 3-4.
398. See Clark PowerPoint, supra note 13, at slides 5-7.
399. See Letter in Response to LLLT Sunsetting, supra note 10 at 4, 5; see also supra
notes 92, 251 and accompanying text.
400. Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at 3-4.
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Contrary to society’s goal, the access to justice gap is
widening. Low-income individuals face a vast majority of their
civil legal needs alone, and the number of unmet civil legal needs
for moderate-income individuals continues to grow.401 As voiced
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, “[w]e educated, privileged lawyers
have a professional and moral duty to represent the
underrepresented in our society, to ensure that justice exists for
all, both legal and economic justice.”402 Yet, despite its best
intentions, the legal profession, in its traditional sense, is failing
to fulfil this important duty.403 When the alternative to being
unable to afford an attorney is no representation at all, we must
consider ways to meet those in need in the middle.404 It is time
for the legal profession to focus on the bigger picture; to open our
minds to change; to continue to consider innovative solutions; to
give proposed solutions the patience, time, and support they
deserve; and to take whatever lessons we can from those
inevitably deemed to come up short.
With the help of individuals uniquely involved, this
Comment analyzed the successes and shortcomings of
Washington’s innovative LLLT program from its conception to
its ultimate sunsetting.405 In doing so, it further emphasized some
key lessons other states should consider moving forward in
establishing and developing similar nonlawyer paraprofessional
programs.406 Many interviewees hope, in one way or another,
other states will take whatever lessons and work product they can
from Washington and continue to innovate.407 Perhaps then, the
program can return to Washington improved by its successors—
401. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
402. Randy James, Sonia Sotomayor: Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, TIME (May
27, 2009), [https://perma.cc/VHL7-F9KU] (quote stated in 2002).
403. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part I.
404. See supra Part I.
405. See supra Parts IV, V.
406. See supra Part VI.
407. See Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 3; Zoom Interview 4, supra note 23, at
4; Telephone Interview 5, supra note 4, at 10; Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at 2-3;
Zoom Interview 14, supra note 269, at 2; Zoom Interview 15 with Wash. State Bar Ass’n
Bd. of Governors Member 1 (Jan. 8, 2021) (stating he is sure a program like this can work,
believing fresh perspectives and new outlooks will help and noting that Utah seems to be
doing well).
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to better achieve the intended purpose of providing more people
with access to justice.408

408. See Zoom Interview 3, supra note 23, at 3; Zoom Interview 13, supra note 19, at
2-3; Telephone Interview 16, supra note 24, at 5 (still believing the LLLT will return to
Washington in the next decade).
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REASSOCIATING STUDENT RIGHTS: GIVING
IT THE OLE COLLEGE TRY
Tyler Mlakar*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of 2020, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) declared Coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) a
“public health emergency of international concern.”1
Governments around the world began instituting citywide and
even nationwide “lockdowns.”2 In the United States, the
approach was far more splintered. While there was no nationwide
lockdown, states across the country instituted varying measures
ranging from “shelter-in-place” and “stay at home” orders, to
school closures, limits on the size of public gatherings, “mask
mandates,” and even some states allowing restaurants and bars to

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. First and foremost, the
author would like to sincerely thank his parents, Amber and Paul Mlakar, as well as his sister,
Emilee Mlakar, for all their enduring love and support. The author would also like to express
the utmost gratitude to Professor Danielle Weatherby, without whom this Comment would
not have been possible. Additionally, the author would like to thank all his friends, especially
Anthony “Scarps” Scarpiniti, for their thoughtful comments and support. Finally, the author
thanks Lacy Ashworth, the editor responsible for this Comment, as well as the rest of the
2021-2022 Arkansas Law Review team for their diligent work in bringing this Comment to
fruition.
1. WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus
(2019-nCoV),
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Jan.
30,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/A2WW-MCQZ].
2. See, e.g., Coronavirus: India Enters ‘Total Lockdown’ After Spike in Cases, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QDS6-MTDN]; Michael Levenson, Scale of
China’s Wuhan Shutdown Is Believed to Be Without Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/42W6-R32W]; Emmanuel Macron annonce l’interdiction des
déplacements non essentiels dès mardi midi, MAG. MARIANNE (Mar. 17, 2020, 8:10 AM),
[https://perma.cc/PM2V-X3XU]; Eric Sylvers & Giovanni Legorano, As Virus Spreads,
Italy Locks Down Country, WALL ST. J., [https://perma.cc/HA3T-FWD2] (Mar. 9, 2020,
6:42 PM); Ndanki Kahiurika, Countdown to Lockdown, NAMIBIAN (Mar. 27, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/S2EJ-NRL4]; Calla Wahlquist, Australia’s Coronavirus Lockdown—The
First 50 Days, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2020, 4:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/PGK9-255K].
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remain open.3 Across the United States, these measures have
resulted in the most pervasive governmental regulation of
American citizens’ private affairs since World War II.4
During the early stages of COVID-19, universities
nationwide frantically closed their doors to students and
scrambled to adopt online teaching curricula.5 As COVID-19
restrictions began to relax across the country over the summer
months, many universities decided to reopen their campuses for
the fall 2020 semester.6 To the seeming astonishment of
university administrators, upon returning to campus, young,
impressionable students who had not seen their friends in months
decided they did not want to sit in their dorm rooms all day every
day.7 As COVID-19 cases surged on campus, universities
adopted policies—often incorporated into their disciplinary
codes—designed to curb the spread of the virus, including, among
other things: mask mandates, required completion of “daily
3. James G. Hodge, Jr., COVID-19 Emergency Legal Preparedness Primer, NETWORK
FOR PUB. HEALTH L. (Mar. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/LF5X-EWBE]; Lawrence Gostin &
Sarah Wetter, Why There’s No National Lockdown, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/AZ6U-GVM3]; Gov. Northam Announces Statewide Mask Mandate to
Begin Friday, NBC12 NEWSROOM, [https://perma.cc/FB72-D9AP] (May 27, 2020, 6:37
AM); Josh Shannon, Face Mask Mandate Takes Effect in Delaware, NEWARK POST (Apr.
29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6KJN-3N6K].
4. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the
authority of the executive to force American citizens of Japanese descent to evacuate their
homes and relocate to government internment camps).
5. Mike Baker et al., First U.S. Colleges Close Classrooms as Virus Spreads. More
Could Follow, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/9DMN-D45W] (Mar. 11, 2020); Abigail
Johnson Hess, How Coronavirus Dramatically Changed College for Over 14 Million
Students, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2020, 2:07 PM), [https://perma.cc/S58Y-5JMR] (stating that as
of March 26, 2020, more than 1,100 colleges and universities had closed their doors to
students as a result of COVID-19).
6. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Fever Checks and Quarantine Dorms: The Fall
College Experience?, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/JZ4V-F8P8] (Aug. 18, 2020); Elinor
Aspegren & Samuel Zwickel, In Person, Online Classes or a Mix: Colleges’ Fall 2020
Coronavirus Reopening Plans, Detailed, USA TODAY (June 22, 2020, 5:36 PM),
[https://perma.cc/7N27-7ZC8]; Jacquelyn Elias et al., Here’s Our List of Colleges’
Reopening Models, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., [https://perma.cc/9WBA-SJKL] (Oct. 1, 2020,
2:04 PM) (providing the fall 2020 reopening plans of nearly 3,000 colleges and universities).
7. See, e.g., Scottie Andrew, The Psychology Behind Why Some College Students
Break Covid-19 Rules, CNN, [https://perma.cc/SSB4-5KTY] (Sept. 9, 2020, 12:37 PM);
More Suspensions Possible as NYU Investigates Massive Party in Washington Square Park,
NBC N.Y., [https://perma.cc/AFX2-34WC] (Sept. 7, 2020, 12:43 PM); Natasha Singer,
College Quarantine Breakdowns Leave Some at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/RC3HNNDD] (Sept. 16, 2020) (detailing how many students refused to remain in quarantine).
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health checks,” prohibitions of in-person registered student
organization (“RSO”) meetings, limits on the size of student
gatherings on and off campus, reporting measures for student
violations, virus tracking apps, etc.8
Unfortunately, for many students, it did not take long for
them to discover that these policies were not idle threats;
disciplinary action was swift and relentless, often making national
headlines.9 The obvious question for many students and their
8. See, e.g., E-mail from Charles F. Robinson, Interim Provost, Univ. of Ark., to Univ.
of Ark. Cmty. (Sept. 4, 2020, 12:50 PM CST) [hereinafter Appendix A] (appended below);
UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, COVID-19 POLICY (2021), [https://perma.cc/S39U-V6GP];
COVID-19: Essential Information, MIDDLEBURY COLL., [https://perma.cc/C92L-FJVS]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2021); UC Berkeley Keep Berkeley Healthy Pledge, UC BERKELEY,
[https://perma.cc/WV7B-LBP8] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021); Rebecca Blank, Chancellor
Directs 14-Day Student Restrictions for Health, Safety, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON (Sept. 7,
2020), [https://perma.cc/W5A4-5Z7Y]; Policy on Health Requirements Related to COVID19 Pandemic, NYU (Aug. 27, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6KLD-3BEZ]; Protect Texas
Together, UNIV. OF TEX., [https://perma.cc/M28K-W8DQ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021);
Healthy
Together
Community
Commitment
Violations,
WM. & MARY,
[https://perma.cc/49KQ-V62L] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021). Indeed, the interim dean of
students of Northwestern University requested that even non-university-affiliated residents
of the communities surrounding Northwestern report student violations of COVID-19
policies off campus to university administrators. Elyssa Cherney, ‘There’s Been an Awful
Lot of Partying’: Northwestern University Asks Evanston Residents to Report Students Who
Ignore COVID-19 Precautions in Off-Campus Gatherings, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/EY4G-E9HK].
9. See, e.g., Bobby Maldonado & Marianne Thomson, Additional Information About
Last Night’s Quad Gathering, SYRACUSE UNIV. (Aug. 20, 2020), [https://perma.cc/77QCCS8E] (suspending twenty-three students for gathering with scores of others in the university
quad); Ian Thomsen, Northeastern Dismisses 11 Students for Gathering in Violation of
COVID-19 Policies, NEWS@NE (Sept. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/243M-H9MT]
(dismissing eleven students from Northeastern for congregating in a hotel room in violation
of Northeastern’s COVID-19 conduct policies); Riddhi Andurkar, UPDATE: Two MU
Students Expelled, Three Suspended for COVID-19 Safety Violations, COLUM. MISSOURIAN
(Sept. 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/895P-87KH] (discussing how the University of Missouri
expelled two students, suspended three others, and began an investigation of eleven student
organizations as a result of reported violations of the university’s COVID-19 policies); Annie
Grayer, 36 Purdue Students Suspended After Breaking Social Distancing Rules, CNN (Aug.
21, 2020, 3:32 PM), [https://perma.cc/7P4B-J6GS] (reporting on Purdue University
administrators’ decision to suspend thirty-six students for attending a party off campus and
not following the university’s COVID-19 policies); Rachel Treisman, More Than 200 Ohio
State University Students Suspended for Violating Pandemic Rules, NPR (Aug. 25, 2020,
9:17 PM), [https://perma.cc/UA4H-H37A] (reporting on Ohio State University
administrators’ decision to temporarily suspend 228 students before classes even began as a
result of the students’ violations of the University’s COVID-19 safety protocols); Pi Kappa
Alpha Chapter and Its Leaders Receive Summary Suspensions, PENNSTATE,
[https://perma.cc/7ZCK-V6LV] (Sept. 22, 2020) (suspending a fraternity and members of its
executive board for hosting a gathering with approximately seventy people in attendance);
Elissa Nadworny, Despite Mass Testing, University of Illinois Sees Coronavirus Cases Rise,
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parents thus became, can public10 universities do this in light of
the United States Constitution’s guarantee of the First
Amendment right to freely associate?11 Not much controversy
surrounded administrators’ decisions to discipline students for
on-campus violations of COVID-19 policies, but the discipline of
students for their off-campus behavior left many enraged and
none with answers. This is largely because the Supreme Court
has never addressed the extent to which public universities may
regulate the off-campus associational activities of their students.
Indeed, the Court has barely touched the First Amendment right
to association in the university context at all, even on campus.12
The jurisprudence of university students’ associational
rights, like that of its speech counterpart, may aptly be described
as “a mixture of muddled reasoning and inconsistent decisions,”13
so muddled, in fact, “that even ‘lawyers, law professors, and
judges’ are unclear what standards apply.”14 As the law currently
stands, there is no one clear approach that courts may uniformly
apply to review the constitutionality of university regulations of
students’ associational rights. Although there is a robust body of
scholarship regarding the impacts of university restrictions on
First Amendment rights, particularly speech, to date, no scholar
has attempted to unravel the extraordinarily murky patchwork of
case law to identify a clear approach to the student associational
NPR (Sept. 3, 2020, 10:39 AM), [https://perma.cc/BA9Y-SJXG] (stating that as of
September 3, 2020, about 100 students and organizations were facing disciplinary action—
including suspension—for violating the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s
COVID-19 policies).
10. Because the Constitution requires state action before its provisions are applicable,
I will not address private universities throughout the rest of this Comment. See generally
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). However, it is likely that even most private
universities today are subject to the directives of the Constitution given their continuous
reception of massive amounts of federal funding. See Richard Vedder, There Are Really
Almost No Truly Private Universities, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),
[https://perma.cc/UV8X-YVGC]. I will leave this question for another day.
11. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (“A
state university without question is a state actor.”).
12. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
13. Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes
the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 341 (2013).
14. Meggen Lindsay, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-Speech
Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v. University of Minnesota,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1500 (2012) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334,
353 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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rights analysis. In light of the critical gap in the Court’s
associational rights jurisprudence, this Comment proposes a
three-tiered, sliding scale of judicial scrutiny analytical
framework for reviewing the constitutionality of university
regulation of students’ associational rights.
In the first tier, the university is at the height of its authority
to regulate students’ associational rights. When the targeted
activity is on campus and school sponsored,15 the courts should
review a university’s regulations of its students’ associational
activities under the rational basis test. In the second tier, the
university retains a significant amount of authority to regulate
associational activities that are either off campus and school
sponsored or on campus and not school sponsored. The courts
should review university regulations of students’ associational
activities that fall into this second tier under the intermediate
scrutiny test. Finally, in the last tier, the university’s authority to
regulate is at its trough where the regulation impacts off-campus,
non-school-sponsored associational activities.
University
attempts to regulate associational activities that fall into this third
tier should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test.
Importantly, the three tiers are not rigid, unforgiving
concepts, but rather, they are meant to be guideposts for the Court
along a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny. Indeed, I realize, as
often happens in the law, there exist gray areas in which student
conduct does not neatly fit into any one of the three tiers. A
flexible approach such as this one would allow the Court to
consider the idiosyncrasies of each case while also providing
clear guidance to university administrators and lower courts.
This Comment will proceed as follows. In Part II, I will
discuss the various (and often inconsistent) frameworks that
courts currently apply to university students’ associational rights.
Part III subsequently re-introduces the proposed three-tiered
15. For the purposes of this Comment, I use the definition of “school-sponsored”
expounded by the Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988) (explaining that “school-sponsored” means those “activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”).
Importantly, the Court has emphasized that even “high school students can appreciate the
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally
required to do so.” Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
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framework and justifies its adoption as the test the Court should
employ moving forward. Following this section, in Part IV, I will
use the proposed framework to review the constitutionality of the
University of Arkansas’s COVID-19 policy. Finally, in Part V, I
will call upon the Court to remedy the incoherent and unworkable
state of university student associational rights jurisprudence and
urge it to adopt a clear framework moving forward.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court’s university student associational rights
jurisprudence is nearly incomprehensible. To fully appreciate the
lack of a coherent approach, it is necessary to understand how the
Court got to where it is today. University student associational
rights principles draw from the right to association and primary
and secondary speech precedent. In this section, I will analyze
each of these predecessors in turn and explain the current state of
university student associational rights.
A. The Right to Association
The right to association is not express in either the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights.16 Nonetheless, since the
founding era, it has long been recognized as vital to both the
effective functioning of the United States government and the
preservation of individual liberties.17 Despite the founders’
16. U.S. CONST. amend I; Mark D. Bauer, Freedom of Association for College
Fraternities After Christian Legal Society and Citizens United, 39 J. COLL. & U. L. 247, 248
(2013).
17. Bauer, supra note 16, at 272 (discussing James Madison’s proposal that “[t]he
people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common
good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their
grievances,” as well as The Federalist’s assertion that the freedom of association is necessary
to the proper functioning of a republic) (quoting THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 217 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that “[t]hose
who won our independence believed that . . . without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine[,]” and “they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
(“Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to
engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First
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insistence on the fundamentality of the right to association, the
Supreme Court did not recognize the right as protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution until 1958.18
In the landmark case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the
Court highlighted the “close nexus” between the freedoms of
speech and association, emphasizing that one cannot exist without
the other.19 Furthermore, the Court unequivocally asserted that
the right to association is entitled to the most onerous of
constitutional protections in holding that “it is immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters . . . state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny.”20 The right to association
remained a bulwark against government regulation for decades as
the Court continually reaffirmed its importance and occasionally
even expanded it.21
However, the right began to deteriorate in response to the
civil rights era and the general push for equality in the United
States throughout the 1960s-80s, as private groups throughout
this period continually tried to keep racial minorities and women
out of their organizations by asserting right to association claims,
only to have the courts consistently invalidate them.22 This
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.”). The freedom of association is deeply rooted in human
history. However, for the purposes of this Comment, I will only discuss the United States
constitutional beginnings of the right to association. For a more in-depth historical analysis
of the right, see generally CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962).
18. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Scott Patrick
McBride, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad Is the Right
to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 136 (1997).
19. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
20. Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (asserting that “[t]he right of
‘association,’ like the right of belief . . . is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes
the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means[,]” and that “[a]ssociation in that context is a form of
expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.”); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 624 (1980) (stating that
“[b]efore Griswold was decided, the notion of constitutional protection of the freedom of
association was a First Amendment doctrine and little more.”); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 447, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold).
22. See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515, 52427 (D. Colo. 1966).
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culminated in the Supreme Court’s overhauling of the right to
association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.23 In Roberts, the
United States Jaycees (“Jaycees”), a non-profit membership
corporation dedicated to the growth and fostering of young men’s
civic organizations, brought an action against the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”), claiming that the
MDHR’s demand that it admit women as regular members to its
organization violated its constitutional right to association.24 The
Court began its analysis of the Jaycees’ right to association claim
by breaking the right down into two sub-rights: the right to
intimate association and the right to expressive association.25
First, the Court discussed the right to intimate association.26
This right is protected “as a fundamental element of personal
liberty.”27 Indeed, the right “reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close
ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted
state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”28
The Court went on to explain that this right is designed to protect
the formation of only certain kinds of highly personal
relationships and provided some guidance on how to interpret this
limitation.29
The “highly personal relationships” limitation requires that
the relationship in question contain those “personal bonds [which]
have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and

23. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
24. Id. at 612-13, 615.
25. Id. at 617-18 (stating that “[o]ur decisions have referred to constitutionally
protected ‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses.”). However, the Court made sure
to clarify that these two rights are not always mutually exclusive, rather, in most instances
“freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated.” Id. at 618. But see, John
D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV.
149, 155-56 (2010) (arguing that the Roberts opinion “suggest[s] four possible categories of
associations: (1) intimate expressive associations, (2) intimate nonexpressive associations,
(3) nonintimate expressive associations, and (4) nonintimate nonexpressive associations.”).
26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
27. Id. at 618.
28. Id. at 619.
29. Id. at 618-20.
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beliefs[.]”30 In other words, it must be along the lines of a familial
relationship.31 The Court ultimately established a spectrum
framework, where the State’s authority to regulate is contingent
upon how intimate the association is.32 The more intimate the
association, the more significant the State’s interest must be for it
to regulate that association.33 In providing further guidance on
gauging the placement of a given association along this spectrum,
the Court suggested several factors be taken into consideration:
size, selectivity, purpose, and seclusion.34 Using these factors,
the Court ultimately decided that the Jaycees were not entitled to
protection under the right to intimate association because the
chapters were not small or selective, and many women and other
non-members regularly attended meetings and participated in
social functions.35
Second, the Court discussed the right to expressive
association.36 The right to expressive association is the “right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected
by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”37 Expressive
association is thus a correlative right of sorts. In establishing this
right as distinct from the right to intimate association, the Court
reasoned that “[a]ccording protection to collective effort on
30. Id. at 618-19.
31. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (asserting that “[t]he personal affiliations that exemplify
these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships
that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation
and sustenance of a family”).
32. Id. at 620; McBride, supra note 18, at 146 (“The continuum of groups for intimate
association analysis has at one end the family, possessing the most highly protected intimate
relationships, and at the other end a large, profit-motivated corporation, having no chance of
claiming intimate associational rights.”).
33. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (“Determining the limits of state authority over an
individual’s freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.”).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 621.
36. Id. at 621-22.
37. Id. at 618. The establishment of the right to expressive association is a recognition
of the fact that “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
not also guaranteed.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority.”38
While
recognizing that the right to expressive association is indeed
entitled to the most onerous of constitutional protections, the
Court held that it is not absolute, and that “[i]nfringements on that
right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.”39 In other words, government regulation
of expressive association must generally meet the arduous
demands of the strict scrutiny test in order to comport with the
Constitution.
While the MDHR’s demand that the Jaycees admit women
to the organization infringed upon the group’s right to expressive
association,40 the State of Minnesota nonetheless prevailed.41 The
Court reasoned that because (1) Minnesota had a compelling
interest in eradicating gender discrimination, (2) the regulation
was the least restrictive means of assuring Minnesota’s citizens
“equal access to publicly available goods and services,” and (3)
the regulation imposed only a limited burden on the associational
freedoms of the Jaycees, the Jaycees’ right to expressive
association claim failed.42
1. Intimate Association
Although the Supreme Court’s most in-depth treatment of
the right to intimate association occurred in Roberts,43 the right
was first articulated in Kenneth Karst’s law review article, The
38. Id. at 622; see also Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68
(2006) (asserting that the right to expressive association developed because “[t]he right to
speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voices of
others[,]” and “[i]f the government were free to restrict individuals’ ability to join together
and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment is intended to
protect.”).
39. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 623-26.
43. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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Freedom of Intimate Association, a mere four years prior to the
right’s constitutional debut.44 Karst’s article and the Roberts
opinion are astoundingly similar.45 Justice Brennan noticeably
omitted any citation to Karst’s article in his Roberts opinion.46
However, several commentators have suggested that the Supreme
Court adopted much of Karst’s intimate association framework,47
one even suggesting that the Supreme Court “lifted the right to
intimate association from Karst’s article.”48
Thus, while Karst’s article did not determine the parameters
of the right to intimate association, it is highly instructive, as it
was almost certainly the Supreme Court’s inspiration of the
right.49 Karst defined an intimate association as “a close and
familiar personal relationship with another that is in some
significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship.
An intimate association, like any group, is more than the sum of
its members; it is a new being, a collective individuality with a
life of its own.”50 Karst argued that the right to intimate
association is an expansive, broad right, protected not only under
the First Amendment, but also under substantive due process and
equal protection principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.51 Importantly, he also argued that the right to

44. Karst, supra note 21, at 624; Gwynne L. Skinner, Intimate Association and the
First Amendment, 3 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 3 (1993).
45. For a comprehensive analysis of the similarities between Karst’s article and the
Supreme Court’s Roberts opinion, see Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate
Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269, 278-79
(2006).
46. Inazu, supra note 25, at 165; Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. Justice Brennan is lucky he
did not have a faculty advisor reviewing his opinion. Although, I suppose Professor Karst is
not too upset, his idea has become enduring constitutional law after all.
47. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 45, at 276; Inazu, supra note 25, 158-68 (“Brennan’s
Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the intellectual debt is apparent.”); Joshua P.
Roling, Functional Intimate Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift to Save the Roberts
Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903, 909 (2012) (“[M]any of Professor Karst’s values were
reflected in the Court’s rationales for protecting intimate associations.”); Skinner, supra note
44, at 3-8; see generally Collin O. Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right,
7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 233-39 (1998).
48. Udell, supra note 47, at 232.
49. See supra notes 43-48.
50. Karst, supra note 21, at 629.
51. Id. at 652-67.
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intimate association was not limited to traditional relationships,52
a point where he and Justice Brennan diverged.53
In the thirty-six years since the Supreme Court initially
recognized the right to intimate association in Roberts, it has not
once taken up another case in which it has devoted extensive
attention to clarifying the right.54 There was an initial attempt by
Justice Blackmun to invoke the right in defense of LGBT rights
in Bowers v. Hardwick,55 a mere two years after Roberts was
decided, but to no avail, as the majority opinion in that case did
not even acknowledge the right to intimate association in
formulating its holding.56
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has provided a limited
amount of guidance on “what [an intimate association] is not[.]”57
A few years after Roberts was decided, another very similar case
came before the Supreme Court: Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.58 Much like in Roberts,
here, Rotary International, an umbrella organization controlling
19,788 local rotary clubs, had a policy limiting official
membership to men.59 The Rotary Club of Duarte, California
(“Duarte Chapter”) decided to start admitting women, to which
Rotary International responded by revoking the club’s charter.60
The Duarte Chapter then sued Rotary International, asserting that
its policy limiting membership to men violated California’s
Unruh Civil Rights Act (“UCRA”).61 Rotary International then
claimed that the UCRA violated its right to association.62

52. Id. at 629, 662, 671, 686-87 (claiming that even “close friendship” may be included
in the right to intimate association).
53. Udell, supra note 47, at 238-39 (suggesting that Justice Brennan was “hesitant to
do more than vaguely suggest that the right might move beyond traditional relationships”).
54. See generally id. at 239; Marcus, supra note 45, at 283-84.
55. 478 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I believe that Hardwick
has stated a cognizable claim that [the Georgia sodomy statute] interferes with
constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of intimate association.”).
56. See generally id. at 186 (majority opinion).
57. Marcus, supra note 45, at 283.
58. 481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987).
59. Id. at 539-41.
60. Id. at 541.
61. Id. at 541-42.
62. See id. at 537.
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In applying the Roberts framework to analyze Rotary
International’s intimate association claim,63 the Court
acknowledged that “[w]e have not attempted to mark the precise
boundaries of this type of constitutional protection.”64 It then
went on to cite a plethora of substantive due process cases in order
to exemplify the kinds of relationships deserving constitutional
protection under the right to intimate association.65 However,
ultimately, in employing the Roberts intimate association factors
to Rotary International, the Court held that neither Rotary
International nor its individual Rotary Clubs were entitled to any
degree of intimate association protection.66 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court highlighted several facts: membership
ranged from fewer than twenty to more than nine hundred, about
ten percent of the membership moved away or dropped out every
year, the clubs’ policies stated that they were inclusive, guests
attended meetings, and members from other Rotary Clubs were
required to be admitted to any Rotary Club meeting.67
Surprisingly, the very next year, the Court decided an almost
identical case: New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York.68
Yet again, private clubs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
human rights law prohibiting discrimination, asserting their right
to association as a defense.69 In analyzing the New York State
Club Association’s claims, the Court failed to even mention the
right to intimate association by name,70 instead choosing to refer
to the vague notion of “private association.”71 Nonetheless, the
Court still employed the Roberts framework and denied the New
York State Club Association’s intimate association claim based
on the facts that most of the clubs were more than four hundred
63. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 545-46.
64. Id. at 545.
65. Id. (first citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); then citing
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (decision to have children); then citing
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing and education); and then citing
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (cohabitation with relatives)).
66. Id. at 546-47.
67. Id.
68. 487 U.S. 1, 1 (1988).
69. Id. at 7.
70. Marcus, supra note 45, at 284; N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. 1.
71. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 6, 12.
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members strong, and they all regularly provided service to and
received payments from nonmembers.72
The Court also
emphasized, albeit implicitly, that the regular presence of
strangers at club meetings strongly counsels against the finding
of an intimate association.73
Following New York State Club Ass’n, it seems that large
private clubs learned their lesson (at least for a time), as there was
not another large private club intimate association case to reach
the Supreme Court for another decade.74 However, this did not
stop the Court from invalidating intimate association claims
elsewhere. The year after New York State Club Ass’n, the Court
denied another intimate association claim in City of Dallas v.
Stanglin.75 In Stanglin, the owner of a skating rink brought a
challenge to a city ordinance that prohibited teenagers from
entering the skating rink at certain hours and socializing with
those outside their age group.76 He alleged that the ordinance
interfered with his patrons’ right to associate with persons outside
their age bracket.77 The Court found that the Constitution does
not recognize “a generalized right of ‘social association’ that
includes chance encounters in dance halls.”78 Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphatically held that “[i]t is
clear beyond cavil that dance-hall patrons, who may number
1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate
human relationships’ referred to in Roberts.”79 However, he
barely explained his reasoning in holding that “coming together
to engage in recreational dancing” does not qualify as a form of
intimate association.80
Continuing the trend of hearing one association focused case
a year, in 1990, the Court reviewed FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas.81 Like in Stanglin, here, owners of Dallas businesses
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
490 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1989).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25.
493 U.S. 215 (1990).
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brought intimate association claims on behalf of their patrons
against a city licensing scheme that, among other things, required
motel owners to obtain a license if they were to rent rooms for
fewer than ten hours.82 Justice O’Connor, perhaps a bit
sarcastically, held that “we do not believe that limiting motel
room rentals to 10 hours will have any discernible effect on the
sorts of traditional personal bonds to which we referred in
Roberts[,]” and that “[a]ny ‘personal bonds’ that are formed from
the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that
have ‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and
beliefs.’”83 Thus, again, the Court refused to take advantage of
an opportunity to clarify the parameters of the right to intimate
association. Since the Court’s decision in FW/PBS, Inc., there
have been no Supreme Court intimate association cases defining
the doctrine to any appreciable extent.84
In the absence of any clear guideposts, the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have largely been left to their own devices when it comes
to the right to intimate association.85 This has created wide and
varying gaps in the application of the right.86 The central thesis
of one of the most comprehensive legal commentaries on the right
to intimate association to date was that “[w]ith Lawrence [v.
Texas] shining new light on intimate association rights, the Court
could soon decide[] . . . that the time has finally come to clarify
the parameters and protections that define the freedom of intimate
association.”87 Indeed, the Court had a golden opportunity to do
82. Id. at 220-21.
83. Id. at 237 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984)).
84. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 286-87 (first citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000); then citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); and then citing Overton
v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), and discussing how, in each case, the Court did not take
advantage of the opportunity to clarify or define the right to intimate association).
85. Id. at 287.
86. Id. at 288-98 (identifying upwards of ten different tests the Circuit Courts of
Appeals have applied to the right of intimate association since Roberts and describing the
variance as “mind-boggling”) (citing Udell, supra note 47, at 233-39). Professor Marcus
also discusses the “[c]lear cries for clarity” coming from the Circuit Courts of Appeals,
providing as an example a somewhat comical reference to the Second Circuit’s citation of a
Bible verse “to describe its lack of knowledge of the unfixed boundaries of intimate
association.” Id. at 297.
87. Id. at 299.
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exactly that in the recent landmark decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges.88 Obergefell was a major step forward in terms of the
right to intimate association, as it finally broke away from the age
old traditional relationships approach in its holding that “[s]amesex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy
intimate association,” echoing a more Karstian view of the right.89
However, aside from a couple of quick references to the right to
intimate association, the Court yet again refused to clarify its
parameters or provide any meaningful analysis of it. 90 Thus, in
line with the rest of its post-Roberts intimate association
decisions, the Court has allowed the gates of the doctrine of
intimate association to remain wide open, refusing to shut them
for almost forty years.91
2. Expressive Association
The Supreme Court’s most in-depth analysis of the right to
expressive association was also laid out in Roberts.92 The Roberts
definition of an expressive association “requires both an
organization (the association itself) and a purpose (a First
Amendment activity).”93 The right to expressive association
essentially allows an organization to be considered an individual
for purposes of the First Amendment and grants it all the First
Amendment rights and corresponding limitations of such rights
that are bestowed upon the individual.94 Just like the intimate
association jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has provided little

88. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
89. Id. at 646.
90. See id. at 646, 667.
91. My sympathies go out to Professor Marcus. I have only just begun researching the
right to intimate association and I am quite frustrated with the Court’s lack of guidance, while
I know she has watched the Court refuse to define the right for at least fourteen years now.
92. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
93. Randall P. Bezanson et al., Mapping the Forms of Expressive Association, 40 PEPP.
L. REV. 23, 24-25 (2012).
94. Id. For example: viewpoint and content restrictions; prior restraints; public forum
doctrine; time, place, and manner restrictions; etc. See id. That being said, the right still
protects the individuals that participate in these associations, so in a sense, it is also an
individual right. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
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guidance on what exactly qualifies an organization as an
expressive association.95
The first expressive association case to come to the Supreme
Court after Roberts was Board of Directors of Rotary
International.96 Although the UCRA’s interference with Rotary
International’s right to expressive association seemed to warrant
the application of strict scrutiny,97 the Court gave short shrift to
Rotary International’s claim, asserting that “the evidence fails to
demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in
any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out
their various purposes.”98 The Court indicated that Rotary
International was not an expressive association at all, seemingly
because the Rotary Clubs did not take positions on political
issues.99 Moreover, the Court went on to say that even if the
UCRA interfered with Rotary International’s right to expressive
association, the UCRA was “unrelated to the suppression of
ideas” and “serv[ed] the State’s compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women.”100
A nearly identical result occurred in the next expressive
association case to reach the Court, New York State Club Ass’n.101
In this case, however, the New York State Club Association
sought to bring the expressive association claim on behalf of
individual club members, as opposed to on behalf of each
organization as a whole.102 The Court affirmed that the right is
also held by individuals, but unfortunately for the New York State
Club Association, it held that the public accommodations law did
“not affect ‘in any significant way’ the ability of individuals to
form associations that will advocate public or private
viewpoints.”103 The Court went on to justify its decision and lay
95. Bezanson et al., supra note 93, at 25-27.
96. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); see
supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
97. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
98. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 549.
101. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); see supra notes
68-72 and accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
102. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 1, 13.
103. Id. at 13 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548).
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the groundwork for future expressive association litigants in
explaining that:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able
to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes
and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints
nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to
those who share the same sex, for example, or the same
religion.104

Following New York State Club Ass’n, the Court briefly
analyzed the right to expressive association in Stanglin.105 Again,
the Court limited the right. Here, the Court held that social
gatherings of strangers do not “involve the sort of expressive
association that the First Amendment has been held to protect.”106
Because the “hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at
this particular dance hall [were] not members of any organized
association[,]” they were not entitled to the protections of the
right to expressive association.107 The Court noted that “[i]t is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity
a person undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring
the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”108
After a decade of consistently striking down expressive
association claims, the Court finally upheld an organization’s
right to expressive association in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.109 In Hurley, the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
(“GLIB”) sought to march in the 1993 Boston St. Patrick’s Day
parade as a way for its members to express their pride in their
Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to
demonstrate the existence of such individuals, and to express
solidarity with individuals like themselves who were at the time
seeking to march in the very similar New York St. Patrick’s Day

104. Id.
105. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989); see supra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text (providing the pertinent facts).
106. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 25.
109. 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995).
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parade.110 However, the organizer of the parade, the South
Boston Allied War Veterans Council (“SBVC”), refused to allow
them to march as a group behind their own banner in the
parade.111 GLIB filed suit under the Federal Constitution,
Massachusetts Constitution, and Massachusetts public
accommodations laws.112 SBVC asserted its right to expressive
association in justifying its exclusion of GLIB.113
The Court began its analysis of SBVC’s expressive
association claim by acknowledging that parades are indeed a
form of expressive action.114 For once, the Court seemed to
broaden the right, in finding that “a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection.”115
Additionally, the Court found that “a private speaker does not
forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an
exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”116
In combining these principles, the Court found that, although
there were a multitude of different groups with different ideas in
the parade, because SBVC “decided to exclude a message it did
not like from the communication it chose to make, . . . that is
enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on
another.”117 Thus, although Massachusetts had a compelling
interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation,
it could not defeat SBVC’s right to expressive association.118
The Court again expanded the right to expressive association
in the case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.119 Here, the Boy
Scouts of America (“BSA”) sought to exclude an assistant
110. Id. at 561.
111. Id. at 560, 572. Importantly, SBVC was a private organization, however, the
parade still involved state action in that the City of Boston authorized the SBVC to organize
it. Id. at 560. It is also important to note that the parade had been a state-sponsored event
from as early as 1737 to as late as 1947. Id. at 560.
112. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
113. Id. at 563.
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 569 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)).
116. Id. at 569-70.
117. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, 574.
118. Id. at 572, 575.
119. 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).

4 MLAKAR.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:23 PM

770

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

scoutmaster (Dale), who had been a longtime member of the
BSA, upon discovering that he was openly gay.120 Dale then filed
suit under New Jersey’s public accommodations law.121 The
Court established several universal rules for the right to
expressive association.
First, “[t]he First Amendment’s
protection of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy
groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”122
Relatedly, “associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’
of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be
entitled to protection.”123 Furthermore, instilling a system of
values constitutes expression within the meaning of the right.124
Finally, courts must give deference to an “association’s assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, [and its] view of what
would impair its expression.”125
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the New Jersey public
accommodations law violated the BSA’s right to expressive
association.126 However, it is unclear which test the Court applied
to the law in striking it down. Although, in citing to the previous
association cases, the Court made vague references to
“compelling state interest[s]” and “serious burden[s],” it did not
expressly state whether it was applying strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, or something entirely different in analyzing
the validity of the New Jersey public accommodations law.127
Rather, the Court said that “[i]n Hurley, we applied traditional
First Amendment analysis” and “the analysis we applied there is
similar to the analysis we apply here.”128

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
Hurley).
128.

Id. at 643-45.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 655.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 657-59 (referencing Roberts, Bd. of Dirs. Int’l, N.Y. State Club Ass’n, and
Id. at 659.
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Thus, the right to expressive association jurisprudence has,
like the right to intimate association jurisprudence, left the lower
courts in flux. Although the right has always been considered a
correlative right of sorts,129 it has become less of a freestanding
right of its own over the years and increasingly more of a branch
of free speech doctrine. Since the Court’s decision in Dale, the
Court has not yet decided another expressive association case
outside of the education context, which I turn to next.130
B. First Amendment Education Jurisprudence
While the Supreme Court has rarely forayed into the realm
of the First Amendment rights of students, especially university
students, there are a few seminal cases that guide lower courts.131
This section proceeds as follows: first, I will discuss the
education quartet; second, I will review off-campus speech
jurisprudence generally; and finally, I will examine the Court’s
treatment of university students’ First Amendment associational
rights specifically. This context is crucial to understanding how
the Court’s approach to university student associational rights
developed and the many problems surrounding its practical
application.
1. The Education Quartet
Because of the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the
education realm, there are not many cases governing the First
Amendment rights of students, especially in the university setting.
Indeed, the Court has provided so little guidance that the lower
courts have consistently relied on the education quartet, a string
of four First Amendment student rights cases that were decided
in the primary and secondary education context.132 The education
129. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
130. See infra Section II.B.2.b. Unfortunately, the expressive association jurisprudence
only gets more complex.
131. See infra notes 132-210 and accompanying text.
132. This reliance has engendered much scholarly commentary. Most commentators
are staunchly opposed to the imposition of these primary and secondary education cases in
the context of the public university setting. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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quartet consists of:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,133 Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,134 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,135 and Morse
v. Frederick.136
a. Tinker
The renowned line from Justice Fortas’s opinion in Tinker
that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate,”137 has been quoted so often that it has
almost become a cliché.138 In Tinker, elementary, junior high, and
high school students planned to wear black armbands to class in
protest of the Vietnam War.139 Upon hearing about this plan,
school administrators adopted a policy “that any student wearing
an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he
refused he would be suspended until he returned without the
armband.”140 The students indeed wore the armbands to school
and, not surprisingly, were suspended pursuant to the policy.141
They then brought First Amendment claims against the school
and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.142
The Court began by emphasizing “the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools,”143 seemingly

133. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
134. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
135. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
136. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
137. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
138. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Lindsay, supra note 14, at
1489; Andrew R. Kloster, Speech Codes Slipping Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Current Issues
in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. REV. 617, 617 (2013); Marcia E. Powers, Unraveling
Tinker: The Seventh Circuit Leaves Student Speech Hanging by a Thread, 4 SEVENTH CIR.
REV. 215, 219 (2008). That of course is not going to stop me from quoting it anyways, as
you may have noticed.
139. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504; id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
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signaling defeat of the students’ claims. However, it went on to
find that:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute
authority over their students. Students in school as well as
out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must
respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to
the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views.144

Thus, the Court found that the First Amendment remains a
bulwark against governmental authority even in the classroom
setting. However, in acknowledging that First Amendment rights
must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment,”145 the Court did establish a limitation to its
protections: school administrators may discipline students for
conduct that “materially and substantially interfer[es]” with the
operation of the school.146
b. Fraser
Following Tinker, the Court decided Fraser. In Fraser, a
high school student gave a sexually explicit, “indecent, lewd, and
offensive” speech at a school assembly, in front of 600 other
students, many of whom were fourteen-years-old.147 School

144. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 506.
146. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
However, the school may not seek to discipline the student on the basis of her viewpoint
alone. Id. at 509, 511 (“In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
147. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
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officials then suspended the student for three days.148 The student
subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
the violation of his First Amendment rights.149 In holding that the
“School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively
lewd and indecent speech,”150 the Court reasoned that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”151 Furthermore, the Court established an additional rule
for future First Amendment education cases:
the First
Amendment does not prohibit schools from regulating speech that
“would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”152
c. Hazelwood
Following Fraser, the Court gave even more power to
schools and their officials to regulate the First Amendment rights
of their students. In Hazelwood, high school journalism students
sought to publish certain articles about teen pregnancy and
divorce in their student-run newspaper.153 However, because the
articles contained identifying information about students and
references to sexual activity and birth control, the principal
prohibited their publication.154 The students then sued the school
and its officials, seeking a declaration that their First Amendment
rights had been violated.155 The Court unequivocally denied the
students’ request for relief in holding that “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related

148. Id. at 678.
149. Id. at 679.
150. Id. at 685.
151. Id. at 682.
152. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
153. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988). Importantly,
the newspaper was part of the school’s journalism curriculum. Id. at 262.
154. Id. at 263-64.
155. Id. at 264.
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to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”156 Importantly, however,
the Court limited this holding to the primary and secondary
context in stating that “[w]e need not now decide whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to schoolsponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”157
d. Morse
Finally, in Morse, a high school principal suspended a
student for ten days after the student waived a banner that said
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at an off-campus, school-approved
event.158 After exhausting his administrative appeals, the student
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the principal and
the school board violated his First Amendment rights.159 Morse
was a much different case than the other three of the education
quartet in that the student’s speech in this case occurred off
campus.160 However, the Court reasoned this extremely pertinent
fact away in finding, among other things, that:
The event occurred during normal school hours. It was
sanctioned by Principal Morse “as an approved social event
or class trip,” and the school district’s rules expressly
provide that pupils in “approved social events and class trips
are subject to district rules for student conduct[.]” Teachers
and administrators were interspersed among the students and
charged with supervising them.161

Because of these factual findings, the Court ultimately
decided that the school had authority over the student’s speech
and that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”162 Although
156. Id. at 273. One is left wondering what school administrators could not identify as
a “legitimate pedagogical concern.”
157. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (emphasis added).
158. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397-98 (2007). Technically it was “off
campus,” although it was right across the street from the school. Id. at 397.
159. Id. at 398-99.
160. Id. at 397.
161. Id. at 400-01 (internal citations omitted).
162. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401, 403.
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the Court ultimately decided that the school had the authority to
discipline the student here, it was cautious in issuing this opinion,
noting that “[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as
to when courts should apply school speech precedents . . . but not
on these facts,” clearly indicating that the school’s authority to
regulate students’ off-campus First Amendment rights is not
synonymous with on-campus authority.163 Indeed, the Court
confirmed this when it referenced its earlier decision in Fraser,
stating that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public
forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected.”164
Given this important on-campus/off-campus dichotomy the
Court explicitly created in the Morse opinion, one would think
that the Court would have taken up an off-campus speech case in
the thirteen years since the decision. Despite numerous
opportunities to do so, the Court has refused to provide any
guidance. Indeed, since its decision in Morse, the Supreme Court
has remained silent on the authority of school administrators to
regulate the off-campus speech rights of their students both in the
primary/secondary and university settings.165 Thus, the Court has
again left the lower courts to their own devices, resulting in a
myriad of different approaches.166
163. Id. at 401.
164. Id. at 405.
165. Benjamin A. Holden, Tinker Meets the Cyberbully: A Federal Circuit Conflict
Round-Up and Proposed New Standard for Off-Campus Speech, 28 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 233, 285 (2018); Marcus Hauer, Note, The Constitutionality of
Public University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV.
413, 427 (2012); Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Who’s Looking at Your Facebook Profile? The
Use of Student Conduct Codes to Censor College Students’ Online Speech, 45 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 261, 290 (2008) (“[T]he Court has remained silent on several issues related to college
speech. These issues include, among others, whether college administrators can discipline
college students for off-campus speech, what constitutes off-campus speech, and whether
student publications receiving financial support from the college or university can be
afforded First Amendment protection.”); Kloster, supra note 138, at 618; Emily Deyring,
“Professional Standards” in Public University Programs: Must the Court Defer to the
University on First Amendment Concerns?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 237, 241 (2019) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the specific issue of university student speech offcampus.”); Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1483 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld a
student-speech restriction at the university level.”).
166. For an absolutely fantastic description of the current Circuit Courts of Appeals’
approaches to the question of the authority of primary and secondary public schools to
regulate the off-campus speech of their students, see Holden, supra note 165, at 257-79.
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2. The University
I am sure at this point you are wondering what a bunch of
free-speech primary and secondary education cases have to do
with the university and associational rights. You are not alone;
many legal commentators have questioned, even challenged, the
imposition of Tinker and its progeny in the university context.167
However, the federal circuits have not been so hesitant; indeed,
many of them have applied Tinker and its progeny to the
university context, at least in speech cases, both on and off
campus.168 Although it did not expressly so hold, the Supreme
167. Id. at 250 n.85 (“[T]he applicability of Tinker’s holding to public colleges remains
open.”); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 307 (“Tinker is a K-12 student speech standard, and
therefore, this standard should not be applied to college student speech.”); Deyring, supra
note 165, at 253 (“Courts must not look to the standards set forth in Tinker and Hazelwood
but must treat students in professional university programs as mature adults who are not in
need of the same paternalistic stance.”); Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1480, 1483 (arguing that
college students are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as other adults and
stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet held explicitly that Tinker or its progeny do not
apply to college speech, but the Court also has never applied Tinker in a post-secondaryspeech case.”); LoMonte, supra note 13, at 306, 342-43 (arguing that none of the purposes
animating Hazelwood apply in the university setting and stating that “[i]t is incongruous with
the law’s otherwise consistent treatment of adult-aged college students—who are eligible to
vote, join the military, purchase firearms, sign contracts, incur civil and criminal liability in
adult court and otherwise bear the legal indicia of adulthood—to regard them as
‘constitutional children’ whose speech is of no greater legal dignity than that of an eighthgrader.”). However, LoMonte concedes that Tinker applies in the university setting. Id. at
311.
168. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying Hazelwood to a university student’s First Amendment claims); Hosty v. Carter,
412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Esfeller v. O’Keefe, 391 F. App’x 337, 341 (5th
Cir. 2010) (same); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 304, 317 n.17 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood in analyzing a graduate student’s First Amendment
claims); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying
Hazelwood to a graduate student’s First Amendment claims); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,
733-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[n]othing in Hazelwood suggests a stop-go distinction
between student speech at the high school and university levels, and we decline to create
one.”); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531-32 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that college
administrators could discipline a nursing student for his off-campus speech so long as their
actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”) (quoting Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). But see, e.g., Student Gov’t Ass’n v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not
applicable to college newspapers.”); Amidon v. Student Ass’n of State Univ. of N.Y. at
Albany, 508 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ases like Hazelwood explicitly reserved the
question of whether the ‘substantial deference’ shown to high school administrators was
‘appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college or
university level.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to
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Court’s decision in Papish v. Board of Curators169 indicated that
the First Amendment rights of university students are far more
expansive than those of primary and secondary education
students.170
a. Papish
In Papish, a graduate student at the University of Missouri
School of Journalism was expelled for distributing a non-schoolsponsored newspaper on campus because it depicted policemen
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice and
contained an article with the headline “Motherfucker
Acquitted.”171 The Court, “while recognizing a state university’s
undoubted prerogative to enforce reasonable rules governing
student conduct,” reaffirmed that “state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.”172 Indeed, although the Court cited to Tinker, there
was no mention of its “material and substantial interference” test
here.173 Arguably, the Court did not apply Tinker’s test because
the University of Missouri was discriminating on the basis of
Papish’s viewpoint,174 and thus, the Court did not dispel Tinker’s
application to the university setting. Nonetheless, the Court
certainly would not require primary and secondary school
administrators to permit their students to bring something to
school depicting a rape, accompanied by a word like

extend the education quartet to the university setting because they “fail[] to account for the
vital importance of academic freedom at public colleges and universities.”).
169. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
170. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
171. Papish, 410 U.S. at 667.
172. Id. at 669-70 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
173. Id. at 670; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
174. The Court stated that while it has “repeatedly approved [the University’s]
regulatory authority” to “enforce reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of
speech and its dissemination[,]” the only reason Papish was expelled was “because of the
disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its
distribution.” Papish, 410 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added). This is indeed in line with those
circumstances in which the Court has held that even in the primary and secondary education
context, Tinker’s test would not apply. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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“Motherfucker.”175 Thus, Papish stands for the proposition that
the First Amendment rights of university students are not
coextensive with those of primary and secondary students, even
if Tinker and its progeny apply.
b. University Association
Support for the proposition that Tinker applies in the
university setting, even to college students’ associational rights,
rests in Healy v. James.176 In Healy, the President of Central
Connecticut State College (“CCSC”) denied official recognition
to a group of students who desired to form a local chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society (“SDS”) because the
organization would constitute a “disruptive influence” on
campus, and perhaps a little ironically, because the group “openly
repudiate[d]” CCSC’s dedication to academic freedom.177 After
exhausting their administrative remedies, the students brought a
First Amendment right to association claim seeking to force
CCSC and its administrators to officially recognize SDS.178 The
Court began by proclaiming that “state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.”179
Immediately after, it confirmed that Tinker applies to the
university setting.180 Indeed, the Court quoted Tinker to
emphasize the need for deference to school administrators.181
Despite this confirmation, the Court nonetheless found that “the
precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
175. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986)
(upholding suspension of student for making sexual innuendos during his speech at a school
assembly in which fourteen-year-olds were in the audience).
176. 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
177. Id. at 170-72, 174-76, 179.
178. Id. at 177.
179. Id. at 180.
180. Id. (quoting Tinker extensively and applying it to the university setting).
181. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (“And, where state-operated educational institutions are
involved, this Court has long recognized ‘the need for affirming the comprehensive authority
of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)) (emphasis added).
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should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large.”182
Thus, the Court’s opinion began quite paradoxically. On the
one hand, a primary and secondary education case controls the
First Amendment rights of full-grown adult college students and
university administrators must receive “comprehensive” judicial
deference,183 but on the other hand, the First Amendment applies
with the same amount of force on college campuses as it does
everywhere else.184 The confusion did not end there. Throughout
the opinion, the Court announced at least two different tests that
could be applicable in the university association context. First,
the Court noted that “[w]hile a college has a legitimate interest in
preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances
requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such a
restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action.”185 This test in itself could be
construed as rational basis review, rational basis plus, or even one
of the multitudinous versions of intermediate scrutiny.
Second, although the first test proposed by the Court
indicated that university students have powerful associational
rights on campus, the Court went on to say that “[a]lso
prohibitable are actions which ‘materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”186 If you are
thinking this is not a high threshold to meet, you would be right,
as “[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or
substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to
obtain an education.”187 Importantly, the Court does not define
the bounds of what constitutes a “reasonable campus rule[],” even
in its holding that “[a] college administration may impose a
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 184.
186. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
187. Id. Although, in line with Tinker, university administrators cannot restrict these
associational activities based on an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”
Id. at 191 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). Rather, there must be “substantial evidence”
that there will be a Tinker violation. Id. at 190-91.
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requirement . . . that a group seeking official recognition affirm
in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law.”188
Despite the highly deferential sounding language of the
second test, in a footnote, the court tacked onto the end of it that:
It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a
legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action
designed to regulate prohibitable action also restricts
associational rights—as nonrecognition does—the State
must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably related
to protection of the State’s interest and that “the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”189

The Court ultimately reversed the lower courts and remanded the
case in light of all the new standards.190 Thus, although the
standards coming out of the Healy opinion appear to be quite
confusing, the principle that may be derived from the case is that,
while college students have strong First Amendment
associational rights generally, on campus, these rights are subject
to reasonable campus rules, and the Court will defer to university
administrators as to what counts as a reasonable campus rule.191
Seemingly, as long as the university does not discriminate on the
basis of the organization’s viewpoint, the Court will likely side
with the decisions of its school officials.192
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Healy in similar
cases.193 It has also continued the trend of deferring to university
administrators’ on-campus regulations, provided that they do not
discriminate on the basis of a student’s viewpoint.194 The Court
has afforded so much deference, in fact, that legal commentators
have said that “the Supreme Court’s deference to educational
188. Id. at 189, 193.
189. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 n.20 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
190. Id. at 194.
191. Id. at 180, 189.
192. See id. at 189-93.
193. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65, 276-77 (1981); see generally
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
194. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5, 668 (asserting in the association context that “[a]
university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a
university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities.”).
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judgment involving college students is an honor.”195 This is hard
to square with the equally repetitive maxim that the Court
employs in university cases, that “[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.”196
The proverbial nail in the coffin of university students’ oncampus associational rights occurred in the Court’s most recent
university association case, Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez.197 In Christian Legal Society, Hastings College of Law
(“Hastings”) refused to grant official recognition to a religious
student organization, the Christian Legal Society (“CLS”),
because the CLS refused to change its by-laws to accord with
Hastings’ “all-comers” policy.198 CLS then sued Hastings,
claiming that Hastings violated the CLS’s First Amendment
rights to free speech and expressive association.199 In an
unprecedented opinion,200 the Court held that CLS’s “expressiveassociation and free-speech arguments merge[,]” and that it
“makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and association claims
as discrete.”201 It reasoned that Hastings’ registered student
organization (“RSO”) program was a limited public forum and
that three observations provide the basis for why the association
claim should also be analyzed under the limited public forum
doctrine.202 First, “speech and expressive-association rights are
closely linked,” and “[w]hen these intertwined rights arise in
exactly the same context, it would be anomalous for a restriction
on speech to survive constitutional review under our limitedpublic-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible
infringement of expressive association.”203
195. J. Wes Kiplinger, Defining Off-Campus Misconduct that “Impacts the Mission”:
A New Approach, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 87, 112 (2006).
196. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
197. 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
198. Id. at 669, 672-73. The CLS’s by-laws required its members and officers to sign
a “Statement of Faith,” affirming certain beliefs and promising to live their lives in
accordance with the Statement. Id. at 672. The by-laws excluded from affiliation members
of different faiths and those of the LGBTQ community. Id.
199. Id. at 668. I told you we would get back to it eventually.
200. Pun intended.
201. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 680.
202. Id. at 680-82.
203. Id. at 680-81.
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Second, applying the strict scrutiny that the Court typically
affords expressive association claims in this context would
destroy “a defining characteristic of limited public forums—the
State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.’”204 Third, the
Court found that “this case fits comfortably within the limitedpublic-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a
state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its
membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any
reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recognition.”205
Following its justification for employing the limited public
forum doctrine here, the Court went on to hold that Hastings’
policy was both “reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”206 In the
analysis of the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, Justice
Ginsburg cited to the (hopefully) now familiar precedents of
Hazelwood and Tinker.207 In line with the increasingly substantial
amount of deference the Court has provided to university
administrators in their regulation of students’ constitutional
rights, Justice Ginsburg discussed how “[s]chools, we have
emphasized, enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over the
type of officially recognized activities in which their students
participate.’ We therefore ‘approach our task with special
caution,’ mindful that Hastings’ decisions about the character of
its student-group program are due decent respect.”208
Thus, the unifying principle derivable from the university
association precedents is that university administrators may
regulate the associational rights of their students on campus so
long as their regulations are reasonable, and the Court will defer
to the university in determining what is reasonable. Indeed, the
Court has even indicated that this general principle applies to

204. Id. at 681 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
205. Id. at 682. This final reason is quite surprising given Justice Powell’s description
of the myriad detriments that the SDS would have suffered, and did suffer, as a result of
CCSC’s denial of official recognition in Healy. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-84
(1972).
206. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 697.
207. Id. at 686.
208. Id. at 686-87 (first quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 240 (1990); and then quoting Healy, 408 U.S. at 171) (internal citations omitted).
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RSOs off campus,209 and potentially even off-campus, non-RSO,
school-sponsored associational activities.210 Yet, the Supreme
Court has never expressly so held. Thus, important questions
remain unanswered: may public universities regulate their
students’ on-campus associational activities that are not school
sponsored? What about associational activities that are off
campus but school sponsored? Associational activities that are
off campus but that have nothing to do with the school? What
framework should the Court apply? These questions are what I
turn to next.
III. PROPOSED THREE-TIERED FRAMEWORK
The inevitable conclusion one must draw from analyzing
these numerous and often conflicting bodies of law is that there is
not a clear test for courts to apply when reviewing the
constitutionality of university regulations impacting their
students’ associational rights. The Court has simply not
adequately developed the law in this area. Thus, in this section, I
propose that the Court adopt a three-tiered framework for
reviewing the constitutionality of these regulations. Importantly,
the three tiers are not rigid, unforgiving concepts, but rather, they
are meant to be guideposts for the Court along a sliding scale of
judicial scrutiny.211 Indeed, I realize, as often happens in the law,
that there exist gray areas in which student conduct does not
neatly fit into any one of the three tiers. A flexible approach such
as this one allows the Court to take into account the idiosyncrasies
of each case while also providing clear guidance to university
administrators and lower courts. My approach is consistent with
209. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000)
(“We make no distinction between campus activities and the off-campus expressive activities
of objectionable RSO’s.”).
210. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686-87 (“A college’s commission—and
its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical approaches—is not confined to the
classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational
process.”).
211. The concept of a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny is not new to First Amendment
analysis, as the Court has explicitly recognized that “not every interference with speech
triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
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the values and realities acknowledged by the Court in its prior
jurisprudence and represents principles extracted from existing
law.
In the first tier, the university is at the height of its authority
to regulate when the associational activity is on campus and
school sponsored. The courts are to review university regulations
of students’ associational activities which fall into this tier under
the rational basis test. In the second tier, the university retains a
significant amount of authority to regulate. Situations that fall
into the second tier are those in which the associational activities
are either off campus and school sponsored, or on campus and not
school sponsored. The courts are to review university regulations
of students’ associational activities which fall into this second tier
under the intermediate scrutiny test. Finally, in the last tier is offcampus, non-school-sponsored associational activities, where the
university’s authority to regulate is at its trough. University
attempts to regulate associational activities which fall into this
third tier must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test.
A. Tier 1: Rational Basis
Under the first tier of the proposed framework, university
regulation of on-campus, school-sponsored associational activity
must be reviewed under the rational basis test. The rational basis
test requires that university regulations “be rationally related to
legitimate government interests.”212 Although it is the lowest
standard of judicial review, and almost any regulation will pass
constitutional muster under this test,213 it makes sense to employ
it in the context of on-campus, school-sponsored associational
activity for several reasons.
First, the Court already provides an enormous degree of
deference to the decisions of university administrators when it
comes to on-campus regulations, even in the associational

212. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
213. See Christen Sproule, The Pursuit of Happiness and the Right to Sexual Privacy:
A Proposal for a Modified Rational Basis Review for Due Process Rights, 5 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 791, 809 (2004).
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context.214 Second, on campus, the Court has consistently
recognized that all that is required of university administrators is
that their regulations of students’ First Amendment rights be
“reasonable.”215 Third, simply by definition, the right to intimate
association will almost certainly never be implicated in the
context of an on-campus, school-sponsored association, and
therefore, the balancing test prescribed by the Roberts Court will
not apply in this first tier.216 Fourth, in citing to Hazelwood in her
Christian Legal Society opinion,217 Justice Ginsburg implied that,
214. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“And, where state-operated
educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized ‘the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’”)
(emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969)); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (asserting in the association
context that “[a] university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never
denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that
mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.”) (emphasis added); Southworth, 529 U.S.
at 232 (“It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in
an institution of higher learning.”); Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686-87 (“Schools, we
have emphasized, enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority over the type of officially
recognized activities in which their students participate.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990)); Kiplinger, supra note
195, at 112 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s deference to educational judgment involving
college students is an honor.”); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 278; Chapin Cimino, Campus
Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the Nondiscrimination
Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 548 (2011) (“[W]hen the association is a student
group meeting on a public university campus, the university receives more deference from
the court than would the state regulator if the association met off campus.”); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1815
(2017) (“[W]hile the Court has not directly held that universities are entitled to a measure of
deference when they restrict student speech on campus, in recent years the Court has
expressly embraced deference in the affirmative action and freedom of association
contexts.”).
215. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 (“A university’s mission is education, and decisions
of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.”) (emphasis added);
Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973) (recognizing a public university’s
“undoubted prerogative to enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct.”) (emphasis
added); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 (“Associational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education.”) (emphasis added); Christian Legal
Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 697.
216. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984); see also Vill. of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 7-9 (1974) (holding that even a group of six college students who
shared a home together off campus were not entitled to any substantive due process
protection).
217. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686.
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at least for on-campus, school-sponsored associations, university
“educators do not offend the First Amendment . . . so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”218
Fifth, the Court established in Christian Legal Society that
when an on-campus, school-sponsored student organization
brings an expressive association claim, this claim cannot be
disaggregated from speech because “[w]hen these intertwined
rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be anomalous
for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review under
our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an
impermissible infringement of expressive association.”219
Therefore, the Court in that case implicitly concluded that any oncampus, school-sponsored expressive association claim must not
be reviewed under anything more than rational basis review, as
this analysis would invalidate the requisite limited public forum
analysis of the speech claim.220 Finally, even the rational basis
test would prohibit the university from blatantly discriminating
against a particular association based on its viewpoint.221
B. Tier 2: Intermediate Scrutiny
Under the second tier of the proposed framework, university
regulation of (1) off-campus, school-sponsored or (2) on-campus,
non-school-sponsored associational activity must be reviewed
under the intermediate scrutiny test. The intermediate scrutiny
test requires that the university’s regulations further an important
state interest and do so by means that are substantially related to

218. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
219. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 680-81.
220. See id. at 679-81.
221. See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (“[T]he State[] may
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group
to be abhorrent.”); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973); Christian Legal
Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 667-68, 683-84; Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 233 (2000). See also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (“For the
University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks
the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s
intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”).
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that interest.222 Although intermediate scrutiny is largely
associated with the Equal Protection context,223 it has found a
home in several tenets of First Amendment doctrine as well.224
Thus, its application to the associational rights of university
students, a First Amendment right, is not unprecedented.225
1. Off-Campus, School-Sponsored
Many of the reasons justifying the use of rational basis
review in the context of on-campus, school-sponsored
associational activities also apply in this context. For example,
because these associational activities are still school sponsored,
Justice Ginsburg’s indication that Hazelwood applies in the
university setting suggests that even off campus, “educators do
not offend the First Amendment . . . so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”226
However, in the off-campus context, this justification would only
apply in limited circumstances. For example, the university
would have substantially more authority to regulate a schoolsponsored organization’s activities at a regional competition,
where the organization is officially representing the school, than
it would if the school-sponsored organization was simply meeting
off campus to socialize.227 Yet, because the organization in this
222. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
223. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)
(associating intermediate scrutiny with equal protection claims related to race, alienage,
national origin, gender, and illegitimacy).
224. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 636-37, 661-62 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to “must-carry provisions” intruding on “cable speech” by requiring
cable operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television
stations); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-803 (1989) (applying a
heightened version of intermediate scrutiny to a city’s volume control regulation); United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a law
imposing criminal penalties for destroying selective service cards); Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980) (applying a version of
intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech).
225. This is especially true given Justice Powell’s quoting of O’Brien in his Healy
opinion. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 n.20 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
226. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 686; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
227. Naturally, the university’s interest in regulating would be much stronger in the
former as opposed to the latter.
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context is still school sponsored, the university retains entitlement
to significant judicial deference in regulating its activities.228
Further, as before, by definition, a school-sponsored association
is almost certainly never going to qualify as intimate, even if it is
off campus.229
The main difference between the first tier, and this first
category of the second tier is, of course, that the associational
activities are occurring off campus.
This distinction is
enormously important. Even in the context of primary and
secondary education, the Court has noted in dicta that First
Amendment activity off campus is entitled to far greater
protection than it would have on campus.230 Many legal
commentators agree.231 However, the Court has also noted that
there is “no distinction between [on-]campus activities and the
off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO’s,” and
that the university “is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules
restricting off-campus travel or other expenditure by RSO’s, for
it may create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the
principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected.”232
Given this holding, the associational rights of university
students in this context clearly could not be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Thus, on the one hand, associational activities in this
context are entitled to more protection than rational basis review
228. See supra notes 208-10, 214 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. But see Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000) (noting that “[u]niversities, like all
of society, are finding that traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to
insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes in communications, information
transfer, and the means of discourse.”).
231. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 14, at 1488-89 (“The very premise of Tinker—that
students do not shed their First Amendment right to free speech at the ‘schoolhouse gate’—
indicates that the restrictions at stake occur at school.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); Beckstrom, supra note 165, at 299-300
(“[F]ederal courts should . . . adopt an unequivocal standard that . . . universities cannot
discipline college students for off-campus speech unless such speech constitutes a true threat
or a crime under existing law.”); Cimino, supra note 214, at 550-51 (“[G]iven the Court’s
expressive association cases, it seems that associational freedom is more likely to prevail off
campus rather than on campus . . . .”); Hauer, supra note 165, at 433 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has not fully addressed whether a school has the power to restrict off-campus speech, but the
decision in Morse suggests that such restrictions will face high scrutiny and may be found to
fall outside the realm of school regulation.”).
232. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234.
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by virtue of their being off campus. However, on the other hand,
they are not entitled to strict scrutiny review because of the
school-sponsored nature of the organizations.
Therefore,
intermediate scrutiny is the best test to apply to student
associational activity falling into this category because it
adequately balances both the off-campus nature of the
associational activities and the university’s interests, while not
providing too much weight to either. Again, the university would
never be permitted to discriminate against an association based
on its viewpoint alone.233
2. On-Campus, Non-School-Sponsored
The primary reason justifying the maintenance of heightened
deference to the university in this context is the fact that the
associational activity is occurring on campus. One of the most
oft-quoted lines from Tinker and the Court’s education
jurisprudence is that “First Amendment rights must be analyzed
‘in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”234
Associational activities are often loud,
rambunctious, or at the very least involve many people. “[I]n
light of the special characteristics of the [university]
environment,” then, universities must have substantial authority
to regulate these activities in order to prevent disruption on
campus.235 Indeed, the Court in Healy held that, “[w]hile a
college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the
campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of
that interest may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests on
the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”236
The Court went on to further define the contours of this holding
in stating that:

233. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (quoting Tinker, 393
U.S. at 506); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685-86 (2010) (same);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (same); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (same).
235. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 513.
236. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
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The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce
such action.” . . . . Also prohibitable are actions which
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.” Associational activities need not be tolerated
where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt
classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education.237

However, the university is not at the height of its authority
to regulate in this context, as it was in the first tier, because the
association is not school sponsored. The associational activities
do not implicate a “legitimate pedagogical concern[]” beyond the
disruption of classes because the organizations are not supported
by the school.238 Additionally, unlike in the first tier, here,
because the organizations are not school sponsored, they have
several arguments potentially implicating the right to intimate
association. Furthermore, the expressive association claims of
these organizations are not necessarily confined to the limited
public forum analysis of their school-sponsored counterparts.239
Indeed, many spaces on college campuses could be considered
truly public forums, where no such limitations can exist.240 Thus,
the intermediate scrutiny test is again the best test to apply in these
circumstances because it adequately balances the “special
characteristics of the school environment” and the university’s
interests in preventing disruption with the student’s more
extensive associational rights.241

237. Id. at 188-89 (first quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); and
then quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513) (internal citations omitted).
238. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
239. See supra notes 197-208, 219-21, 232-33 and accompanying text.
240. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5 (1981) (“This Court has recognized
that the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum.”); id. at 267-68 (“The Constitution forbids a State to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not
required to create the forum in the first place.”).
241. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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C. Tier 3: Strict Scrutiny

Lastly, under the third and final tier of the proposed
framework, university regulation of off-campus, non-schoolsponsored associational activities should be subject to the most
rigorous standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny. The strict
scrutiny test requires the university to affirmatively demonstrate
that the regulation “furthers a compelling [state] interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” meaning that the
regulation employs the least restrictive means possible.242 In
proposing the adoption of the strict scrutiny test, I do mean strict
scrutiny. I emphatically do not mean a test that is merely “strict
in theory but feeble in fact.”243
One of the primary justifications driving the adoption of the
strict scrutiny test in this context is the fact that the students’
associational activities are occurring off campus, where the
university’s authority to regulate is already diminished, even for
school-sponsored associational activities.244
Additionally,
because these associational activities are not school sponsored, in
theory, there is no risk that the community at large will impute
the activities of the organizations to the university.245 There is
also the common sense justification that it does not make any
sense to grant universities broad authority to regulate their
students’ off-campus, non-school-sponsored associational
activities, because they have absolutely nothing to do with school.
Judicial deference to university authority in this context is
unwarranted and simply “becomes a matter of deference for
deference’s sake.”246

242. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). The
strict scrutiny standard has an extensive history in First Amendment jurisprudence. See
generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800-01 (2006).
243. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013).
244. See supra Section II.B.1.
245. Indeed, even on campus, the Court has acknowledged that “an open forum in a
public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on [First Amendment
activities].” Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
246. LoMonte, supra note 13, at 341.
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Furthermore, although the right to intimate association
typically requires a balancing test,247 strict scrutiny is warranted
in this context because the university has no business whatsoever
regulating an off-campus, non-school-sponsored intimate
association. It would be nonsensical to assert that a university has
any say over how one of its students raises her children,248 who
she decides to marry,249 who she chooses to have sex with,250 or
any other of the kinds of relationships which have been
recognized as protected by the right to intimate association.251
Indeed, even if the more expansive Karstian definition of the right
is invoked, no one would seriously argue that a university has the
authority to regulate a student’s choice of who she decides to
become close friends with outside of school.252
Regarding the right to expressive association, strict scrutiny
is the test that is applied to the community at large.253 Therefore,
there is no reason why university students should have less
expressive associational rights off campus, while in the
community at large, when their associational activities are not
school sponsored. Ultimately, because the university should only
be permitted to regulate the off-campus, non-school-sponsored
associational activities of their students in the gravest of
circumstances, strict scrutiny is the best test for this final tier.
IV. COVID-19 AND THE THREE-TIERED
FRAMEWORK
Having now described and justified the three-tiered, sliding
scale of judicial scrutiny approach to university associational
247. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
248. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (“[T]he child
of man is his parent’s child and not the State’s.”).
249. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[T]he freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
250. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter [into sexual] relationship[s] in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”).
251. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
252. Karst, supra note 21, at 629 (claiming that even “close friendship” may be
included in the right to intimate association).
253. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).

4 MLAKAR.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:23 PM

794

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

rights, I will apply it to the University of Arkansas’s COVID-19
disciplinary policy.254 The policy provides that, first, “on-campus
events are suspended, other than official events conducted by
University academic and administrative units, which are still
subject to approval on a case by case basis.”255 Second,
if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a
report of large parties and similar social gatherings involving
10 or more student guests, without very clearly maintained
safety elements such as social distancing and mask-wearing,
and the report is verified, the University will treat the event
as a violation of the Code of Student Life by organizers and
by attendees. Organizing and conducting such an event will
be considered a serious matter and students will be held
accountable.256

Third, it provides that “if the Office of Student Standards and
Conduct receives a report of students in the Dickson Street
entertainment district or elsewhere congregating in large groups
to socialize, not maintaining social distancing and mask-wearing,
the matter will be treated as a Code of Student Life violation.”257
A. Tier 1: Rational Basis
The first part of the University policy, stating that “oncampus events are suspended, other than official events
conducted by University academic and administrative units,
which are still subject to approval on a case by case basis,”258
implicates the first tier of the three-tiered approach. Under the
first tier of the proposed framework, university regulation of oncampus, school-sponsored associational activity must be
reviewed under the rational basis test. The rational basis test
254. To view a copy of the actual policy, see Appendix A provided below. I apply my
approach to the University of Arkansas’s policy only because I attend law school there, not
because of any animus toward the school. Furthermore, the University of Arkansas’s policy
is a representative sample of many public universities’ COVID-19 policies nationwide. See
supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Thus, the application of my approach to the
University of Arkansas’s COVID-19 policy is applicable across the country. Do note that
the University’s policy has since changed.
255. Appendix A, supra note 8.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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requires that the university regulations be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.259 Rational basis is the lowest
standard of judicial review, and almost any regulation will pass
constitutional muster under this test.260 Indeed, the Court has held
that under rational basis review, it is “entirely irrelevant” what
end the government is actually seeking and regulations can be
based on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.”261
One of the primary functions of government is to protect the
safety and well-being of its citizens.262 In furtherance of this
paramount objective, the Court has held that the states have an
interest in regulating the spread of infectious and contagious
diseases.263 Indeed, from the very beginning, the Court has
adhered to the principle that states have legitimate interests in
promulgating “quarantine laws [and] health laws of every
description . . . .”264 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court
stated that, “of paramount necessity, a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the
safety of its members.”265 Recently, the Court confirmed that
preventing the spread of COVID-19 is not only a legitimate state
interest, but also a compelling one.266 Thus, here, one cannot
seriously argue that the University does not have a legitimate
interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19.
In terms of the second prong of the rational basis test, the
University’s policy of restricting on-campus, school-sponsored
259. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
260. See Sproule, supra note 213, at 809.
261. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
262. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan
v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
263. See generally Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1902); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13, 39
(1905) (holding that Massachusetts had the authority to require its citizens to receive
smallpox vaccinations to prevent the spread of the disease).
264. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 205 (1824).
265. 197 U.S. at 27.
266. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020); S. Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020) (Kagan, J., in
chambers) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that “California undoubtedly has a
compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its
citizens.”).
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events to only those which have been officially sanctioned is
almost certainly rationally related to preventing the spread of
COVID-19. First, empirical evidence is not even necessary, as
the University “has the right to pass [regulations] which,
according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to
prevent the spread of contagious diseases.”267 Indeed, it is
common sense that preventing large groups of people from
congregating in close spaces helps prevent the spread of
communicable diseases. Beyond the common sense justification,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) COVID19 guidelines emphasize that large gatherings result in the rapid
transmission of COVID-19.268 Thus, the restriction of oncampus, school-sponsored events to only those which the
University has officially sanctioned is unquestionably a
“reasonable campus rule[]”269 that meets the rational basis test in
light of the University’s interest in preventing the spread of
COVID-19. Further, the policy applies to all on-campus, schoolsponsored events,270 meaning that it is content neutral and cannot
be struck down on the basis of viewpoint discrimination.
B. Tier 2: Intermediate Scrutiny
The second part of the University policy states:
if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a
report of large parties and similar social gatherings involving
10 or more student guests, without very clearly maintained
safety elements such as social distancing and mask-wearing,
and the report is verified, the University will treat the event
as a violation of the Code of Student Life by organizers and
by attendees. Organizing and conducting such an event will
be considered a serious matter and students will be held
accountable.271

267. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
268. Guidance for Organizing Large Events and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/QYE4-VBE3] (Mar. 8, 2021).
269. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
270. Appendix A, supra note 8.
271. Id.
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This implicates both prongs of the second tier. Under the second
tier of the proposed framework, university regulation of (1) offcampus, school-sponsored or (2) on-campus, non-schoolsponsored associational activity must be reviewed under the
intermediate scrutiny test. The intermediate scrutiny test requires
that the university’s regulation furthers an important state interest,
and does so by means that are substantially related to that
interest.272 There is no single definition of what constitutes an
important state interest, though the Court has provided a
multitude of examples.273 A substantial relation requires only that
the regulation be an effective way to achieve the stated objective,
not necessarily the optimal way, and that it ultimately “avoid
unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.274
1. Off-Campus, School-Sponsored
The University policy targets “large parties and similar
social gatherings involving 10 or more student guests,” regardless
of whether they occur on or off campus.275 In the university
environment, off-campus social gatherings and large parties
involving ten or more students often occur at fraternity houses.
Universities consider fraternities as RSOs, requiring them to go
through various official recognition processes, and universities
retain the authority to regulate the organizations’ conduct, revoke
official recognition, and even ban the organizations from
272. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
273. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984)
(upholding a ban on sleeping in public parks against a First Amendment challenge because
the government had a “substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital
in an attractive and intact condition”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380 (1968)
(upholding criminal sanction for destruction of Selective Service cards against a First
Amendment challenge because the government had an important interest in “preventing their
wanton and unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing
people who knowingly and willfully destroy or mutilate them”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994) (finding that “(1) preserving the benefits of free, overthe-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming” are all important governmental interests); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737
(2008) (identifying “preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” as an important
governmental interest).
274. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
275. Appendix A, supra note 8.
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returning to campus.276 Thus, fraternities are school sponsored.
However, in addition to fraternities, the University of Arkansas’s
policy implicates any off-campus RSO meeting at which more
than ten people are in attendance, regardless of the purpose of the
meeting.277
Given the analysis of the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of communicable diseases above,278 the University’s
policy regulating off-campus, school-sponsored gatherings
certainly serves an important interest. Moreover, the policy is
likely substantially related to the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of COVID-19. The policy does not outright restrict
associational conduct, but rather, it simply requires students
organizing in groups of more than ten to follow nationally
mandated and empirically tested CDC COVID-19 best practice
guidelines.279 Thus, the University policy serves the important
state interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19 while also
“avoid[ing] unnecessary abridgment” of students’ First
Amendment rights in participating in off-campus, schoolsponsored activities.280
2. On-Campus, Non-School-Sponsored
As stated in the previous section, the University’s policy
targets “large parties and similar social gatherings involving 10
or more student guests,” regardless of whether they occur on or
off campus.281 Given the analysis of the State’s interest in
276. See generally, e.g., INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL, COLL. OF WM. & MARY, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL AT WILLIAM & MARY (2020),
[https://perma.cc/7AM6-Z29B]; UNIV. OF ARK. INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL, UNIVERSITY
OF ARKANSAS INTERFRATERNITY COUNCIL CONSTITUTION (2019), [https://perma.cc/P65HW4SS]; Chapter Conduct Status, STOCKTON UNIV., [https://perma.cc/8WNW-6QEZ] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2021); UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, THE ALL-GREEK SOCIAL CODE
(2009), [https://perma.cc/9H94-VRAZ]; Policies and Resources for Members, NYU,
[https://perma.cc/6AEG-RQ6H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
277. Appendix A, supra note 8.
278. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
279. Appendix A, supra note 8; How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/K5J9-LCMQ] (Mar. 8, 2021) (advocating
social distancing, mask wearing, avoiding large gatherings, among other things).
280. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
281. Appendix A, supra note 8.
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preventing the spread of communicable diseases above,282 the
University’s policy regulating on-campus, non-school-sponsored
gatherings surely serves an important interest. This is especially
true in the on-campus context because university campuses are
“at risk to develop an extreme incidence of COVID-19 and
become superspreaders for neighboring communities.”283
Moreover, it is almost certain that the policy is substantially
related to the achievement of the State’s interest in preventing the
spread of COVID-19. First, the CDC emphasized that, “measures
are needed to reduce transmission at institutes of higher education
and could include reducing on-campus housing density, ensuring
adherence to masking and other mitigation strategies, increasing
testing for SARS-CoV-2, and discouraging student
gatherings.”284 The policy seeks to implement many of these
recommendations as it encourages students to avoid large
gatherings, wear masks, and practice social distancing
techniques.285 Empirical data suggests that these kinds of actions
on the part of university administrators are effectual in stemming
the spread of COVID-19.286 Furthermore, the policy says nothing
about gatherings of less than ten people, essentially respecting
students’ intimate association rights. Finally, as discussed in the
prior section, the policy does not outright ban large gatherings,
but rather, it simply requires students organizing in groups of
more than ten to follow nationally mandated and empirically
tested CDC COVID-19 best practice guidelines.287 Thus, the
University policy serves the important state interest of preventing
the spread of COVID-19 while also “avoid[ing] unnecessary
282. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
283. Hannah Lu et al., Are College Campuses Superspreaders? A Data-Driven
Modeling Study, 24 COMPUT. METHODS IN BIOMECHANICS & BIOMEDICAL ENG’G 1136,
1136 (2021), [https://perma.cc/U3MZ-5TGS]; see also Erica Wilson et al., Multiple COVID19 Clusters on a University Campus—North Carolina, August 2020, in 69 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1416, 1416 (2020),
[https://perma.cc/92TF-UBBN]; Danielle Ivory et al., Young People Have Less COVID-19
Risk, but in College Towns, Deaths Rose Fast, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/7FZH-CVFR]
(Mar. 2, 2021) (finding that “deaths in communities that are home to colleges have risen
faster than the rest of the nation”).
284. Wilson et al., supra note 283, at 1418.
285. Appendix A, supra note 8.
286. See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 283, at 1413; Lu et al., supra note 283, at 1144.
287. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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abridgment” of its students’ First Amendment rights while on
campus participating in non-school-sponsored activities.288
C. Tier 3: Strict Scrutiny
Finally, the last part of the University policy provides that
“if the Office of Student Standards and Conduct receives a report
of students in the Dickson Street entertainment district or
elsewhere congregating in large groups to socialize, not
maintaining social distancing and mask-wearing, the matter will
be treated as a Code of Student Life violation.”289 This aspect of
the policy implicates the third tier of the three-tiered approach, as
it restricts off-campus, non-school-sponsored associational
activities. Under this final tier, university regulation of offcampus, non-school-sponsored associational activities is subject
to the most rigorous standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny test requires the university to affirmatively
demonstrate that the regulation “furthers a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” meaning that the
regulation employs the least restrictive means possible.290
Although there is no single definition of what constitutes a
compelling state interest, the Court has provided a multitude of
examples.291 Indeed, beyond that, it has explicitly held that
“[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a

288. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 199 (2014).
289. Appendix A, supra note 8.
290. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
291. Compare Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (finding that
states have a compelling interest “in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984) (holding that states have
a compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (same); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007) (finding that “remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test”); Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013) (reiterating that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (discussing the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (suggesting
that neither preserving a town’s aesthetic appeal nor traffic safety were compelling state
interests).
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compelling interest . . . .”292 Thus, the compelling state interest
prong of the strict scrutiny test is certainly met here.
The narrowly tailored prong is a closer question. On the one
hand, the “Constitution principally entrusts” state officials with
broad latitude to guard and protect health and safety when there
are medical and scientific uncertainties and “[w]here those broad
limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to secondguessing by [the courts] which lack[] the background,
competence, and expertise to assess public health and [are] not
accountable to the people.”293 However, on the other hand, “even
in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and
forgotten.”294 Thus, although the University has implemented the
policy in the face of an unprecedented crisis, caution is still
warranted. As aptly stated by Judge Stickman of the Western
District of Pennsylvania in discussing COVID-19 regulations:
[G]ood intentions toward a laudable end are not alone
enough to uphold governmental action against a
constitutional challenge. Indeed, the greatest threats to our
system of constitutional liberties may arise when the ends
are laudable, and the intent is good—especially in a time of
emergency. In an emergency, even a vigilant public may let
down its guard over its constitutional liberties only to find
that liberties, once relinquished, are hard to recoup and that
restrictions—while expedient in the face of an emergency
situation—may persist long after immediate danger has
passed. Thus, in reviewing emergency measures, the job of
courts is made more difficult by the delicate balancing that
they must undertake. The Court is guided in this balancing
by principles of established constitutional jurisprudence.295

The Court held in Frisby v. Schultz that “[a] [regulation] is
narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the

292. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (emphasis
added); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020)
(Kagan, J., in chambers) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that “California undoubtedly
has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of
its citizens.”).
293. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (Kagan, J., in chambers)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
294. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 68.
295. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883, 890 (W.D. Pa. 2020).
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exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”296 Here, on the one
hand, the University policy does not define what constitutes a
“large group[]” and it applies broadly to cover any student
gathering, whether it be on public or private property, and without
regard to its proximity to the University.297 However, on the other
hand, it only covers “socializ[ing],” indicating that many
protected associational activities, such as protesting, are not even
implicated.298 Importantly, as discussed in the prior section, the
policy does not outright ban large gatherings, but rather, it simply
requires students to follow nationally mandated and empirically
tested CDC COVID-19 best practice guidelines.299 Thus, the
University policy serves the compelling state interest in stemming
the spread of COVID-19 while also “eliminat[ing] no more than
the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”300 Ultimately,
then, the University policy is likely constitutional even under the
strict scrutiny test.
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented the United States
with unprecedented challenges. Uncertainty abounds, and in the
face of that uncertainty, federal, state, and local government
actors have done the best they can to keep American citizens safe.
Desperate times often call for desperate measures. Importantly,
however, desperate times do not condone draconian measures.
Indeed, “even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away
and forgotten.”301
As government officials have taken
unprecedented actions in attempting to stem the spread of
COVID-19, many have raised novel constitutional questions, or
highlighted areas of constitutional law that are severely
296. 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984)).
297. Appendix A, supra note 8.
298. Id. Indeed, as Judge Van Tatenhove of the Eastern District of Kentucky recently
opined, “it is the right to protest . . . that is constitutionally protected, not the right to dine
out, work in an office setting, or attend an auction.” Ramsek v. Beshear, 468 F. Supp. 3d
904, 919 (E.D. Ky. 2020). However, the right to intimate association is still implicated.
299. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
300. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808).
301. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020).
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underdeveloped and in desperate need of a new approach. The
university student associational rights jurisprudence is
paradigmatic.
COVID-19 has presented the Court with the perfect
opportunity to remedy the incoherent and unworkable state of
university student associational rights jurisprudence. My threetiered, sliding scale of judicial scrutiny approach provides the
Court with a sound, precedent-based test that adequately weighs
both student associational rights and the prerogatives of
university administrators “in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment,”302 both on and off campus. It utilizes
familiar standards and is easy to apply. Perhaps it is time an
addition was made to Justice Fortas’s oft-quoted line in Tinker,
“[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech [or association] at
the schoolhouse gate,” or beyond it.303

302. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
303. Id.; see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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THE PROBLEM OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN
K-12 SCHOOLS
Sarah Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
When thirteen-year-old Savana Redding arrived at school
one autumn day in 2003, she was not expecting to be pulled out
of her math class and strip searched.1 But, that is exactly what
happened after the assistant principal suspected her of possessing
and distributing “prescription-strength ibuprofen” and “over-thecounter . . . naproxen” after receiving information from another
student.2 After Savana consented to a search of her backpack and
other belongings—a search which turned up no evidence of drug
possession—the assistant principal asked the school nurse and
administrative assistant to search Savana’s clothes.3 To do this,
the school officials asked Savana “to remove her jacket, socks,
and shoes,” followed by her pants and shirt.4 As if this was not
enough, they then told Savana “to pull her bra out to the side and
shake it, and to pull out the elastic of her underpants, thus
exposing her breasts and pelvic area . . . .”5 Ultimately, the school

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Articles Editor for the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author sincerely thanks Professor Danielle
Weatherby for her help, advice, and support throughout the writing process. The author also
thanks Gray Norton for her invaluable encouragement and advice and the entire Arkansas
Law Review staff, especially Caleb Epperson, for the countless hours they spent cite checking
and editing. Finally, the author also gives a special thank you to her mother, father, and
brothers for their encouragement and support throughout the writing process and her entire
law school career.
1. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
2. Id. That student, Marissa, was also subjected to a strip search before the school
officials’ search of Savana, during which the school did not find any pills. Id. at 373.
3. Id. at 368-69.
4. Id. at 369.
5. Redding, 557 U.S. at 369.
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officials did not find any pills after the “embarrassing,
frightening, and humiliating” strip search.6
In response to the strip search, Savana’s mother filed suit
against the school, the assistant principal, the administrative
assistant, and the school nurse for violating Savana’s Fourth
Amendment rights.7 The case made it to the Supreme Court,
which found that although the strip search violated Savana’s
Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity protected the
school officials from liability because the law surrounding school
strip searches was not “sufficiently clear.”8 This is the most
recent Supreme Court case that addresses qualified immunity’s
application to public school officials.
However, numerous lower courts have also held that
qualified immunity protected school officials in cases with other
forms of egregious conduct against students.9 Lower courts’
applications of qualified immunity as a shield for school
personnel have created a problem for students and their parents
who attempt to sue school officials for wrongful conduct but are
barred because of the doctrine’s broad application.10 This
Comment argues that the Supreme Court should abolish qualified
immunity in Section 1983 cases, which enables private
individuals to sue government actors for civil rights violations,11
against public school officials.

6. Id. at 369, 374-75.
7. Id. at 369.
8. Id. at 378-79.
9. See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951-52 (11th Cir. 2003)
(teacher entitled to qualified immunity after performing strip searches of fifth grade students
after twenty-six dollars disappeared from the teacher’s desk); Harris v. Robinson, 273 F.3d
927, 929, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity after making student
clean out a toilet with his bare hands); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025-26, 1033
(8th Cir. 1996) (school district and physical therapist entitled to qualified immunity after
using a blanket wrapping technique to restrain a mentally and physically disabled student for
over one hour, allowing flies to enter the student’s nose and mouth); Hagan v. Hous. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 48, 50, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1995) (school principal entitled to qualified
immunity after failing to sufficiently respond to complaints of sexual molestation by a coach
even though he failed to follow the steps for handling sexual abuse complaints in the school
handbook).
10. See Amanda Harmon Cooley, An Efficacy Examination and Constitutional
Critique of School Shaming, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 345 (2018).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The modern-day application of the doctrine, particularly
how courts view and apply the “clearly established” prong, allows
school officials to escape liability for egregious acts against
students. Indeed, courts applying the “clearly established” prong
require the facts in a particular case to be strikingly similar,
substantially similar, or nearly identical to a previous case that “a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates” the constitutional right at issue.12 If the Supreme Court
rejected qualified immunity for public school officials, students
would have a greater chance of winning their Section 1983
claims.
In the absence of qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense for school officials, courts should evaluate claims against
these officials based on the nature of the claimed injury, applying
existing standards. First, courts should continue to evaluate
claims for Fourth Amendment violations through the New Jersey
v. T.L.O. standard for school searches13 and the Ingraham v.
Wright standard for corporal punishment.14 Second, regarding
Fourteenth Amendment violations, courts should continue to use
the already burdensome “shocks-the-conscience” test for
substantive Due Process violations.15 Third, concerning First
Amendment violations, courts should continue to apply
heightened scrutiny, based on the quartet of Supreme Court cases
that govern issues implicating student speech rights.16
To be clear, practically, these standards already govern a
student’s Section 1983 claim after it survives the defendant’s
dispositive motion grounded in qualified immunity. However,
this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should reject
qualified immunity in these cases because it has been an
additional barrier for vindications of students’ constitutional
rights. Relying on these standards alone, without the interference
12. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
13. 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
14. 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
15. See Lewis M. Wasserman, Students’ Freedom From Excessive Force by Public
School Officials: A Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment Right?, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
35, 51-61 (2011).
16. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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of the qualified immunity defense, will more effectively balance
vindication of student rights with school officials’ discretion to
control the learning environment.17 The existing standards also
provide adequate notice to school officials about what behaviors
are and are not permissible when performing their job duties
because they are sufficiently clear to define the contours of the
implicated constitutional rights.18
This Comment includes four parts. Part II explains the
doctrine of qualified immunity and its policy justifications and
summarizes other protections for school officials to defend
against Section 1983 claims. It then argues that the modern
application of qualified immunity is inappropriate in the K-12
public school context because it fails to support the Supreme
Court’s policy justifications for the doctrine. Part III analyzes the
existing legal standards and structures that should continue to
inform courts’ evaluations of students’ claims for constitutional
violations against school officials. This Part lays out the T.L.O.
standard for Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable
searches, describes the burdensome “shocks-the-conscience” test
for Fourteenth Amendment excessive punishment claims, and
explains how First Amendment claims for violations of student
speech are analyzed under heightened scrutiny. Part IV considers
the implications of abolishing qualified immunity for public
school officials and relying on the existing legal standards alone
to evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims.
In conclusion, this Comment suggests that abolishing
qualified immunity as a defense for K-12 public school officials
will respect the policy justifications of qualified immunity while
providing an avenue for more successful student claims asserted
against school officials under Section 1983. Allowing traditional
legal standards alone to guide students’ Section 1983 claims will
effectively balance public and private interests by securing
greater protections for students’ constitutional rights, shielding
school officials from financial liability where appropriate,
providing adequate notice of the types of conduct that violate

17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Parts III-IV.
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constitutional protections, and respecting school officials’
discretion to perform their duties as educators.19
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND OTHER
PROTECTIONS
To fully understand why the modern application of the
doctrine of qualified immunity has failed in the K-12 public
school context, it is instructive to look at how the doctrine began
and how it has evolved in the Supreme Court. This Part traces the
Supreme Court’s introduction of the doctrine in the public school
context, its subsequent transformation to its modern iteration, and
scholars’ support of the doctrine. It then discusses other
protections that are available to public school officials and
districts when students bring Section 1983 claims for violations
of their constitutional rights. This Part concludes with a
discussion of why courts’ modern applications of qualified
immunity are inappropriate in the K-12 context.
A. Qualified Immunity
The main statutory mechanism for students to vindicate their
constitutional rights in claims against teachers is 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which provides that anyone who, “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia,” deprives another “of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”20 Although
written broadly, Section 1983 has its limits, including several
immunities for government officials.21 Courts have traditionally
19. Courts’ applications of qualified immunity are problematic in all areas, not just K12 public schools. However, it is important to focus on qualified immunity in the school
context because schools are charged with the important task of “educating the young for
citizenship[, which] is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). Thus, this Comment is limited to qualified immunity in the K-12
public school context.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21. David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey
v. T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1994).
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allowed school officials to raise qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense against claims of civil rights violations.22
Qualified immunity is a “judicial construct”23 created because the
Supreme Court determined “that an individual’s right to
compensation for constitutional violations and the deterrence of
unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the
governmental interest in effective and vigorous execution of
governmental policies and programs.”24
The Supreme Court first addressed qualified immunity’s
application to school officials in Wood v. Strickland.25 In that
case, Arkansas high school students brought a Section 1983
action against two school administrators, claiming that the
administrators violated their Due Process rights when they
expelled the students for possessing and consuming alcohol at an
extracurricular meeting in violation of a school regulation.26 The
Court held:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury to the student.27

The Wood Court based this holding on the principle that “the
school disciplinary process . . . necessarily involves the exercise
of discretion . . .” and reasoned that denying immunity to school
officials “would contribute not to principled and fearless
decision-making but to intimidation.”28
The Court modified its Wood holding in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, which introduced the modern qualified immunity
22. Id. at 20; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
23. Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21. But see Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1858
(2018) (arguing that qualified immunity is “an unquestioned principle of American statutory
law”).
24. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 (1989).
25. 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975).
26. Id. at 309-11.
27. Id. at 322.
28. Id. at 319 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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doctrine.29 Although Harlow involved presidential aides rather
than school officials, it introduced the current qualified immunity
defense school officials raise in response to claims of
constitutional violations.30 Justice Powell noted that the Wood
holding involved both an objective component and a subjective
component but found the subjective component created
“substantial costs” in the litigation of whether the government
officials acted in good faith in carrying out their duties.31 In
response, the Court articulated a new test for the application of
the qualified immunity doctrine: “government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”32 The new test wholly
eliminated the subjective component articulated in Wood and
reworked the objective component to include the “clearly
established” language on which courts rely so heavily today.33
Anderson v. Creighton further expanded the protection
granted to government officials under the qualified immunity
doctrine.34 In that case, an F.B.I. agent conducted a warrantless
search of a family while pursuing the suspect of a bank robbery.35
Justice Scalia explained that “if the test of ‘clearly established
law’ were to be applied” too generally, “it would bear no
relationship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the
touchstone of Harlow.”36 Thus, he clarified that “[t]he contours
of the [constitutional] right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”37 Under this rule, it is substantially easier for
government officials, including public school officials, to avoid
liability.38
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Id. at 802.
Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 818.
Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 22; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 23.
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Pearson v. Callahan is another important qualified
immunity decision.39 In that case, “state law enforcement officers
. . . conducted a warrantless search of [the respondent’s] house
incident to his arrest for the sale of methamphetamine to an
undercover informant . . . .”40 The Court overturned its previous
ruling in Saucier v. Katz which required courts first to determine
“whether ‘the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right’” and then to decide “whether the right was
clearly established.”41 The Court in Pearson held that “[t]he
judges of the district courts and courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which
[one] of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.”42 Following this decision, many courts have failed
to reach the first prong (i.e., “whether the conduct violated a
constitutional right”) and have focused solely on the “clearly
established” prong of qualified immunity.43
As discussed in Part I, the most recent Supreme Court case
applying qualified immunity to school officials is Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding.44 The Court held that a school
principal was entitled to qualified immunity after he strip
searched a thirteen-year-old girl because he suspected her of
bringing prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter
naproxen to school.45 While the Court did not spend much of its
opinion discussing qualified immunity, it found that even though
the principal’s search of the student’s bra and underwear was
unreasonable, the law surrounding school strip searches was
unclear.46 Therefore, the principal was not expected to know that
his conduct would violate the student’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches.47 This decision renewed
39. 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 232 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
42. Id. at 236.
43. Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All but the Plainly Incompetent”
(and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2012).
44. 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 378-79.
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the debate over the legality of strip searches in schools and
whether qualified immunity should protect public school
administrators and teachers in these situations.48
The Supreme Court has articulated several policy
justifications for its creation of and reliance on the qualified
immunity doctrine.49 In Pearson, the Court stated that qualified
immunity was necessary to balance “the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.”50 The Supreme
Court in Harlow also pointed to the doctrine’s protection against
(1) “the expenses of litigation,” (2) “the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues,” (3) “the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office,” and (4) “the danger
that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties’” as important policy
justifications for the doctrine.51 In United States v. Lanier, the
Court explained that “qualified immunity seeks to ensure that
defendants ‘reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may
give rise to liability,’” meaning that public officials need to have
“fair warning” that their conduct would violate an individual’s
constitutional rights to be held liable for their actions.52 A more
recent justification for the doctrine is to reduce the “burdens
48. See Ryan E. Thomas, Comment, Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding:
Qualified Immunity Shields School Officials Who Ordered Strip-Search of Thirteen-YearOld Girl, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 267, 275 (2010); Eric W. Clarke, Note, Safford Unified
School District #1 v. Redding: Why Qualified Immunity is a Poor Fit in Fourth Amendment
School Search Cases, 24 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 313, 324-26 (2010); Thomas R. Hooks, Comment,
A Rock, a Hard Place, and a Reasonable Suspicion: How the United States Supreme Court
Stripped School Officials of the Authority to Keep Students Safe, 71 LA. L. REV. 269, 26970 (2010).
49. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J.
2, 13-16, 58-76 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails]; Alan K. Chen,
The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 236-37 (2006).
50. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
52. 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984));
see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 741 (2002) (explaining that “qualified immunity
operates ‘to ensure that before they are subject to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct
is unlawful’”) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
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associated with discovery and trial” for public officials.53 In the
public school setting, the Supreme Court has placed heavy
emphasis on qualified immunity’s protection of school officials’
discretion in disciplining and protecting students.54
B. Other Protections
Aside from qualified immunity, public school teachers and
districts are afforded other protections against claims for civil
rights violations. One of these is the lack of a school’s legal duty
to protect its students under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive Due Process right.55 According to the Supreme Court
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.”56 Therefore, school officials cannot be liable for private
actors’ actions against students while attending school under the
traditional rule.57
However, “courts have recognized two exceptions to this
rule: (1) the special relationship theory and (2) the state-created
danger doctrine.”58 The special relationship theory states that “a
special relationship exists, imposing an affirmative duty to
protect, only when a state entity confines a person in its custody
against her will, rendering that person unable to care for
herself.”59 Notably, the Supreme Court has not recognized that a
special relationship exists between students and their schools or
teachers, and even though states have “compulsory education
laws,” several circuit courts have determined that these laws do
not create a special relationship between schools and their
students that would establish a duty to protect the students.60 The
53. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 9.
54. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
55. Danielle Weatherby, Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers in the War
Against School Violence and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119,
130 (2015).
56. 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
57. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 130.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id.
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lack of a special relationship between schools and their students
means that student plaintiffs may not assert a heightened duty of
care when bringing claims against teachers.61
Further, the state-created danger doctrine provides a very
narrow exception to the no-duty rule if the “harms . . . are brought
onto campus by the school itself or its employees.”62 This
doctrine only applies in limited circumstances, however, so it
alone is insufficient to enable student claims against school
officials, especially since qualified immunity poses an additional
barrier.63 Therefore, school officials can avoid liability for certain
civil rights violations because of a lack of special relationship
between schools and their students or if the school itself did not
create the danger.
The Supreme Court has also afforded school boards and
districts protection under the extremely stringent standard
articulated in Monell v. Department of Social Services.64 Under
this standard, “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury, . . . the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.”65 A Monell claim involves two
elements.66 First, a state actor (i.e., public school official) must
have “violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”67 Second, the
school must be responsible for the violation because its policy,
practice, or custom was the “‘moving force’ of the deprivation of
the plaintiff’s federal rights.”68 Further, the plaintiff must show
the school, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which
directly caused [the plaintiff] constitutional harm.”69 Because the
deliberate indifference standard sets such a high bar for plaintiffs,
it offers substantial protection to school districts, even when an
61. See id. at 133.
62. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 135.
63. Id. at 135-36 (listing the elements required for a plaintiff to rely on the state-created
danger doctrine).
64. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978).
65. Id. at 694.
66. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 160.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 161 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 400 (1997)).
69. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1988).
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individual teacher or administrator is liable for a constitutional
violation.
C. Why Qualified Immunity is Inappropriate in
K-12 Public Schools
In response to the Supreme Court’s policy justifications for
qualified immunity, several scholars have advanced significant
criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine.70 Although many
of these criticisms arise in the context of the doctrine’s application
to law enforcement officers, they are still relevant to the
doctrine’s application to school officials.
Professor Joanna Schwartz has advanced several arguments
against the doctrine.71 She first argues that “qualified immunity
has no basis in the common law.”72 In Pierson v. Ray, the
Supreme Court claimed that the qualified immunity defense
should be available to government officials because there was a
“good faith and probable cause” defense available for “commonlaw action[s] for false arrest and imprisonment.”73 Professor
Schwartz argues that because there was no “good faith defense to
liability” to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which initially enacted
Section 1983, the Supreme Court’s claim in Pierson is not
accurate.74 Even if the Supreme Court was correct about qualified
immunity’s basis in the common law, its modern application of
the doctrine undermines this claim because the Court “eliminated
consideration of officers’ subjective intent and instead focused on
whether officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.”75
Consequently, even if “a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
defendant was acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered
irrelevant to the qualified immunity analysis.”76
70. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified
Immunity]; Bendlin, supra note 43, at 1040; Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified
Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil
Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1985).
71. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1801-32.
72. Id. at 1801-02.
73. 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
74. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1801.
75. Id. at 1802.
76. Id.
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Professor Schwartz further claims that the doctrine does not
actually advance the policy goals articulated in Harlow, in part
because qualified immunity “does not shield officers from
financial burdens.”77 In her six-year study of law enforcement
officers, she found that “[i]n the vast majority of jurisdictions,
‘officers are more likely to be struck by lightning’ than to
contribute to a settlement or judgment over the course of their
career” because of state laws either requiring or allowing
municipalities to indemnify officers in Section 1983 cases.78 This
argument also applies in the K-12 context because school boards
or districts often “have a statutory duty to hold . . . teacher[s]
harmless from financial loss and expense, including legal fees”
for Section 1983 claims or reimburse school officials “for legal
expenses incurred with respect to his or her duties.”79 Although
one of the main policy justifications for qualified immunity is to
protect government officials from “the expenses of litigation,”
these statutes that authorize teacher indemnification already
provide that protection, rendering qualified immunity
unnecessary to shield school officials from financial burdens.80
Further, Professor Schwartz argues that the doctrine “does
not protect against overdeterrence.”81 One of the main policy
objectives of qualified immunity articulated in Harlow was to
prevent “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”82
However, Professor Schwartz notes that “law enforcement
officers infrequently think about the threat of being sued when
performing their jobs.”83 She also argues that any difficulty in
recruiting police officers is due to “high-profile shootings,
77. Id. at 1804-08, 1813-14.
78. Id. at 1806 (quoting Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 885, 914 (2014)).
79. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 460 (2021); see also Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, 109 GEO. L.J. 229, 269-74
(2020).
80. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
81. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1811.
82. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)).
83. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1811.
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negative publicity about the police, strained relationships with
communities of color, tight budgets, low unemployment rates,
and the reduction of retirement benefits.”84 There has also been
an increased shortage of teachers in the past several years, largely
due to inadequate salaries, “the repeated refrain that US schools
are failing and terrible,” “loss of professional autonomy,” and the
sentiment that teaching is so easy that anyone can do it.85 It is
unlikely that the elimination of qualified immunity would deter
individuals from working in public schools any more than other
factors already do.
Qualified immunity also does not further the policy objective
of providing government officials notice that specific kinds of
conduct may violate individuals’ constitutional rights.86 This is
largely because of “[t]he challenge of identifying clearly
established law.”87 Professor Schwartz notes that “the Supreme
Court’s qualified immunity decisions require that the prior
precedent clearly establishing the law have facts exceedingly
similar to those in the instant case.”88 The Court has stated that
“‘clearly established law’ should not be defined at a high level of
generality.”89 However, by requiring such close factual similarity
between cases, “Supreme Court precedent [may be] the only
surefire way to clearly establish the law.”90 When the Supreme
Court’s Pearson decision allowed lower courts to evade the
constitutional violation issue if they found that no clearlyestablished right existed in a particular case, it created a “vicious
cycle” in which courts grant qualified immunity without ruling on
the underlying constitutional claim, thus not “clearly
establish[ing]” the law.91
This resulting “constitutional
stagnation” only creates more “confusion about the scope of
constitutional rights” and makes it extremely difficult for
84. Id. at 1813.
85. Peter Greene, We Need to Stop Talking About the Teacher Shortage, FORBES (Sept.
5, 2019, 8:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/A6PB-XTTM].
86. See Jacob Heller, Abominable Acts, 34 VT. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (2009).
87. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1814-15.
88. Id. at 1815.
89. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)) (internal quotations
omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1815-16.
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plaintiffs to bring successful claims for constitutional violations
under Section 1983.92
The above criticisms of qualified immunity are concerning
in the public school context.93 Further, there are other protections
that courts have afforded to school officials that still allow
teachers and administrators to exercise discretion in their job
duties.94 The modern application of qualified immunity in the K12 context is inappropriate because it protects school officials’
egregious conduct. The Supreme Court should abolish the
doctrine’s use in cases against public school officials and instead
should simply rely on existing legal standards for students’ claims
of constitutional violations. Courts should continue to use the
T.L.O. standard for school searches95 and the Ingraham standard
for corporal punishment to evaluate Section 1983 claims based on
the Fourth Amendment.96 Concerning Fourteenth Amendment
claims, courts should continue to rely on the burdensome
“shocks-the-conscience” test for substantive Due Process
violations.97 Lastly, courts should continue to evaluate claims for
First Amendment violations under heightened scrutiny, based on
previous Supreme Court decisions analyzing students’ claims for
First Amendment violations.98 These modes of analysis are
sufficiently clear as to provide notice to school personnel about
what actions may or may not impermissibly violate students’
constitutional rights. Relying on these standards without
allowing school officials to raise a qualified immunity defense
will also further clarify the law, which will allow school officials

92. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2015); Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 318 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity]; see also Bendlin,
supra note 43, at 1040, 1047-48 (arguing that the modern application of qualified immunity
allows courts to skip the constitutional question, thus “leav[ing] an allegedly unclear area of
law entirely unsettled, and the state officials remain uncertain whether their actions will
violate someone else’s constitutional rights”).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92.
94. See supra Section II.B.
95. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
96. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
97. See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 51-61.
98. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
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to have even more adequate notice of what kinds of conduct may
or may not be unlawful.
Abolishing qualified immunity will provide more
protections for students’ constitutional rights while still
preserving the policy justifications that qualified immunity was
designed to serve. Recognizing that existing legal standards
clarify what conduct is permissible and what is impermissible for
school officials in performing their job duties will effectively
balance the need “to hold [school] officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly” with the protection of school
personnel from “harassment, distraction, and liability.”99 Further,
the existing legal standards that put school officials on notice of
what they can and cannot do when performing their duties as
educators continue to provide school personnel with discretion in
controlling the learning environment.100 Overall, abolishing
qualified immunity in the K-12 public school context will enable
more successful student Section 1983 claims while continuing to
permit school officials to perform their job duties without fear of
financial liability.
III. STUDENTS’ CLAIMS
A rejection of the doctrine of qualified immunity would not
mean that students’ Section 1983 claims against school officials
“would imperil individual defendants’ pocketbooks and the
government fisc . . . [or] discourage people from accepting”
positions in K-12 public schools.101 Current modes of analysis
that courts use to evaluate students’ constitutional claims are
designed to protect teachers’ discretion in schools so that school
officials can perform their job duties without fear of frivolous
lawsuits or financial liability. This Part will explain the standards
that courts should continue to use to evaluate students’ Section
1983 claims, beginning with claims for bodily injury or violations
of bodily integrity under both the Fourth and Fourteenth

99. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 8 (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)).
100. See infra Part III.
101. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 92, at 315.
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Amendments. It will then discuss students’ claims for violations
of their free speech rights under the First Amendment.
A. Bodily Injury and Violations of Bodily Integrity
Students’ claims for bodily injury or violations of bodily
integrity commonly arise as claims for violations of the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendments.102 Fourth Amendment claims usually
arise in response to strip searches of students,103 and Fourteenth
Amendment claims commonly result from excessive
punishment.104 This Section will analyze claims under each
amendment separately. It will also argue that these standards—
which courts already use—provide adequate notice to school
officials regarding the lawfulness of their conduct because they
are sufficiently clear in defining the scope of permissible conduct
for school officials performing their job duties.

102. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368-69
(2009) (student’s mother claimed assistant principal and school nurse violated student’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches after nurse strip-searched the
student to look for pills); Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir.
2017) (student claimed high school football coach violated student’s substantive Due Process
rights when student received a traumatic brain injury after coach required the student to
participate in practice after student received a violent hit and coach observed concussion
symptoms); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951-52 (11th Cir. 2003) (fifthgrade students claimed teacher violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches after teacher performed strip searches to find missing money);
Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (disabled student’s parents
claimed school-employed physical therapist violated the student’s substantive Due Process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment after restraining student using a blanket-wrapping
technique for over an hour).
103. See generally Holly Hudelson, Spare the Rod, but a Strip Search is Okay? The
Effect of Qualified Immunity and Allowing a Strip Search in School, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 595
(2010) (discussing how the Redding Court analyzed the student’s Fourth Amendment claim
against assistant principal for strip search); Hooks, supra note 48, at 270, 278-79; Thomas,
supra note 48, at 275-77 n.101; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 2 n.7.
104. See Carolyn Peri Weiss, Note, Curbing Violence or Teaching It: Criminal
Immunity for Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1272-73
(1996). However, it is also common for claims of school officials using excessive force
against students to arise under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., J.W. ex rel. Williams v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2018); Preschooler II v. Clark
Cty. Sch. Bd., 479 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Wasserman, supra note 15, at
35-38. For the purposes of this Comment, claims for excessive punishment, including
corporal punishment, will be dealt with under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis because
the majority of courts apply substantive Due Process analyses to these claims. Id. at 35.
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1. Fourth Amendment Claims: Unreasonable Searches
Scholars have noted qualified immunity’s failure to protect
students in cases involving Section 1983 claims for violations of
the Fourth Amendment, particularly in cases involving strip
searches of students by school personnel.105 One reason for the
doctrine’s failure is courts’ misinterpretations or misapplications
of the Supreme Court’s articulation of the law regarding strip
searches of students in T.L.O.106 In that case, a high school
principal searched a student’s purse for cigarettes and drugs.107
Although T.L.O. did not involve strip searches, the Supreme
Court held that school searches are subject to a two-part inquiry
from Terry v. Ohio based on the “reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.”108 This two-part inquiry requires
courts first to consider “whether the . . . action was justified at its
inception” and then determine whether the search as conducted
“was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.”109 The Court then
continued and stated how the Terry standard should apply in
school search cases:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official[] will be “justified at its
inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.110

In Redding, the Court determined that the law from T.L.O.
was unclear because the Circuits interpreted the law differently
and that these differences were significant enough for the
105. See Hudelson, supra note 103, at 597, 602; Hooks, supra note 48, at 285; Thomas,
supra note 48, at 281; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 55.
106. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985); see also Thomas, supra note
48, at 275; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 42-47.
107. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
108. Id. at 341.
109. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
110. Id. at 341-42.
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assistant principal to receive qualified immunity.111 The Court
found that these different interpretations of T.L.O. did not provide
the assistant principal with adequate notice that ordering the strip
search of Savana violated the Fourth Amendment.112 However,
the Court’s failure to clarify the law from T.L.O. has not allowed
the law regarding student searches to become sufficiently clear.
This kind of “circular reasoning” is a common critique of
qualified immunity, even outside cases involving school officials
and students.113
However, two of the dissenters in Redding argued that the
T.L.O. standard outlining reasonable searches of students under
the Fourth Amendment was sufficiently clear to act as a guide for
school officials in determining whether a search of a student was
reasonable.114 First, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the
T.L.O. standard was unambiguous, especially regarding strip
searches of students.115 He even stated, “I have long believed that
‘[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a
nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude.’”116 Using the T.L.O. standard, he
would have determined the strip search of Savana “was both more
intrusive and less justified than the search of the student’s purse
in T. L. O.”117 He also noted that “the clarity of a well-established
right should not depend on whether jurists have misread [the
Supreme Court’s] precedent.”118 Justice Ginsburg also argued in
her dissent that T.L.O. “‘clearly established’ the law governing”
the facts in Redding because “it was not reasonable for [the
assistant principal] to believe that the law permitted” his
“abusive” treatment of Savana.119 This demonstrates that, at least
in the eyes of two Supreme Court Justices, the T.L.O. standard is
111.
112.
113.
114.
part).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
part).

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
Id.
See Bendlin, supra note 43, at 1040.
Redding, 557 U.S. at 379-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 380.
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.5 (1985)).
Id.
Id.
Redding, 557 U.S. at 381-82 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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sufficiently clear to put school officials on notice of what conduct
is and is not permissible when conducting searches of students.
Further, the T.L.O. standard for assessing the reasonableness
of school searches of students preserves discretion for school
officials in performing their daily duties.120 Alysa Koloms notes
that the Supreme Court’s T.L.O. standard “heavily favors the
disciplinary authority of the school administration.”121 In fact,
much of the Court’s reasoning for the reasonableness standard
was to preserve the school’s “freedom to maintain order in the
school . . . .”122 The majority in T.L.O. even stated that the goal
of the reasonableness standard was to “strike the balance between
the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the
school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in
which learning can take place[.]”123 Because the T.L.O. standard
was formulated in part to protect school officials’ discretion in
disciplining students, qualified immunity for public school
personnel is unnecessary to protect their discretion, contrary to
the Court’s suggestion in Wood.124
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Excessive Punishment
The majority of claims for excessive punishment arise as
claims for violations of a student’s substantive Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.125 In the seminal corporal
punishment case, Ingraham, the Supreme Court held “where
school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately
decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child
and inflicting appreciable physical pain . . . Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated.”126 However, the
Court failed to extend this to the substantive component of the
120. Alysa B. Koloms, Note, Stripping Down the Reasonableness Standard: The
Problems with Using In Loco Parentis to Define Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 169, 189 (2010).
121. Id. at 191.
122. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-342 (1985).
123. Id. at 340.
124. Id.; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975) (holding that “the school
disciplinary process . . . necessarily involves the exercise of discretion . . . .”).
125. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 35.
126. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
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Due Process Clause and expressly rejected the notion that these
claims implicated the Eighth Amendment, leaving lower courts
unsure as to how to deal with excessive or corporal punishment
cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.127
Circuit courts that deal with claims for excessive punishment
as an alleged violation of the student’s substantive Due Process
rights usually rely on Johnson v. Glick, a case from the Second
Circuit that first applied the “shocks-the-conscience” test to these
claims.128 Although that case involved incarcerated persons and
correctional officers rather than students and school officials,
other circuits have extended the Second Circuit’s four-factor test
to students’ claims of excessive force.129 The Glick “shocks-theconscience” test requires courts to:
[L]ook to such factors as the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.130

In these cases, the stringent analysis courts use to evaluate
the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity imposes an
additional barrier to students’ claims.
For example, in
Heidemann v. Rother, a student’s parents brought a claim alleging
a Fourteenth Amendment violation after a school-employed
physical therapist used a blanket wrapping technique to
physically restrain their mentally and physically disabled nineyear-old daughter for over an hour at a time.131 The blanket
wrapping technique bound the student’s body “with a blanket
such that she could not use her arms, legs, or hands.”132 When
the student’s mother found her at the school the first time, the
student had “flies crawling in and around her mouth and nose.”133
The second time her mother found her, the physical therapist had

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 659 n.12; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 54.
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1033-34; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 56-58.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
84 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
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wrapped the student so tightly that her mother could not remove
the blanket without help.134 Shockingly, the Eighth Circuit held
that the physical therapist was entitled to qualified immunity
against the student’s Section 1983 claim because the “treatment
was . . . within the scope of professionally accepted choices” and
was not a “substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards . . . .”135
Had qualified immunity not been available in Heidemann,
the court’s use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test from Glick
would have resulted in the physical therapist’s liability under
Section 1983.136 “[T]he need for the application of force” was
low, if not nonexistent.137 In fact, the facts of Heidemann provide
no evidence that the physical therapist needed to administer the
blanket wrapping technique except for the presence of the
student’s disabilities and the professional judgment of the
physical therapist.138 Therefore, “the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used” was disproportionate
because no force was necessary and the restraint of the student—
so tight that her mother could not remove the blanket without
assistance—was excessive.139 Further, “the extent of injury” was
substantial, especially considering the presence of flies in and
around the student’s nose and mouth.140 Moreover, although
there was no evidence that the punishment was inflicted
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm,” it was also not “applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline.”141 Therefore, had qualified immunity not
applied, the nine-year-old student and her family would have been
able to bring a successful claim for a violation of the student’s
substantive Due Process rights under Section 1983.
Courts’ use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test in evaluating
students’ right to be free from excessive punishment without the
interference of a qualified immunity defense would allow
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 1030-31.
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id.
Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1025-26.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033; Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1026.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033; Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1026.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
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students to bring more successful claims for egregious violations
of their substantive Due Process rights while still allowing some
level of discretion for school personnel. The “shocks-theconscience” test is a high bar to clear, leaving much room for
school officials to implement appropriate disciplinary measures
to protect the students and the learning environment. Further, the
use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test will continue to protect
school officials from the fear of frivolous lawsuits interfering
with their ability to perform their jobs. However, for conduct that
is completely outrageous, the “shocks-the-conscience” standard
will still serve to protect students.
This standard will also allow school officials to have “fair
warning” regarding what kinds of conduct are and are not
permissible.142 The “shocks-the-conscience” test is a stringent
standard, one that is based on “our common moral intuitions.”143
One does not have to be a constitutional scholar to recognize that
some conduct is so egregious that it violates an individual’s
constitutional rights.144 The “shocks-the-conscience” standard
reflects that sentiment and informs public officials that some
conduct is so horrible that it cannot possibly pass constitutional
muster, even without the protection of qualified immunity.
B. First Amendment Violations
The qualified immunity defense is also frequently raised in
students’ claims against school officials for violations of their
First Amendment rights.145 However, it often creates an
142. Heller, supra note 86, at 320.
143. Id. at 356.
144. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583, 662 (1998) (arguing that some conduct “contains indicia of its own
blameworthiness”).
145. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (school
administrators entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for violation of her
First Amendment free speech rights after preventing her from running for student
government because of her off-campus speech and prohibiting her from wearing a
homemade printed t-shirt at a school assembly); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364-65
(5th Cir. 2011) (principal entitled to qualified immunity when student brought a claim for
violation of her First Amendment rights after he restricted her from distributing religious
materials outside of school hours to a group of students); C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity
after student claimed teacher violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
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additional obstacle for students who bring claims against school
officials under Section 1983 for First Amendment violations.146
In fact, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he law governing
restrictions on student speech can be difficult and confusing, even
for lawyers, law professors, and judges. The relevant Supreme
Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts often struggle to
determine which standard applies in any particular case.”147 One
First Amendment scholar notes that the Pearson Court’s decision
to allow courts to skip the analysis of whether there was a
constitutional violation and directly determine whether the right
was clearly established posed serious problems for student
speech.148 In particular, he argued that “[t]he Pearson decision
gives judges the discretion to avoid tough constitutional questions
and decide cases based on the ‘clearly established’ prong . . . .”149
Because of this problem, another argument is that “First
Amendment values and constitutional values in general would be
better served by an approach that obliges courts to decide
constitutional questions.”150 Abolishing qualified immunity
would allow courts to rule on these constitutional issues without
dealing with the stringent “clearly established” standard that
requires extreme factual similarity to find that the right was
“clearly established” at the time of the school officials’ conduct.
The traditional standard for analyzing student speech under
the First Amendment comes from Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.151 In that case, the
when teacher made statements hostile to religion while discussing creationism in history
class); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.
2004) (teacher and principal not entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim
for violation of his First Amendment free speech rights after school officials paddled student
for raising his fist during a daily flag salute instead of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance).
146. See Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of
Tinker in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 916-17 (2012); David
L. Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment
Law, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 125, 136 (2011) [hereinafter Hudson, Jr., Pearson v.
Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law].
147. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 353.
148. Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First
Amendment Law, supra note 146, at 136.
149. Id.
150. David L. Hudson, Jr., 4th Amendment Ruling Could Influence First Amendment
Law, FREEDOM F. INST. (Jan. 27, 2009), [https://perma.cc/MXW6-TPXE].
151. 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969).
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Supreme Court ruled that a public school district could not
prohibit students from wearing black armbands at school in
protest of the Vietnam War.152 The Court also announced that
student speech should only be prohibited if it threatens a
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities . . . .”153
After the Tinker decision, the Court carved out three
exceptions to the Tinker doctrine.154 The first exception applies
to “offensively lewd and indecent speech.”155 The Court held that
public schools may prohibit this type of speech because it “would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”156 The
second exception includes student newspapers and other schoolsponsored speech.157 The Court determined that “school officials
were entitled to regulate the contents of [the newspaper] in any
reasonable manner” when “students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the imprimatur of
the school.”158
The last exception is in the Court’s second most recent
student speech decision, Morse v. Frederick, in which the Court
took a significant step away from the traditional Tinker standard
but did not abandon it altogether.159 In that case, a school
principal suspended a student for displaying a banner with the
phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”160 Chief Justice Robert’s
majority held that the principal did not violate the student’s First
Amendment rights because the principal interpreted the banner to
advocate for illegal drug use.161 The Court recognized that
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed,
perhaps compelling’ interest” and that “[t]he First Amendment
does not require schools to tolerate at school events student
152. Id. at 510-11.
153. Id. at 512-14.
154. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
155. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
156. Id.
157. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
158. Id. at 270-71.
159. 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007).
160. Id. at 397-98.
161. Id. at 402.
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expression that contributes to” the dangers of student drug use,
thus creating the third exception to the Tinker standard.162
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in part and dissent in part in
Morse would not have undertaken this analysis under the First
Amendment.163 Instead, Justice Breyer would have held that
qualified immunity protected the principal in this case because
“she did not clearly violate the law during her confrontation with
the student.”164 The majority suggested it did not decide the case
based on qualified immunity because the principal asked for
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages (and
qualified immunity is only available as a defense in cases
requesting money damages).165 However, Justice Breyer’s
approach of avoiding the constitutional question in favor of
finding that the principal was entitled to qualified immunity
because there was no “clearly established” right is precisely the
problem that the qualified immunity doctrine poses.166 Without
negotiating the highly discretionary qualified immunity analysis,
courts could rely solely on Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
to evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims for violations of their
First Amendment rights, and the law in these areas would become
clearer.
Although the outcome in Morse would likely have been the
same with or without a qualified immunity analysis, lower court
opinions have demonstrated that qualified immunity is
unnecessary in cases involving Section 1983 claims for First
Amendment violations.167 Lower courts tend to rely on Tinker’s
162. Id. at 407, 408, 410 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)).
163. Id. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Morse, 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 400 n.1 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hudson, Jr.,
Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law, supra note
146, at 136.
167. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (school
administrators entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for violation of her
First Amendment free speech rights after preventing her from running for student
government because of her off-campus speech and prohibiting her from wearing a
homemade printed t-shirt at a school assembly); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364-65
(5th Cir. 2011) (principal entitled to qualified immunity when student brought a claim for
violation of her First Amendment rights after he restricted her from distributing religious
materials outside of school hours to a group of students); C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano
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“substantial disruption” standard when analyzing students’
claims for violations of their First Amendment free speech rights
“unless the speech is lewd, advocates drug use, or bears the
school’s imprimatur.”168
For example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit
granted qualified immunity to a principal and a superintendent of
a school after they prohibited a student from running for class
secretary and from wearing a homemade printed shirt stating
“Team Avery” to a school assembly based on the student’s offcampus speech calling the school administrators “douchebags”
and urging other students to take action “to piss [them] off
more.”169 Under the Tinker analysis, the court held “it was
objectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that [the
student]’s behavior was potentially disruptive of student
government functions . . .” and thus, the student did not have a
clearly established right “not to be prohibited from participating
in a voluntary, extracurricular activity because of offensive offcampus speech . . . .”170 Despite the student’s reliance on a
Supreme Court case in which “public school students were
punished for publishing and distributing to their peers a lewd,
satirical newspaper” off campus, the court found that this did not
create a “clearly established” right despite the substantial factual
similarities in the cases.171 If the school administrators had been
unable to raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the
student would have had a greater chance to prevail because the
Second Circuit would have had more freedom to compare prior

Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity
after student claimed teacher violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
when teacher made statements hostile to religion while discussing creationism in history
class). But see Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004)
(teacher and principal not entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for
violation of his First Amendment free speech rights after school officials paddled student for
raising his fist during a daily flag salute instead of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance).
168. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Lee
Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 395, 404 (2011).
169. 642 F.3d at 340-41, 351, 356.
170. Id. at 346, 351 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (D. Conn.
2009)).
171. Id. at 346.
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cases with similar facts to the case at issue when applying the
Tinker standard.
The previous example also demonstrates the discretion the
Tinker standard affords to school personnel in determining
whether to limit particular student speech.172 The standard
“requires courts to defer to educators’ reasonable determinations
of what speech may cause a substantial disruption . . . .”173 This
is exactly the type of deference that the Supreme Court was trying
to protect in Wood when they extended qualified immunity to
protect school officials.174 The Tinker standard and the three
other exceptions to protect student speech are also sufficiently
clear to provide officials with “fair warning” about what conduct
is unlawful when dealing with student speech issues.175
Therefore, qualified immunity is unnecessary and may actually
present additional challenges to students bringing Section 1983
claims for First Amendment violations.176
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ABOLISHING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
The biggest challenge to abolishing qualified immunity in
K-12 schools and simply relying on existing legal standards to
evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims is that scholars argue that
these standards are unclear and thus do not provide school
officials with “fair warning”177 that their conduct is unlawful.178
Regarding Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable searches,
David Blickenstaff argues that the T.L.O. standard is “too lenient
172. See Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student
Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008).
173. Id.
174. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
175. See Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 171, 182-88 (2012); Goldman, supra note 168, at 405; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739-41 (2002).
176. See Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First
Amendment Law, supra note 146, at 136-39.
177. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41.
178. See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 41 (arguing that the T.L.O. standard to evaluate
strip searches of students is unclear); Jett, supra note 146, at 897-98, 918-19 (arguing that
the Tinker standard is unclear as applied to student speech cases).
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and too ill-defined” to apply to strip searches of students at
school.179 However, Justices Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s dissents
in Redding demonstrate why this view is incorrect.180 They
opined that there is disagreement about the T.L.O. standard not
because the T.L.O test is ambiguous but rather because lower
courts misapply the standard.181 Therefore, if lower courts were
to apply the T.L.O. test correctly, school officials would have “fair
warning” about what is and is not permissible behavior when
conducting student searches because the standard is sufficiently
clear to provide that notice.182
Regarding First Amendment claims, a common critique of
the Tinker standard is that it is unclear how it applies in student
speech cases, particularly regarding online or off-campus student
speech.183 Allison Belnap notes that the Tinker standard is
ambiguous because it is uncertain whether a school needs to show
“specific and concrete evidence” that previous similar speech has
“resulted in a material and substantial interference with school
operations,” “a well-founded belief that the disruption will occur,”
or “merely a foreseeable risk that the speech would result in a
material and substantial disruption . . . .”184 Another scholar
notes that lower courts have applied Tinker differently and
reached different results in online school speech cases because of
“the difficulty in applying traditional school-speech
jurisprudence to cyberspeech.”185
However, these arguments highlight the fact that lower
courts are misapplying the Supreme Court’s precedent in Tinker
rather than the standard’s ambiguity.186 Professor Dryden notes
that lower courts run into trouble when they only apply one of
Tinker’s prongs rather than both.187 If courts applied both prongs
179. Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 47.
180. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380-82 (2009).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19.
182. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
183. See generally Jett, supra note 146; Allison Belnap, Comment, Tinker at a
Breaking Point: Why the Specter of Cyberbullying Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public
School Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech, 2011 BYU L. REV. 501, 509 (2011).
184. Belnap, supra note 183, at 523-24.
185. Jett, supra note 146, at 897.
186. See Dryden, supra note 175, at 182-88; Goldman, supra note 168, at 405.
187. Dryden, supra note 175, at 215-16.
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of the Tinker standard in analyzing students’ claims for First
Amendment violations:
[S]chool officials would not be permitted to proscribe any
speech . . . unless they could articulate objective facts which
would demonstrate that the expression created, or was likely
to create, a substantial disruption of school operations or the
expression interfered with the rights of others on more than
just a temporary and superficial level.188

This hearkens back to Justice Stevens’s comment in Redding
that “the clarity of a well-established right should not depend on
whether jurists have misread [the Supreme Court’s]
precedents.”189 In other words, if applied correctly, the Tinker
standard is sufficiently clear to put school officials on notice of
what kinds of conduct are and are not permissible when dealing
with student speech issues.
Relying on T.L.O., the highly deferential “shocks-theconscience” test, and Tinker and its progeny for analyzing
students’ Section 1983 claims will still provide school officials
notice of conduct that is unconstitutional in discharging their
duties without the need for qualified immunity. The Supreme
Court has stated that “officials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.”190 The standards under which courts analyze
students’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
sufficiently clear to provide school officials with “fair warning”
of what conduct is and is not permissible.191 Further, the
argument that qualified immunity is designed to allow public
officials, particularly law enforcement officers, to make splitsecond decisions is not as pressing in the K-12 context.192 It is
much more likely that teachers and school administrators have
time to consult attorneys, supervisors, and co-workers about a

188. Id. at 215.
189. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380 (2009) (Stephens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
191. Id.
192. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 671 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“Officers assigned to protect public officials must make singularly swift, on the spot,
decisions whether the safety of the person they are guarding is in jeopardy.”).
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particular method they intend to use to discipline students or
prevent distractions in the learning environment.
Even if these standards are not sufficiently clear to provide
school officials with notice about the lawfulness of their conduct,
it has been noted that public officials “do not pause in the course
of conduct to ponder whether their behavior violates the
Constitution and can therefore subject them to federal liability
. . . .”193 Therefore, there is an argument that “providing [public
officials] with legal or constitutional notice is of little practical
use” because state actors do not consider “federal forum[s] or
attorney’s fees” when deciding how to handle a particular
situation.194 Instead, public officials, “like most people, make
decisions based on their conceptions of right and wrong,
buttressed perhaps by a rough sense of the law.”195 When viewed
in this light, qualified immunity may not be necessary to provide
notice to school officials about lawful and unlawful conduct
because these officials do not rely on specific articulations of the
law when making decisions in the classroom.
Students will also receive more expansive constitutional
protections if the Supreme Court abolishes qualified immunity in
the K-12 context. According to the Wood Court:
The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes which were
not unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances would
undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious school
decisionmaker from exercising his judgment independently,
forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long-term
interest of the school and the students.196

Thus, qualified immunity in the school setting serves to
protect teachers and other school officials from costly litigation
by allowing them to exercise discretion in their day-to-day
duties.197 However, the legal standards previously discussed
provide that same level of protection of school officials’
discretion.198
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Heller, supra note 86, at 317.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975).
See id.
See supra Part III.
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Rejecting qualified immunity for school officials would not
affect any other protections the law has already afforded to school
personnel, such as the law’s refusal to recognize any duty to
protect or supervise students.199 Some cases have applied
qualified immunity in cases alleging a failure to protect or
supervise students, and these cases usually result in awarding
qualified immunity to the school officials.200 For example, in
Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, a student brought suit
against his football coach under a failure to protect theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment after the student suffered a traumatic
brain injury when the coach knew the student sustained multiple
hard hits in practice and failed to implement the policies required
when a student suffered a head injury.201 The court held that the
football coach was entitled to qualified immunity because “it was
not so plainly obvious that requiring a student-athlete, fully
clothed in protective gear, to continue to participate in practice
after sustaining a violent hit and exhibiting concussion symptoms
implicated the student athlete’s constitutional rights.”202 The
Third Circuit repeatedly emphasized the fact that although there
were other cases involving student-athletes and coaches brought
under Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims, none of
the facts of those cases was similar enough to create a “clearly
established” right.203 However, without having to undertake a
qualified immunity analysis, the court would have been allowed
to rely more heavily on the other cases, and thus may have
allowed the student to prevail on his claim for a constitutional
violation.
Further, abolishing qualified immunity for school officials
would not affect the protections that the stringent Monell standard
199. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1989).
200. See, e.g., Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2017)
(student claimed high-school football coach violated student’s substantive Due Process
rights when student received a traumatic brain injury after coach required the student to
participate in practice after student received a violent hit and coach observed concussion
symptoms); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1995) (superintendent
entitled to qualified immunity after a classmate sexually assaulted the student because the
court found no special relationship existed that would create a duty to protect).
201. 872 F.3d at 169-70.
202. Id. at 174.
203. Id. at 173-74.
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provides to school districts and school officials.204 School
districts often indemnify teachers and other school administrators
when students bring claims under Section 1983.205 If a school
district or school board indemnifies a school official, another
avenue for students to bring Section 1983 claims is against a
school district or school board under Monell, which requires that
(1) a state actor “violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” and
(2) the municipal entity be responsible for the violation because
of the entity’s policies, practices, or customs.206 Therefore, even
with the availability of qualified immunity, teachers are rarely
responsible for the financial burden that comes from Section 1983
liability. Even without qualified immunity, this framework would
preserve the doctrine’s goal of protecting public officials from
financial liability.207
The strict “deliberate indifference”
requirement under Monell also serves to protect school districts
from financial liability, meaning that eliminating qualified
immunity in the K-12 context would not lead to more successful
suits against school districts if suits brought against individual
school officials fail.208
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should abolish qualified immunity in
favor of relying on existing legal standards when analyzing
Section 1983 claims against school officials for violating
students’ constitutional rights. The modern application of the
doctrine fails to protect students from constitutional violations
because it requires too strict a reliance on cases with substantially
similar facts. The T.L.O. standard for Fourth Amendment claims,
204. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1989).
205. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 460 (2021).
206. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 160-61.
207. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting that “the expenses of
litigation” is one of qualified immunity’s protections afforded to public officials).
208. See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. This is important because one way that school
districts receive the money they could use to pay damages, court costs, and attorneys’ fees is
from taxes levied against the communities in which they operate. See Public School Revenue
Sources, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., [https://perma.cc/J57T-FRKZ] (May 2021). Thus,
Monell’s strict standard protects school districts, the school officials these districts may
indemnify, and the families of students who attend those school districts.
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the “shocks-the-conscience” standard for Fourteenth Amendment
claims, and the Tinker standard for First Amendment claims more
effectively balance students’ interests and the need for adequate
notice about what constitutes unlawful conduct. These tests will
also preserve discretion for school officials to perform their job
duties effectively. Further, eliminating qualified immunity in
cases against school officials would not leave them entirely
unprotected from students’ Section 1983 claims.
Qualified immunity is not only a problem in K-12 schools.209
For years, scholars have noted the serious problems the doctrine
poses, especially in excessive force claims asserted against law
enforcement.210 After the tragic death of George Floyd in May
2020 while in police custody,211 many critics renewed the call for
a repeal of qualified immunity, especially in the law enforcement
context.212 The U.S. House of Representatives even passed a bill
entitled the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, which
would amend Section 1983 to state that qualified immunity can
no longer be a defense for law enforcement officers.213 However,
not everyone is on board with the idea of abolishing qualified
immunity.214 Considering the Supreme Court’s reluctance to

209. Courts’ applications of qualified immunity are problematic in all areas, not just
K-12 public schools. However, it is important to focus on qualified immunity in the school
context because schools are charged with the important task of “educating the young for
citizenship[, which] is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
210. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 17981800; Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 6-7, 22; John P. Gross,
Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 67, 67 (2017).
211. See Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2021, 9:48 AM), [https://perma.cc/8BR5-36XX].
212. See John Kramer, George Floyd and Beyond: How “Qualified Immunity”
Enables Bad Policing, INST. FOR JUST. (June 3, 2020), [https://perma.cc/AY7K-MYM3];
Tyler Olsen, George Floyd Case Revives ‘Qualified Immunity’ Debate, as Supreme Court
Could Soon Take Up Issue, FOX NEWS (May 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/N7TX-EJL5].
213. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102
(2021). As of April 19, 2021, only the U.S. House of Representative has passed this bill.
214. See Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 92, at 315 & nn.18-19
(describing the Supreme Court and other scholars’ “strongest defenses of qualified
immunity”).
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address the issue for police officers, it may be a while before there
is any further progress in the movement to abolish the doctrine.215
The next time the Court addresses the issue, however, it may
be more feasible to start in the K-12 public school context than in
the law enforcement context. School officials are not often faced
with situations in which they must make life or death decisions as
law enforcement officers are.216 Abolishing qualified immunity
for K-12 school officials could be a starting point for the Court to
see how public officials may react to not having the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity in their back pockets when making
decisions within the scope of their employment.
Ultimately, regardless of how abolishing qualified immunity
in the K-12 context may affect other public actors, the Supreme
Court must take a hard look at how the doctrine protects egregious
conduct by school officials and prevents students from bringing
successful Section 1983 claims. Students do not and should not
“shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”217
Courts’ modern applications of qualified immunity in K-12
school cases dilute this sentiment and leave students and their
families without a legal remedy in the face of more and more
violations of their constitutional rights.

215. See Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Case Over ‘Qualified Immunity’
For Police, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2021, 8:48 AM), [https://perma.cc/57U9-CAFM].
216. See supra text accompanying notes 190-93; see also Justin Driver, Schooling
Qualified Immunity, EDUC. NEXT, [https://perma.cc/6M3Q-PY4J] (Mar. 23, 2021) (“The
teacher’s paddle is . . . a far cry from the officer’s gun.”).
217. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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MORNINGSIDE CHURCH, INC. v. RUTLEDGE1
In a case involving a Missouri televangelist, a purported
COVID-19 cure, and state officials from Arkansas and California,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Jim Bakker is the lead pastor at Morningside Church in
Stone County, Missouri and the host of the Jim Bakker Show—a
nationally broadcast television program produced in conjunction
with Morningside Church and Morningside Church Productions
(collectively, “Morningside”). Bakker is a resident of Stone
County, and both Morningside entities are headquartered there.
In February 2020, Bakker began advertising a product
named “Silver Solution” on the Jim Bakker Show as a “proven”
COVID-19 remedy. This attracted scrutiny from law enforcement
officials across the country. Los Angeles, California City
Attorney Mike Feuer; Arkansas Attorney General Leslie
Rutledge; Merced County, California District Attorney Kimberly
Lewis; and San Joaquin County, California District Attorney Tori
Verber Salazar opened investigations into Bakker’s
advertisements for potential violations of California’s false
advertising law, Arkansas’s deceptive trade practices law, and
California’s Business and Professions Code, respectively.
Bakker and Morningside filed suit against the four officials
in the Western District of Missouri, alleging the investigations
violated their constitutional rights and that the relevant state
statutes were unconstitutional. The district court dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Morningside appealed.
Reviewing the decision de novo, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that due process requires a defendant have minimum contacts
with a forum state for that state to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction. The court then enumerated the Eighth Circuit’s five1. Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge, 9 F.4th 615 (8th Cir. 2021).
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factor test to assess the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts: “(1)
the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the
quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; and (5) [the] convenience of the parties.”2
The court additionally evaluated specific jurisdiction using
the ‘effects test’ set forth in Calder v. Jones,3 which extends
specific personal jurisdiction to nonresident defendants who
commit intentional torts when their effects are “felt primarily
within the forum state.”4 The contacts that Bakker and
Morningside alleged were sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendants in the Western District of
Missouri were the letters and telephone calls that the defendants
had directed toward them requesting information related to the
Silver Solution advertisements.
Using the five-factor test, the court held that the first two
factors in this instance “weigh[ed] heavily against personal
jurisdiction.”5 It reasoned that the communications at issue
occurred in Missouri merely because Bakker lived there and
Morningside was headquartered there; therefore, Bakker and
Morningside were “the only link between defendant[s] and the
forum.”6 The court likewise held that the third factor disfavored
personal jurisdiction, as the communications failed to
demonstrate contacts with the forum itself. Regarding the fourth
and fifth “less important” factors, the court held that “while
Missouri has an interest in establishing a forum for its residents,
that forum is an inconvenient one for the defendants, who are not
from Missouri and have no business in the state.”7

2. Id. at 619 (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. FedNat Holding Co., 928 F.3d 718,
720 (8th Cir. 2019)).
3. See id. at 620 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
4. Id. (citation omitted). Walden v. Fiore refined the effects test, adding two
limitations: (1) the defendant must have created the contacts with the forum state himself;
and (2) the contacts must go to the defendant’s relationship with the forum itself and not
merely to persons who happen to reside there. 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014).
5. Morningside Church, Inc., 9 F.4th at 620-21.
6. Id. at 620 (quotation omitted).
7. Id. at 621 (quoting Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 2020)).
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MYERS v. FECHER8
According to this December 2021 decision from the
Arkansas Supreme Court, the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) requires that communications between a state
employee and another on a cloud-based messenger application
that are of a mixed public and private nature must be sorted to
determine which messages qualify as “public records” under the
Act and are therefore “open to inspection and copying.”9
In December 2019, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette renewed
a 2017 FOIA request seeking correspondence between former
Department of Information Systems (“DIS”) Director Mark
Myers and any representatives of Cisco Systems since January
2015. The requested records included emails, text messages, and
communications saved on Blackberry Messenger, a private, thirdparty cloud-based application. Myers and Jane Doe, an employee
of a technology company that did business with DIS, contested
the release of the three thousand-some-odd Blackberry
Messenger messages on grounds that they were not entirely
public records; rather, they comprised of private, “deeply
personal exchanges, musings and information” unrelated to the
performance of official functions.10
The Democrat-Gazette argued the messages were public
records because they were connected to public business and were
stored on a server belonging to DIS. The circuit court agreed,
stating that “the business and personal matters were so
intertwined that all of the messages were ‘public records[.]’”11
The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a stay of the judgment
pending appeal.
The Court considered two issues on appeal: (1) whether “the
circuit court erred in finding that the [messages] were ‘public
records’ pursuant to FOIA;” and (2) whether “the circuit court
erred in finding that the public interest outweighed privacy
rights.”12 Addressing the first issue, the Court found that:
8. Myers v. Fecher, 2021 Ark. 230, at 1, 635 S.W.3d 495.
9. Id. at 8, 635 S.W.3d at 499 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A)).
10. Id. at 4, 635 S.W.3d at 497.
11. Id. at 5, 635 S.W.3d at 498.
12. Id. at 6, 635 S.W.3d 498.
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[B]ecause these messages are individual, sent on different
days, and sent at different times, the messages are not all
interrelated and inextricably intertwined as found by the
circuit court. Rather, the messages in this case are capable
of being sorted into private-and public-record
categories. Therefore, the circuit court clearly erred by not
determining whether each individual message met the
definition of a “public record.”13

The Court did not reach Myers and Doe’s remaining
arguments on appeal, and instead, opined that “once the circuit
court has determined which, if any, individual messages are
‘public records,’ Myers and Doe may raise their right-to-privacy
arguments [at which time] the circuit court must conduct the
appropriate weighing test for each item before ordering
disclosure.”14
SLUYTER v. WOOD GUYS, LLC15
The Arkansas Court of Appeals considered the recently
amended mechanics’- and materialmen’s-lien statutes in this
November 2021 decision involving a dispute between
homeowners and a contractor over the refinishing of hardwood
flooring in a private residence.
Aaron and Cheryl Sluyter orally contracted with Wood
Guys, LLC (“Wood Guys”) for the replacement and refinishing
of hardwood flooring in their Rogers home. After Wood Guys
completed the work in March 2019, a dispute arose regarding the
quality of the work performed and the amount owed by the
Sluyters. In response to their refusal to pay the demanded
amount, Wood Guys filed a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien
on the property and then filed a complaint to foreclose on the lien,
ultimately seeking damages for breach of contract or,
alternatively, recovery under the theory of quantum meruit for
work done on the Sluyters’ property. The Sluyters argued that
Wood Guys was barred from bringing any claims because it did
not provide the necessary preconstruction lien notice.
13. Myers, 2021 Ark. 230, at 11, 635 S.W.3d at 500-01.
14. Id. at 11, 635 S.W.3d at 501.
15. Sluyter v. Wood Guys, LLC, 2021 Ark. App. 442, at 1, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.
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The circuit court found that Wood Guys was exempt from
the notice requirement under Arkansas Code Annotated § 18-44115 (requiring a “residential contractor” to give preconstruction
lien notice) because it was a “home improvement contractor,” not
a “residential contractor.”16 The court reasoned that the term
“residential contractor” used in §18-44-115 was synonymous
with the term “residential building contractor” defined in
Arkansas Code Annotated § 17-25-502(3). Because the former
term is not defined in the statute, but the latter term is, Wood Guys
did not fall within the definition of a “residential building
contractor.”
On appeal, the court agreed that Wood Guys was not a
residential building contractor but disagreed that the two terms
are interchangeable. The court opted for a broader definition of
residential contractor, opining that Wood Guys was assuredly a
“contractor” as that term is defined in the statute—Wood Guys
directly contracted with the Sluyters, who were owners of a
single-family residence, for the repair and replacement of wood
flooring on the property. “[C]ommon usage of the word
‘residence’ refers to a place or dwelling in which a person or
people live[,]” and the Sluyters’ home certainly fit that
description.17 Ergo, the Court held that Wood Guys was a
residential contractor subject to the statutory requirement to
provide lien notice prior to the commencement of work.
Furthermore, the appellate court agreed with the circuit
court’s finding that Wood Guys was a “home improvement
contractor,” but it held that this characterization barred the
contractor from being a lien claimant under the direct-sale
exception to the notice requirement. This exception provides that
the lien notice requirement does not apply if the transaction is a
direct sale. A direct sale is a transaction in which: (1) “[t]he
property owner orders materials or services from the lien
claimant;” and (2) “[t]he lien claimant is not a home improvement
contractor . . . or a residential building contractor[.]”18 The
appellate court opined that the plain language of the statute
16. Id. at 3, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
17. Id. at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
18. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___ (emphasis added) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44115(a)(8)(B)).
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stipulates that a contractor that is a home improvement contractor
may not avail itself of the direct-sale exception. Since Wood
Guys was a home improvement contractor, the preconstructionlien-notice requirement was undisturbed.
At bottom, because Wood Guys was a residential contractor
and a home improvement contractor, it was required to provide
the Sluyters with lien notice prior to commencing the work on the
wood floors in their home under Arkansas Code Annotated § 1844-115(a). Wood Guys did not give notice, so it was barred from
bringing an action to enforce its contractual and quantum meruit
claims.
The Court concluded by noting that the General Assembly
amended the statute in 2021 to remove the bar against equitable
claims for residential contractors who fail to provide
preconstruction lien notice. “While this legislative amendment
comes too late to aid Wood Guys, it now provides a way for
residential contractors to seek redress, even when they fail to
execute and deliver preconstruction lien notice.”19
SILAS HEFFLEY

19. Id. at 9, ___ S.W.3d at ___.

Subscriptions and Claims: Effective volume 56, issue 1, the Arkansas Law Review will be
published quarterly for $25.00 per year ($30.00 per year for foreign delivery). Domestic claims for
nonreceipt of issues should be made within 90 days of the month of publication, overseas claims
within 180 days; thereafter, the regular back issue rate will be charged for replacement. Address all
subscription and claim correspondence to the Managing Editor of the Arkansas Law Review.
Single and Back Issues: Single current issues will be available for $9.00 (plus $1.00 postage and
handling) from the Managing Editor of the Arkansas Law Review. Back issues may be purchased
from William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209- 1987.
Copyright: Copyright © 2022 by the Arkansas Law Review, Inc. Except as otherwise provided,
articles herein may be duplicated for classroom use, provided: (1) copies are distributed at or below
cost; (2) the author and journal are identified; (3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy;
and (4) the Arkansas Law Review, Inc. is notified of the use.
Binding: Binding is available at $31.00 per volume (plus $4.00 postage and handling; decorative
gold lines available for an additional $4.00 per volume) from the Managing Editor of the Arkansas
Law Review.
Manuscripts: The editors of the Arkansas Law Review encourage the submission of unsolicited
articles, comments, essays, and reviews. Manuscripts should be sent to the attention of the
Executive Editor at lawrev@uark.edu. Authors should include a current curriculum vitae.
The Arkansas Law Review also accepts submissions through its Scholastica academic publishing
accounts.
Exclusive Submissions: The Arkansas Law Review will be accepting exclusive submissions which
will be considered on an expedited basis. Publication decisions will be made within one week of the
date of submission. By submitting exclusively to us, authors agree to accept a publication offer
should the Arkansas Law Review extend one. Authors should submit their manuscript to the
attention of the Managing Editor of the Arkansas Law Review at arkansaslawreview@gmail.com
with “Exclusive Submission” in the subject line.
For 2022, we will actively consider articles from February 1, 2022 to April 30, 2022.
Form: Please cite this issue of the Arkansas Law Review as 74 ARK. L. REV. ___ (2022). Citations
in the Arkansas Law Review conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (21st ed.
2020).
Disclaimer: The Arkansas Law Review is a student-edited journal. Any and all opinions published
herein are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the
Arkansas Law Review, Inc., the University of Arkansas School of Law, or any person other than the
author.

The Arkansas Law Review (ISSN 0004-1831) is published quarterly at the
University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701-1201, by the
Arkansas Law Review, Inc., and the School of Law of the University of Arkansas.
Printed at Joe Christensen, Inc., Lincoln, Nebraska 68521. Periodicals postage
paid in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and additional mailing offices. The Arkansas Law
Review is a member of the National Conference of Law Reviews.
Arkansas Law Review
University of Arkansas School of Law
Leflar Law Center, Waterman Hall
Corner of Maple and Garland Avenues
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701-1201
Telephone: (479) 575-5610
POSTMASTER. Send address changes to the Managing Editor, Arkansas Law
Review, University of Arkansas School of Law, 1045 W. Maple St., Fayetteville,
Arkansas 72701-1201.

